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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and key questions
Although periods of sustained economic growth are generally associated with re-
ductions in absolute poverty, such reductions do not necessarily bring about an
equitable distribution of incomes. For example, in Germany, average real incomes
have increased by around 10 percent over the last 25 years. However, while only a
slight income increase occurred at the bottom of the income distribution, incomes
of the richest 10 percent of the population have increased considerably.1 This phe-
nomenon of an increasing dispersion of incomes is not unique to Germany. A recent
OECD (2011) report shows that income inequality has increased in most developed
countries over the last two decades (see Figure 1.1.1). In fact, according to the
International Social Survey Programme (IISP) 2009, the majority of respondents
in European countries agree that di¤erences in income are too large and it is
the responsibility of the government to reduce the di¤erences in income between
people with high incomes and those with low incomes. Therefore, economic and
social cohesion are high on the political agenda of most developed welfare states,
and most people agree that public policies can play a key role in redistributing
income. However, as the considerable variations in inequality levels illustrated in
Figure 1.1.1 show, welfare states di¤er dramatically in terms of the extent to which
they reach this goal. Therefore, understanding scal and social policy design and
the corresponding distributive outcomes is of crucial importance not only to public
economics but also for well-designed redistributive policymaking.
In this book, we examine redistributive policies and income inequality and
1Source: SOEP micro data. Real income for the poorest (richest) 10 percent of the population
in 1983 was less than e11,549 (more than e48,976) and less than e12,001 (more than e55,788)
in 2008 (in 2005 prices).
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Figure 1.1.1: Gini coe¢ cients of income inequality in the mid-1980s and late 2000s
Source: OECD (2011). Note: For the Czech Republic and Hungary, instead of data for the mid-1980s, data for
the early 1990s are used.
their interdependencies from a cross-national perspective. The book will contrib-
ute to the debate about the distribution and redistribution of income in various
ways. First, we analyze the size and structure of e¤ective redistribution in a broad
sample of European welfare states. Besides answering the question of how di¤er-
ent components of the tax and transfer system contribute to disposable income
inequality, we also investigate whether the ndings are sensitive to the underly-
ing measurement method. In the second chapter, we extend this analysis by also
considering indirect taxes and investigating the development of redistributive ef-
fects over time. Based on two detailed case studies of Germany and the United
Kingdom, we theoretically and empirically evaluate whether the structure of scal
policies has changed over the last two decades. The analysis provides a compre-
hensive dynamic analysis of e¤ective progressivity and redistribution by including
all major scal elements: direct taxation, pay roll taxes, indirect taxes, and social
benets.
The rst two chapters focus only on the rst-order e¤ects of redistributive
policies, ignoring the possible subsequent behavioral e¤ects of these policies. In the
third chapter, we try to identify the causal e¤ect of redistributive spending policies
on income inequality and discuss possible second-order e¤ects. In contrast to
previous analyses, for the cross-country analysis in the last chapter, we investigate
the concept of unequal opportunities rather than outcome inequalities. While the
rst chapters of this book only rely on cases from the European Union (EU), here
we compare Germany and the United States because of the distinct di¤erences
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between Europeans and Americans in attitudes toward inequality, social mobility,
and redistribution (Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Alesina and Angeletos (2005)).
We present and discuss a new approach for measuring equality of opportunity
(EOp) and analyze the impact of tax benet systems on opportunities instead of
outcomes.
In the remainder of the introduction, we will proceed as follows. In Section
1.2, we will briey describe inequality, redistribution, and inequality of opportunity
(IOp) and their interdependencies. Then, in Section 1.3, we will contextualize the
di¤erent chapters and summarize their main results.
1.2 Conceptual foundations
In this section, we introduce general conceptual issues related to the distribution
and redistribution of income. More precisely, we dene the three major concepts
with which the book is concerned: economic inequality, redistribution, and EOp.
1.2.1 Economic inequality
» ...with the hope that when they grow up they will nd less of it no
matter how they decide to measure it « Amartya Sen (1973, dedication
to his children)
With the seminal publications of Atkinson (1970, 1975) and Sen (1973), the is-
sue of economic inequality became part of the economic research agenda. By now,
a substantial body of research has been accumulated on the measurement, causes,
and consequences of inequality. Especially with the availability of comparable na-
tional micro datasets with representative household income data, researchers have
made great progress in empirical studies focusing on economic inequality and in
the concepts, methods, and models used.2 Especially when measuring economic
inequality in an international context or over time, several conceptual issues have
to be taken into account. Ideally income would be measured on a post-tax and
transfer basis consistent with the Haig-Simons income concept of real consumption
plus (or minus) change in net worth. Income would include both cash and non-
cash components, would be adjusted for economies of scale in consumption using
an appropriate equivalence scale, and would cover the period over which famil-
ies can smooth consumption by lending or borrowing(Gottschalk and Smeeding,
2See Jenkins and Micklewright (2007) for a broad overview over the historical development of
studies on the issue of economic inequality.
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1997: 637).3 In general, this benchmark income concept can only be approximated
in empirical inequality research. Nevertheless, this benchmark operationalization
hints at three major issues that have to be considered when assessing economic in-
equality: the economic variable of interest, the time period, and the demographic
reference unit.
In the following, we delineate on which conceptual denitions of economic in-
equality the subsequent analyses are based. As in almost all other studies, we
fall short of Haig-Simonss comprehensive denition and apply income as the only
resource variable of interest. Our choice of income as a measure of well-being is
primarily justied by the better availability of comparable micro data on incomes,
as compared to data on consumption and total assets. In contrast to Haig-Simonss
denition, we do not attempt to capture lifetime utility but we generally restrict
our reference period to one year. Thus, as an important limitation, we cannot
take into account the lifetime distribution of resources and can only provide an-
nual snapshots of the distribution of incomes. This annual view, however, is also
suggested by the Expert Group on Household Income Statistics (2001) because it
is the natural accounting period for the majority of income sources. Our reference
unit will be the household (or individuals within households), and in order to ac-
count for possible economies of scales within households, household incomes are
adjusted by equivalence scales.4
Beside these conceptual issues, we must point out that one can aggregate the
distribution of incomes into a measure of inequality in numerous ways. Here we
only introduce the most popular and most frequently used inequality measure,
the Gini coe¢ cient (Gini (1914)). We also rely on this inequality measure in the
majority of subsequent analyses.5 The Gini coe¢ cient is derived with the help of
the Lorenz curve, which orders the population by magnitude of income (starting
with the lowest). Then, the cumulative proportion of total income received by
income units is plotted against the cumulative proportion of the population. The
Gini coe¢ cient then measures the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45 line
as a fraction of the total area under the the 45 line: G = A
A+B
(see Figure 1.2.1).
3Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) refer to the income concepts developed by Haig (1921) and
Simons (1938).
4Throughout the book, we will rely on di¤erent equivalence scales, which are explained at the
relevant places. For more information on equivalence scales, see Buhmann et al. (1988).
5In the remainder of the book, further inequality measures are formally introduced. See e.g.
Jenkins (1991), Cowell (2000), Jenkins and Van Kerm (2009), and Ochmann and Peichl (2006)
for comprehensive overviews on the measurement of economic inequality.
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Figure 1.2.1: Graphical representation of the Gini coe¢ cient
Source: Lambert (2001).
The Gini coe¢ cient is one in the case of maximum inequality and zero when
all incomes are equal (45 line). With regard to the sensitivity of the distribution
scale, the Gini coe¢ cient attaches most weight to the income of the middle classes.
The Gini coe¢ cient has the disadvantage that it might indicate the same value of
inequality for two distinct distributions in the case of intersecting Lorenz curves.
When comparing income distributions across countries and over time, another
major concern is the underlying data sources. Atkinson and Brandolini (2001: 772)
comment on the pitfalls of using secondary inequality data: Gini coe¢ cients of
income inequality may be published for a range of countries, but there is no agreed
basis of denition. [. . . ] We cannot therefore be sure whether results of comparative
or econometric analyses obtained using such data are genuine or a product of data
di¤erences.Therefore, all subsequent distributional measures are computed from
micro data to ensure the comparability of their conceptualization.
1.2.2 Redistribution
» Because it taxes and it spends, the welfare state is by denition
redistributive, but the degree to which this is associated with more equal-
ity is an open empirical question « Esping-Andersen and Myles (2009:
639)
In order to assess the distributional impact of public policies, we must rst
clarify what is meant by redistribution and how it is measured. At rst glance,
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redistribution seems to be an easy, rather concrete term. As Lambert (2001:
37) states, Transferring income from rich to poor is an act of redistribution,
in anyone´ s language. Although this is obviously true, redistribution can still
encompass di¤erent things and there is no uncontroversial way to measure it. We
will start by narrowing down what we mean when we speak of redistribution and
develop a general denition of redistribution that is relevant for our research.
This book is particularly concerned with the distributional impact of scal
policies. Thus, we will focus only on redistribution by the government, more
specically redistribution induced by the tax and transfer systems. Accordingly,
private transfers are not taken into account. Another important restriction of our
denition will be the one-dimensionality of redistribution because we will only
consider monetary redistribution. Due to data constraints, the redistributive ef-
fects of the public provision of services, such as education and health care, are not
taken into account, despite the fact that those are important components of social
policies in many a­ uent countries (Huber and Stephens (2001)).
Finally and most importantly, policies reect di¤erent objectives, and di¤erent
types of redistribution are achieved. Besides the redistribution from rich to poor,
social policies seek to provide income maintenance or insurance in the face of
adverse risks (e.g., unemployment, sickness, and disability) or redistribution across
the life cycle (e.g., retirement pensions). As outlined above, the view we take is
static in the sense that we cannot take into account lifetime redistribution.6 Thus,
we focus exclusively on the annual actual amount of redistribution, meaning how
much reduction in income inequality is achieved in a country per year. Therefore,
we are most interested in the redistribution from rich to poor  although, as
will become clear throughout the subsequent chapters, we will not be able to
fully disentangle redistributive e¤ects from lifetime redistribution. Summing up,
in the remainder of the book, when we speak of redistribution, we refer to the
(annual) reduction in income inequality achieved by the national design of tax
benet systems.
The standard approach of measuring (e¤ective) redistribution is the comparison
of inequality measures before and after government intervention (or before and
after a single tax benet instrument).7 This approach, however, can be problematic
because the pre-government distribution of incomes is not independent of changes
6In a related paper on the distributional outcomes of welfare states, we discuss and empirically
assess the lifetime redistribution achieved by public pensions. See Kammer et al. (2011).
7Further approaches to empirically assess redistribution (and progressivity) and studies that
apply these di¤erent methods are introduced in Chapters 2 and 3.
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in tax benet systems. Notwithstanding this problem, there is strong political
interest in the redistributive e¤ects of the scal system, and empiricists try to
measure them. This book is part of this research program and seeks to contribute
to the understanding and measurement of the redistribution achieved by di¤erent
tax benet instruments. In particular, Chapter 4 discusses possible second-order
e¤ects of redistributive policies on the pre-government distribution of incomes.
1.2.3 Equality of outcomes versus equality of opportunity
» We know that equality of individual ability has never existed and
never will, but we do insist that equality of opportunity still must be
sought. « Franklin D. Roosevelt (1936)
While in recent decades most economists have observed an increase in income
inequality in the bulk of developed countries, fewer agree about whether govern-
ments should do something about it. One argument for why the government should
care about inequality rests on the philosophical doctrine of utilitarianism, whose
main idea lies in the maximization of the total utility of a society.8 Together with
the (intuitive) assumption that income has diminishing marginal utility and the
(restrictive) assumption that everyone has the same utility function, it follows that
any transfer from rich to poor would increase social welfare. Given these assump-
tions, an equal distribution of incomes would maximize total utility. However, this
immediately evokes the main counterargument against promoting perfect equality.
The utilitarian distribution principle o¤ers people no incentive to work. The main
idea of the incentive argument is that without redistributive government interven-
tion, total income would be larger, and in the end, everybody would be better o¤
(trickle-down-e¤ect).9
Martin Feldstein restates this idea as follows: "According to o¢ cial statistics,
the distribution of income [in the United States] has become increasingly unequal
during the past two decades. A common reaction in the popular press, in political
debate, and in academic discussions is to regard the increased inequality as a prob-
lem that demands new redistributive policies. I disagree. I believe that inequality
as such is not a problem and that it would be wrong to design policies to reduce
it. What policy should address is not inequality but poverty" (Feldstein, 1999:
8See Bentham (1789).
9Further arguments against inequality derive from pure self-interest considerations and relate
to the possible negative consequences of inequality (e.g., crime and the instability of political
institutions). However, robust evidence on inequality as the driving force behind these outcomes
is still missing.
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33). This is compatible with the Rawlsian view about distributive justice, which,
in contrast to the utilitarian distribution principle, requires that any distributive
principle should maximize the income of the least well-o¤ (Rawls (1971)). This
begs the question of whether we should actually worry about an unequal distri-
bution of income or if it is enough to provide a social safety net for the poor.
Rawls derives his conclusion by ruling out envy as a legitimate motivation for
thinking about distributive issues. However, Milanovic (2007) argues that envy
might simply represent peoples impression that di¤erences in income are to a large
part undeserved because incomes are mainly determined by luck and external cir-
cumstances. If we ignore the negative connotation of envy, we might also view
this as a sense of justice.10 Thus, regarding income inequality, of major concern
are fairness considerations, which are related to the origins of income di¤erences.
Indeed, the evidence shows that individuals are more willing to accept income
di¤erences that are due to individual e¤ort (or laziness) rather than exogenous
circumstances. Also, preferences for redistribution are systematically correlated
with beliefs about the relative importance of e¤ort and luck in the determination
of outcomes.11 This is in line with most modern theories of distributive justice,
which distinguish between ethically acceptable inequalities (e.g., due to di¤erences
in e¤ort) and unfair inequalities (e.g., due to endowed characteristics and luck).
By now, many philosophers see EOp as the appropriate currency of egalitarian
justice.12
While the traditional notion of equality of outcomes refers to an equal dis-
tribution of economic outcomes (e.g., well-being and income), the EOp theory,
in contrast, distinguishes between circumstances and e¤ort as determinants of
outcomes. Starting with seminal works by Roemer (1993, 1998), Van de gaer
(1993), and Fleurbaey (1995), economists have become increasingly interested in
this normatively appealing concept. By now, a vast number of researchers have
conceptualized EOp and tried to measure it.13 Since EOp theory only defends com-
pensation for inequalities due to circumstances, EOp policy aims at leveling the
playing eld by compensating individuals for any decits due to circumstances and
ensuring that only e¤ort a¤ects achievement. Thus, the empirical assessment of
questions such as whether redistributive policies are actually e¤ective in promoting
10See Kenworthy (2008) for a more detailed discussion of these issues.
11See Fong (2001), Konow (2003), Alesina and Giuliano (2011), and Gaertner and Schokkaert
(2011).
12See Sen (1980, 1985, 1992), Dworkin (1981a,b), Arneson (1989), Cohen (1989), Roemer (1993,
1998, 2002), and Fleurbaey (2008).
13See Chapter 5 for a broad overview of the EOp literature.
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EOp and whether improvements in terms of outcome equality are also associated
with advances regarding EOp are of particular interest. Indeed, in a related work
on a broad set of European countries, we found that the equalizing impacts of
the tax benet system on IOp di¤er substantially from those observed in the tra-
ditional notion of inequality of outcomes (see Dunnzla¤ et al. (2011)). The last
part of the book builds on this earlier work and contributes to the EOp literature
in two major ways: First, we introduce a new approach of empirically measuring
EOp, and second, we analyze the e¤ect of public policies on these measures.
1.3 The agenda
In the following, we will summarize the content and main contribution of the
following four chapters. For each chapter, we will sketch the methods used and
outline the main results. Chapter 6 will briey draw conclusions.
1.3.1 Chapter 2: Redistributive tax benet systems
In this chapter, we provide a comprehensive descriptive analysis of the equalizing
e¤ects of di¤erent taxes and benets based on two approaches. We derive and
compare redistributive e¤ects based on both the standard sequential accounting
approach, which is briey mentioned in Section 1.2.2, and the factor source decom-
position approach suggested by Shorrocks (1982, 1983). Thus, we investigate not
only the redistributive importance of tax benet instruments across countries but
also whether our ndings are sensitive to the measurement method used. Since the
analysis is based on the EU-25, it is also interesting to see how the new member
states, mostly from Central and Eastern Europe, compare to the well-established
welfare states of Western Europe.
The results suggest that tax and transfer systems substantially reduce income
inequality in all EU member states. However, the two measurement approaches
yield very di¤erent, partly contradictory, results. Inequality analysis based on
the sequential accounting approach suggests that benets are the most import-
ant source of inequality reduction in most European tax and transfer systems,
whereas the factor source decomposition approach suggests that benets play a
negligible role and sometimes even contribute slightly positively to inequality. On
the contrary, here taxes and social contributions are by far the most important
contributors to income inequality reduction. The di¤ering results can be attrib-
uted to the di¤erent normative focus of the two approaches. While the Shorrocks
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approach provides a unique decomposition rule for any inequality measure, the ap-
proach violates the normatively intuitive axiom that equally distributed transfers
reduce aggregate inequality.
With respect to country di¤erences, we nd that the new EU member states
do not di¤er greatly from traditional Western European welfare states. Instead,
the majority of Central Eastern European countries naturally group together with
traditional Continental Western European welfare states. The Baltic at tax coun-
tries, however, emerge as a distinct group characterized by very small welfare
states, as compared to other European countries.
1.3.2 Chapter 3: The development of scal redistribution
While the previous chapter takes a purely cross-sectional perspective, this chapter
focuses on the structural changes in the composition of national scal systems from
the mid-1980s to today. However, it draws on ndings from the previous analysis
and applies the standard approach to measure the redistributive e¤ects of taxes
and benets. Besides the dynamic perspective, one important contribution is the
inclusion of indirect taxes in the analysis of the redistributive e¤ects of welfare
states.
The analysis begins with a detailed review of established political economic
theories on the development of scal redistribution. The political economy liter-
ature frequently argues that increasing international integration and competitive
pressures also a¤ect welfare policies. The consequences are reected in a cut back
of tax progressivity. However, there is no consistent evidence of a retrenchment of
welfare states. Grounding our analysis in compensation theory as well as tax com-
petition and tax mix arguments, we deduce our guiding substitution hypothesis,
which predicts that redistributive capacities shift from taxation to spending, mean-
ing that the redistributive e¤ects of taxes and benets are empirical substitutes.
To empirically test the substitution hypothesis, we conduct a micro-data based
analysis of e¤ective progressivity and redistribution by including all major scal
elements: direct taxation, pay roll taxes, indirect taxes, and benets. In addition
to the standard approach of measuring redistribution, we also apply a transplant-
and-compare procedure to account for the impact of changing pre-government
incomes. Since indirect tax payments are not available for a broad set of countries,
our analysis is restricted to the two cases of Germany and the United Kingdom.
For Germany, we use an imputation procedure to approximate the distribution of
indirect tax payments across households for di¤erent years.
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This analysis reveals two important results. First, we nd that the regressive
structure of indirect taxation (and social insurance contributions) absorbs the re-
distributive e¤ects from progressive income taxation in both countries. Second, we
nd some evidence for the substitution hypothesis in Germany. Here, increasingly
regressive tax systems are indeed accompanied by more redistributive benets. We
do not observe this shift in the United Kingdom.
1.3.3 Chapter 4: Social spending and income inequality
In the previous chapters, we generally abstracted from behavioral e¤ects induced
by redistributive policies. In this chapter, we relax this restrictive assumption.
Using a dynamic panel approach based on European countries and the period
1993-2007, we investigate whether a more generous welfare state is indeed causally
related to more equality in the distribution of incomes or whether the rst-order
equalizing e¤ects we found in the previous (cumulative) cross-sectional analyses
are o¤set by reverse behavioral e¤ects in the long run. Besides the overall e¤ect
of social spending, we also investigate which kind of benets are most e¤ective in
reducing income inequality by examining the specic structure and characteristics
of benets.
The chapter starts with a theoretical part in which we elaborate on possible
behavioral second-order responses induced by redistributive social policies, which
might o¤set inequality reducing rst-order e¤ects. In this context, the di¤erent
objectives of social spending policies are also discussed. Regarding the estimation
strategy, we apply the System GMM dynamic panel estimator and the presumably
random incidence of certain diseases to account for the inherent endogeneity of
social policies with regard to inequality levels.
The regression results unambiguously suggest that more social spending e¤ect-
ively reduces inequality levels. The result is robust with respect to the instru-
ment count and di¤erent data restrictions. Looking at the structure of benets,
unemployment benets and public pensions in particular are responsible for the
inequality-reducing impact. More targeted benets, however, do not signicantly
reduce income inequality. Rather, their positive e¤ect on pre-government income
inequality hints at substantial disincentive e¤ects.
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1.3.4 Chapter 5: Inequality of opportunity
So far, the empirical analyses were all based on the traditional inequality of out-
comes approach. However, individuals might be more willing to accept income
di¤erences that are due to individual e¤ort rather than exogenous circumstances.
Therefore, in this chapter, we introduce the concept of EOp and analyze the equal-
izing impact of public policies on opportunities rather than outcomes.
Previous estimates of unfair IOp are only lower bounds because of the unob-
servability of the full set of relevant circumstances. In the conceptual framework
at the beginning of the chapter, we develop a new estimator based on a xed
e¤ects panel model, which also allows for the identication of an upper bound
for IOp. The empirical application of the new estimator is based on Germany
and the United States, two countries that di¤er considerably in their attitudes to-
ward inequality and redistribution and which provide appropriate panel data with
su¢ cient information on parental background and other external circumstances.
We nd signicant and robust di¤erences between lower and upper bound IOp
estimates for both countries. Therefore the analysis suggests that existing lower
bound estimates for IOp might demand for too little redistribution in order to
equalize unfair inequalities. When using periodical incomes, IOp shares in the
United States are signicantly lower than in Germany. Hence, EOp is indeed higher
in the land of opportunity.Interestingly, we nd no signicant di¤erence between
IOp shares in gross and net earnings in the two countries. This indicates that there
is no di¤erential e¤ect of the tax benet system on unequal opportunities in our
sample (i.e., no tagging on circumstances). However, we identify public policies as
a useful tool to change IOp: A policy simulation reveals that the abolishment of
joint taxation in favor of individual taxation signicantly reduces IOp.
Chapter 2
Redistributive tax benet systems
In this chapter we analyze the redistributive e¤ects of tax benet systems in the
enlarged European Union. The analysis reveals that di¤erent approaches of meas-
uring redistribution might lead to very di¤erent results regarding the equalizing
e¤ects of di¤erent tax benet instruments.14
2.1 Introduction
Inequality is usually measured in terms of disposable income, which is determined
by i) the pre-tax income distribution and ii) various redistributive policies. From a
policy perspective, it is important to understand to what extent the di¤erences in
inequality levels between countries are driven by di¤erences in the market income
distribution and to what extent they are driven by di¤erent designs of the welfare
state. Although one of the main objectives of the European Union (EU) is to
enhance economic and social cohesion, there are still sizeable di¤erences across
member states in the levels of within country income inequality. This is true
especially since the enlargements of the EU in 2004 and 2007, when in total twelve
additional countries, mostly from Eastern Europe, joined the EU. With respect to
the recent EU enlargement it is particularly interesting to see how the new member
states compare to the well-established welfare states of Western Europe.
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the impact of taxes and benets
on disposable income inequality and to compare the contribution of these two
components across twenty-four EU member states. Our results suggest that the
measured contributions of taxes and benets on overall inequality strongly depend
on the measurement concept used. These di¤erences in results can be explained
14This chapter is based on Fuest et al. (2010).
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by di¤erent normative concepts underlying the two approaches.
The analysis of income inequality, the design of the welfare state, and the size
of redistribution have a long tradition in economic and social science literature.
Especially regarding the analysis of the development of income inequality across
countries and time, a large number of empirical studies exists (see Anand and
Segal (2008) for a recent overview). Due to data limitations, the development of
redistribution across countries and time is not as extensively analyzed as inequality.
However, since the availability of comparable micro data sets there has been much
progress in analyzing redistributive e¤ects in cross-country comparisons.
When assessing the overall distributional impact of di¤erent tax benet in-
struments, one can generally distinguish between two di¤erent approaches in the
literature. The majority of micro studies measures e¤ective redistribution of the
tax benet system by taking either the relative or absolute change of inequality
measures of the pre-government and post-government income distribution (e.g.,
Mitchell (1991), Immervoll et al. (2005), Mahler and Jesuit (2006), Whiteford
(2008)). Based on a certain income accounting framework, this approach sequen-
tially applies di¤erent tax benet instruments and compares the status-quo with
the counterfactual distribution without the instrument in question. In the follow-
ing, we will refer to this approach as the sequential approach of measuring e¤ective
redistribution.
Another means of assessing the impact of di¤erent income components such
as taxes and transfers on income inequality is the factor source decomposition ap-
proach, suggested by Shorrocks (1982, 1983). As total disposable income can be
exhaustively decomposed into di¤erent pre-tax income sources as well as taxes,
social insurance contributions and benets, it is possible to calculate the contribu-
tion (equalizing or disequalizing e¤ect) of each factor to overall inequality in the
status quo. Here the inequality contribution of each factor component is determ-
ined simultaneously. With this decomposition approach it is not only possible to
determine the impact of taxes and transfers but also the inequality contribution of
self-employment and capital income to total income (e.g., Jenkins (1995), Jäntti
(1997), Frässdorf et al. (2011)).
Obviously, di¤erent approaches can lead to di¤erent results, which in turn
would imply di¤erent policy implications. Therefore, we use EU-SILC (Statist-
ics on Income and Living Conditions) micro data of 2007 to compare the two
approaches with regard to the redistributive e¤ects of tax benet systems. The
2007 wave is the rst to provide information on both gross and net incomes for all
twenty-ve EU member states (except Malta). Thus, not only do we investigate
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the redistributive importance of tax benet instruments across countries, but we
also investigate whether our ndings are sensitive to the measurement method em-
ployed. Particularly, we identify the relative positions of the new member states
in the inequality ordering of EU countries.
Our results suggest that tax and transfer systems substantially reduce income
inequality in all EU member states. But the two measurement approaches de-
scribed above yield very di¤erent, partly contradictory results, especially concern-
ing the relative importance of di¤erent tax benet instruments. Inequality analysis
based on the sequential accounting approach suggests that benets are the most
important factor reducing inequality in the majority of countries. The factor source
decomposition approach, however, suggests that benets play a negligible role and
sometimes even slightly increase inequality. According to this methodology, taxes
and social insurance contributions are by far the most important contributors to
reducing income inequality. We explain these partly contradictory results by the
di¤erent normative focuses of the two approaches and show that many benets
seem to have objectives other than reducing disposable income inequality.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes
the data and methodologies employed in this study. In Section 2.3, we provide
some descriptive statistics about inequality levels in EU countries and household
income composition. Section 2.4 presents the results of the redistributive e¤ects
of tax benet instruments based on both, the sequential and the decomposition
approach and di¤erences in the ndings are discussed. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data and methodology
2.2.1 Data
The EU-SILC micro data set provides harmonized and comparable multidimen-
sional micro data of households and individuals in European countries.15 Since
2005, the dataset covers the EU-twenty-ve member states (except Malta) and it
is the largest comparative survey of European income and living conditions. Our
analysis is based on the 2007 EU-SILC wave which is the rst to include gross
income information for all countries. The sample size varies from 3,505 households
in Cyprus to 20,982 households in Italy. The survey is representative for the whole
15For more information on the EU-SILC methodologies, denitions, coverage as well as the
national questionnaires see http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/dsis/eusilc/library.
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population in each country due to the construction of population weights.
In the remainder, we refer to our total sample of countries as the "EU-24" or
simply the "EU". To the fteen old EU member states before the EU enlargement
in 2004 we refer to as "EU-15"16 and to the nine New Member States shortly
as "NMS"17. Furthermore, we categorize countries according to their geograph-
ical position into Continental (AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL), Northern (DK, FI,
SE), Southern (CY, ES, GR, IT, PT), Anglo-Saxon (IE, UK), Central Eastern
(CZ, HU, PL, SI, SK) and Baltic (EE, LT, LV) countries, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.2.1. The geographical clustering of the EU-15 countries nicely corresponds
to the famous welfare state typology of the political and social science literature
(Esping-Andersen 1990, later modied by Ferrera 1996), which we will refer to
later on. The subgroups of Central Eastern and Baltic countries add up to the
group of Eastern European countries.
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Figure 2.2.1: Income inequality in EU countries and regions
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC. The size of the circles represents the level of inequality in DPI in
the corresponding country.
In our application, total equivalent disposable household income (DPI) is ex-
haustively decomposed into its household equivalent components: factor income
(wages and salaries, income from self-employment and capital incomes), personal
16Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Spain (ES), Fin-
land (FI), France (FR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Portugal
(PT), Sweden (SE), United Kingdom (UK).
17Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Hungary (HU), Lithuania (LT), Lativa
(LV), Poland (PL), Slovenia (SI), Slovakia (SK).
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income taxes (PIT), social insurance contributions, social benets and public pen-
sions, based on the following identity:
DPI = (factor income+ SIC employer)| {z }
expanded factor income
 PIT SIC+benefits+public pensions
(2.2.1)
We use household equivalent incomes to compensate for di¤erent household
structures and possible economies of scales within households.18 In the remainder
of the chapter we always refer to the equivalent measures of household income com-
ponents unless explicitly noted otherwise. To make incomes comparable across
countries, we adjust national income amounts by the multilateral current pur-
chasing power parities provided by Eurostat database. Note that our concept of
expanded factor income (EFI) includes social insurance contributions paid by the
employer as they can be very di¤erent across countries.19 For the sake of sim-
plicity we refer to the total amount of social insurance contributions paid by the
employee and the employer simply as "SIC". We consider the role of public pen-
sions separately because one can argue that public pensions are not really part
of the redistributive system but should rather be seen as deferred earnings or the
result of compulsory savings.20 This function of public pensions is particularly true
for countries which apply insurance-based systems. Furthermore, the analysis only
allocates those taxes and benets that can be reasonably attributed to households.
Therefore, corporate taxes as well as some types of government expenditures such
as expenditures on defense are not considered. Due to data limitations, indirect
taxes and in-kind benets cannot be taken into account, either. Thus, in the re-
mainder, we merely advert to cash benets when speaking of social benets and to
personal income taxes in the cases of taxes. We provide further information on the
exact denition and computation of all income components in the data appendix.
18For each person, the equivalent (per-capita) DPI is its household DPI divided by the equivalent
household size according to the modied OECD scale, which assigns a weight of 1.0 to the head
of household, 0.5 to every household member aged fourteen or older and 0.3 to each child aged
less than fourteen. Summing up the individual weights gives the household specic equivalence
factor.
19Ankrom (1993) also follows this approach. He argues that ignoring employerssocial insurance
contributions would implicitly assume that the wage elasticity of labour supply is innite.
However, empirical analyses rather suggest the opposite and therefore this can signicantly
bias the results of the e¤ectiveness of tax and transfer systems.
20Pensions in EU-SILC generally follow the ESSPROS classication of Eurostat which includes
all mandatory pension programmes and does not distinguish between pre-funded and pay-as-
you-go systems. Further information on this interpretation of the function of pensions may be
found in the ESSPROS Manual (Eurostat (1996)).
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2.2.2 Sequential accounting approach
Consider a population of n persons (or households), i = 1; :::n, with xi as the
income of individual i, x is the average income and a population weight wi (N =Pn
i=1wi).The generalized entropy (GE) class of inequality indices (Shorrocks (1980))
is given by the following expression:
I =
1
(  1)
1Z
0
xi
x
hxi
x

  1
i
dF (2.2.2)
where F is the CDF of income and  is a parameter indicating the sensitivity
toward social concern for a particular part of the income distribution.21
To determine the e¤ective distributional impact of di¤erent tax benet instru-
ments, we rst use what we call the sequential approach to analyzing the distribu-
tional impact of di¤erent policy instruments. For this approach we have to dene
di¤erent income concepts at di¤erent stages of redistribution. Following Mitchell
(1991) and Whiteford (2008), among others, we apply an accounting framework for
household income, where di¤erent income components are added sequentially. Ac-
cordingly, the sum of wages and salaries, self-employment income, capital income
and in our case also employers social insurance contributions equal "expanded
factor income (EFI)" and "market income (MI)" is the EFI and public pensions.
MI plus all di¤erent types of social benets is "gross income (GI)", subtracting
personal income taxes is "post-tax income" and nally subtracting employeesand
employerssocial insurance contributions (SIC) is "DPI". With this accounting
framework, a number of measures of the redistributive impact of the tax benet
system can be constructed by comparing inequality measures at di¤erent stages of
household income. For instance, the relative redistribution achieved by social be-
nets equals the percentage change in the inequality of MI relative to the inequality
of GI:
GE()MI  GE()GI
GE()MI
(2.2.3)
The impact of personal income taxes is evaluated by comparing the inequality of
the distribution of GI and post-tax income and so on.
However, this framework is static and linear which results in a number of lim-
itations. For example, there are no interactions between the di¤erent stages of
redistribution. In reality, however, in some countries benets are also taxable.
21See, e.g., Cowell and Kuga (1981). The more positive (negative) is, the more sensitive is to
changes at the top (bottom) of the income distribution.
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As a result, the order in which di¤erent components are accounted inuences the
measurement of their relative contribution to redistribution. For example, by rst
adding benets to factor income, we necessarily overestimate the redistributive ef-
fects of benets in countries in which such benets are taxable (Ferrarini and Nel-
son (2003); Mahler and Jesuit (2006)). Due to this sensitivity of the redistributive
measures with regard to the denition of pre-instrument income, Immervoll et al.
(2005) follow a slightly di¤erent approach which we also apply as a robustness
check of our results. For each tax or benet they start from the hypothetical situ-
ation without the instrument in question (DPI - instrument) and ask by how much
inequality is reduced by introducing it.
2.2.3 Factor source decomposition approach
As total (disposable) income is generally composed of several sources of income,
it is useful to express total inequality in DPI as the sum of these factorscontri-
butions (Shorrocks 1982, 1983). The exact decomposition procedure depends on
the measure of inequality used, but whichever measure is used must naturally be
decomposable and it must be dened for zero incomes. In practice, the easiest
measure to implement with these properties is GE(2) which can also be expressed
as half the squared coe¢ cient of variation CV:
GE(2) =
1
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Suppose DPI x can be written as the sum of f = 1; :::; K di¤erent sources of
income xf : x =
KP
f=1
xf ; f is the correlation between x and xf ; and f =
xf
x
is f 0s
factor share.
I2 = GE(2) =
KX
f=1
ff
q
GE2GE
f
2 =
KX
f=1
sfI2 =
KX
f=1
Sf (2.2.5)
where GEf2 denotes the inequality in factor source f and Sf the (absolute)
contribution of factor f to total (DPI) inequality. Note that income source f
provides a disequalizing e¤ect if Sf > 0, and an equalizing e¤ect if Sf < 0.
sf = Sf=I2 is the relative contribution of f to total inequality and indicates the
importance of f:
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2.3 Descriptive evidence
2.3.1 Income distribution and redistribution
To illustrate the variation in inequality among EU member states we compute a
number of distributional measures. Note, that here we use the Gini coe¢ cient as
our measure of inequality because of its readily intuitive interpretation and its use
in comparable micro studies. When rst looking at the former EU-15 countries
as one single economic unit, irrespective in which country the individuals live,
we nd an overall inequality level in EFI of 0.51 and of 0.31 in DPI. Adding
the nine additional EU member states yields inequality levels of 0.53 and 0.34,
respectively. This highlights a notable increase in overall inequality as a result
of the enlargement of the EU. The substantial variation in inequality, particularly
since the recent enlargement, is also conrmed when looking at the inequality levels
in EFI, MI and DPI within the di¤erent member states, which are illustrated in
Figure 2.3.1.
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Figure 2.3.1: Gini income inequality and absolute redistribution
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC. Countries are sorted in ascending order of the inequality in DPIs.
The distance between the inequality in EFI and the inequality in DPIs shows
the very di¤erent extent of redistribution schemes across EU member states, here
illustrated by the absolute di¤erence in Gini coe¢ cients. Overall redistribution is
particularly high in the Nordic countries, some Continental countries as well as
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in Hungary and Slovenia. These countries achieve substantially better equality
rankings in DPI as opposed to EFI. On the contrary, e¤ective redistribution is
rather low in Cyprus and in the Baltic States.
Looking at the inequality of EFI, huge disparities among the European coun-
tries emerge, with Gini coe¢ cients ranging from 0.31 in the Slovak Republic to 0.54
in Portugal. EFI inequality is comparatively high in the Anglo-Saxon countries as
well as in Lithuania, Germany, Greece, Portugal and Hungary, with Gini coe¢ -
cients larger than 0.50. Rather low inequality levels can be found in Cyprus, the
Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Particularly within the group of Eastern European
countries there are substantial di¤erences in EFI inequality levels. The group en-
compasses countries with very high EFI inequality such as Hungary and Poland but
also countries with comparatively low EFI inequality such as the Slovak Republic
and Slovenia. The di¤erences among the Gini coe¢ cients of EFI and the Gini coef-
cients of MI demonstrates the di¤erent strength of the redistributive character of
public pensions across European countries. It emerges that public pensions have
huge redistributive power in the Continental countries such as France, Germany
and Austria, who now achieve a substantially higher rank in terms of DPI equal-
ity. This is also true for Poland and the Czech Republic. On the other hand, the
inclusion of public pensions leads to a signicantly lower equality ranking for the
Baltic states and Denmark.22 Looking at the inequality of DPI, it should be noted
that DPI inequality is signicantly lower than the EFI inequality, indicating a
substantial degree of redistribution in all countries. Also, the ranking of countries
according to EFI inequaltiy as opposed to DPI inequalitly changes substantially.
Here the group of Nordic countries can be identied as having very low DPI in-
equality (around 0.25), and the Central Eastern European countries Slovenia, the
Slovak and the Czech Republic also display low DPI inequality. On the other
hand, the distribution of post-government income is comparatively unequal in the
Baltic, Southern and Anglo-Saxon countries (>0.30).
These ndings reveal that with regard to DPI inequality, the importance of
public pension schemes and overall redistribution, the EU-15 countries can almost
perfectly grouped according to their geographical region and the welfare state ty-
pology of the political and social science literature. This is also reected in the
similar size of circles in Figure 2.2.1 across regions, which represent the level of
DPI inequality in the respective country. In contrast, EFI inequality levels yield a
22As in most of the countries the largest part of SIC serves as nancing source of public pensions,
it could be argued that taking into account the nancing side of public pensions, however,
qualies the importance of public pensions in reducing income inequality.
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very heterogeneous country clustering of EU-15 countries. Interestingly, the East-
ern European member states do not really form a homogeneous group of countries.
There appear to be three distinct groups. First, there are the Baltic States which
are characterized by high EFI inequality, low redistribution and high inequality in
DPIs. In this regard, they are similiar to the Southern European countries, still,
their level of redistribution is substantially lower than in the Southern European
countries. Second, Hungary and Poland show high EFI inequalities, more extens-
ive redistribution schemes and therefore comparatively lower inequality in DPIs.
Third, Slovenia, the Slovak and Czech Republics represent low inequality in EFI,
above-average redistribution and very low inequality in DPIs. Therefore, with re-
gard to inequality and overall redistribution levels, they are similar to the Nordic
and Continental countries.
2.3.2 Composition of household income
As a next step we investigate in how far the importance of di¤erent components of
the redistributive system varies across European countries. Figure 2.3.2 illustrates
the composition of total DPI in terms of factor income, personal income taxes,
SIC, social benets and public pensions. Here, we also show the importance of
employerssocial insurance contributions in DPI separately in order to visualize
our concept of EFI. It should be noted that this perspective does not allow us to
identify government budget decits or surpluses because major parts of government
spending and nancing are not considered. According to Immervoll et al. (2005),
results as in Figure 2.3.2 can be interpreted as showing how much factor income is
necessary to achieve a certain level of DPI and how much is deducted by taxes and
contributions and added by benets. If the share of factor income is around 100%,
then the state approximately givesthe same amount of benets as he takesin
form of contributions and personal income taxes.23
If we look at unadjusted factor income without the social insurance contribu-
tions of the employer, the majority of countries reveals shares in factor income
close to 100%. The share of unadjusted factor income is signicantly larger than
105% only in Denmark and the Netherlands, which means that in these countries
the sum of deductions outweighs the sum of benets. In Cyprus, France, Hungary
and the Slovak Republic the share is less than 95%, therefore on average people
receive more benets than they pay as contributions and taxes. If we consider
23Note that indirect taxes are not taken into account here. This explains why it is possible for
the share of factor income in total income to be less than 100%.
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Figure 2.3.2: Factor shares of tax benet instruments
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC. Note: here we consider the social insurance contributions by
employers and original income separately whereas in the factor shares f in Table 2.4.2 these two are included
in "factor income".
the social insurance contributions by the employer as part of factor income (EFI),
in all countries except Cyprus the share of EFI is signicantly higher than 100%.
Also, the economic weight of employerssocial insurance contributions varies sub-
stantially across countries: from a share of 8.3% in Ireland to 33.2% in Belgium.
With respect to the overall importance of the other sources of income, total social
insurance contributions (SIC) make up a greater proportion of DPI than personal
income taxes in almost all the countries in our sample. On average their share in
DPI is about ten percentage points higher. Exceptions are the Nordic countries
and Poland where personal income taxes play a more important role. The high
share of SIC may seem surprising but is explained by the fact that contributions
include both, employer and employee contributions. On the benet side, with an
average share of 18% the economic weight of public pensions exceeds the import-
ance of the rest of social benets (on average 10%). The opposite is true only
in Denmark and Ireland. Also, Figure 2.3.2 suggests that personal income taxes
generally have a higher economic weight than social benets. Here the only excep-
tions are Ireland, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic. Looking at the importance
of particular income components across countries, the share of public pensions in
DPI is particularly high (greater than 20%) in some Continental countries (AT,
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FR, DE) as well as in the Southern European countries Italy, Greece and Portugal,
whereas it is rather low in Ireland, Cyprus and the Baltic States. Social benets
are most important in the Nordic countries, in Hungary and Ireland. They only
make up a small part of DPI in Southern European countries. With regard to the
burden side, the share of personal income taxes is particularly high in the Nordic
countries, and it is low in the Central Eastern European countries (SI, SK, CZ)
as well as in Cyprus. SIC, on the contrary, are most important in the Continental
countries (NL, BE, FR, DE), which is again in line with the welfare state typology
referred to earlier. The share of SIC is also relatively high in Slovenia, the Slovak
and Czech Republic, whose share of personal income taxes is rather low.
Overall, the importance of di¤erent tax benet components, as measured by the
various components of DPI, is consistent with the clustering of the EU-15 countries,
as described in the political and social science welfare state typologies. However,
as before, the Eastern European countries do not seem to form a homogeneous or
distinct group. With regard to the importance of tax benet components in DPI,
Slovenia, the Slovak and Czech Republic reveal similarities, as does the group of
the Baltic states. Poland and Hungary do not really t into either of these two
groups but seem to t rather well in to the group of EU-15 welfare states. However,
this analysis only considers the economic importance of tax benet instruments in
DPI and does not take into account their particular distribution across households
and therefore their redistributive impact on the distribution of incomes. We take
up this analysis in the following section.
2.4 Inequality contribution of tax benet instru-
ments
In this section, we look at the redistributive importance of the di¤erent tax be-
net instruments across countries. We use the GE(2) measure to analyze the
redistributive impact of tax benet instruments because it is naturally decom-
posable and also dened for zero incomes. Furthermore, we apply two di¤erent
approaches to measuring the redistributive impact of taxes and benets. First,
we use the sequential accounting approach which is based on the income account-
ing framework outlined above. Second, we apply the factor source decomposition
approach suggested by Shorrocks (1982, 1983) which determines the contribution
of each tax benet instrument to inequality in DPIs simultaneously. Finally, we
compare the results and discuss the di¤erences between these two methodologies.
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2.4.1 Sequential accounting approach
To analyze the redistributive impact of tax benet instruments based on the se-
quential accounting approach, we rst compute the GE(2) inequality measures for
the di¤erent income concepts dened above. The results are presented on the left
hand side of Table 2.4.1. By taking the percentage change between each of the
consecutive inequality measures, we then compute the relative redistributive e¤ect
of the di¤erent tax benet instruments. When comparing the GE(2) inequality
measures with the Gini coe¢ cients in Section 2.3, there are some important di¤er-
ences in the rankings of the countries. Particularly for the GE(2) measure of DPI
inequality, it stands out that Denmark and Finland - which could be considered as
rather equal with regard to the Gini Coe¢ cients - now belong to the group of un-
equal countries. In addition, the Anglo-Saxon countries, Cyprus and Estonia also
have worse equality rankings. On the other hand, the Southern countries Spain,
Greece and Italy display relatively more equal distributions of income, when using
the GE(2) inequality measure. It might seem surprising that the inequality in
DPI in the Nordic countries such as Denmark and Finland is higher than in Italy
and Spain. The reason for the di¤erence is the fact that the GE(2) measure is
particularly sensitive to changes at the top of the income distribution.24
However, we are not interested here in the redistributive e¤ect of the tax benet
system as a whole, but in the relative contribution of each of the main tax benet
instruments to redsitribution, such as public pensions, social benets, personal
incomes taxes and SIC. The amount of redistribution achieved by a certain tax
benet instrument is measured as the percentage change between two adjacent
income concepts. The results are presented in the right hand side of Table 2.4.1,
which shows the relative redistributive e¤ect of di¤erent tax benet instruments
for the twenty-four EU member states in our sample.
Regarding the total redistributive importance of the di¤erent instruments, pub-
lic pensions are responsible for most of the reduction in income inequality of EFIs.25
24There are more observations at the very top of the distribution for the Nordic countries, and
the spread of these observations is also larger than in the case of the other member states. In
order to address this problem we applied top-coding and trimming to the data and recomputed
all measures. The ranking of the countries with respect to the level of DPI inequality moves
in the direction of the results reported for the Gini coe¢ cient in Section 2.3.1. The results for
the redistributive e¤ect as well as the inequality contributions in the next section, however,
remain qualitatively the same. Therefore, we decided to report the results for the uncoded
data as any coding is always somewhat arbitrary. Furthermore, we have also conducted the
analysis for both approaches using the Gini coe¢ cient as a sensitivity check. The results are
qualitatively the same and can be obtained from the authors upon request.
25Note that a large part of the redistributive e¤ect of public pensions is due to a pure re-ranking
of individuals. A majority of pensioners in our data are assigned zero factor incomes. Public
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Exceptions are the Anglo-Saxon countries as well as Denmark and Slovenia. With
respect to the other redistributive instruments, in half of the countries social be-
nets play a more important role than personal income taxes, in the other half
it is the other way round. Also, the results suggest that SIC are least import-
ant in redistributing income in almost all EU member states. In some countries
SIC are counter-equalizing implying a regressive incidence. The regressive im-
pact is particularly strong in those countries where there is an earnings threshold
for contribution purposes, such as Germany, Cyprus and the UK. Only in Slov-
enia do contributions play the most important role in redistributing income. In
Belgium, France, Lithuania and Poland they are more important than personal
income taxes. With respect to the redistributive importance of single tax benet
instruments across countries, public pensions are particularly important (around
40%) in Continental countries (FR, AT, DE) as well as in the Slovak Repub-
lic, Poland and Italy. On the other hand, public pensions lead to comparatively
low inequality reductions in Cyprus, the Anglo-Saxon countries and in the Baltic
States. Benets have high redistributive e¤ects in the Nordic countries, Ireland
and Hungary; the opposite is true for the Southern European countries and the
Baltic States. Inequality reduction induced by personal income taxes is relatively
high (greater than 25%) in the UK, Hungary and Italy, and relatively low (smaller
than 10%) in Poland, Cyprus and Denmark. Finally, SIC have high redistributive
e¤ects in Slovenia, France, Belgium and Hungary. In constrast, they lead to sub-
stantial increases in inequality (smaller than negative 10%) in Germany, Cyprus
and Estonia.
Although we nd some hints of country clustering in the case of public pensions
and social benets, we cannot really identify distinct welfare state groups on the
burden side of the redistributive system. In fact, we nd a rather arbitrary rank-
ing of countries. Note, that the redistributive importance of instruments across
countries does not fully correspond to the economic weight of these instruments
as discussed in the previous section. On the contrary, this sequential approach
to redistributional analysis suggests that public pensions are the most important
source of inequality reduction. Furthermore, about half of the countries achieve
more redistribution with benets than with taxes and vice versa, and contributions
even increase inequality in almost half of the countries in our sample.
As argued above, the results for the redistributive impact of individual tax
pensions merely restore their position in the pre-retirement income ranking and this re-ranking
e¤ect makes up a large part of the pension e¤ect on income inequality (see Whiteford (2008)
for a discussion).
2.4. INEQUALITY CONTRIBUTION OF TAX BENEFIT INSTRUMENTS 27
benet instruments may be sensitive to the sequence in which instruments are
accounted for in the income accounting framework.26 Therefore we also follow the
approach suggested by Immervoll et al. (2005), and for each instrument start from
the hypothetical situation without a given instrument (DPI - instrument) and ask
how much inequality is reduced by adding this instrument. Using this approach
instead of the sequential approach, however, does not qualitatively change the
results reported above. As expected, it lowers the size of the redistributive e¤ect of
benets, but the relative importance of instruments in reducing inequality remains
unchanged.
2.4.2 Decomposition approach
This section reports the results of the inequality decomposition analysis by factor
components, i.e. determining the relative inequality contribution sf of the di¤erent
tax benet instruments to total inequality. The results of this methodology are
illustrated in Figure 2.4.1. Comparing Figure 2.4.1 with the results in Table 2.4.1,
it is evident that the decomposition results substantially di¤er from those based
on the sequential accounting approach. In almost every country in our sample,
personal income taxes and SIC lead to the highest reduction in income inequality.
The contribution of benets to reducing income inequality is negligible.
Interestingly, while personal income taxes and SIC have a signicant equalizing
e¤ect in all countries, the e¤ect of social benets and public pensions is not so clear
across countries. Whereas taxes and contributions reduce income inequality by on
average about 30%, social benets do not seem to have any signicant impact
on inequality (smaller than 5% in all countries except in Cyprus and Sweden),
also the inuence of public pensions is comparatively small. In fact, in the ma-
jority of countries public pensions have a disequalizing e¤ect on DPI inequality;
on average they increase inequality by 6%. The positive e¤ect of public pensions
on inequality is particularly large (greater than 20%) in Austria, Portugal and
Cyprus. According to this factor source decomposition approach, public pensions
only have a signicant equalizing impact in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Denmark
and Lithuania.
Benets positively contribute to the DPI inequality in at least seven countries.
The disequalizing e¤ect of benets is particularly evident in the Baltic States and
26As outlined by Burniaux et al. (1998: 15), the "adding in" of di¤erent income components also
implies that the inequality due to the correlation of income sources is arbitrarily attributed to
the income share which is added last.
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Figure 2.4.1: Relative inequality contribution of tax benet instruments
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC. Note that values above (below) 0 represent a disequalizing
(equalizing) impact on income inequality in DPIs. The size of the di¤erent bars correspond to the relative
inequality contributions sf in Table 2.4.2.
Cyprus. Benets only have notable equalizing e¤ect (greater 3%) in the Nordic
countries, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Austria and the Netherlands. On the
burden side, the equalizing e¤ect of personal income taxes is highest in the Nordic
Countries. However, in Greece, Italy, Hungary, Poland and the UK taxes account
for an inequality reduction of more then 40%, according to the Shorrocks decom-
position method. The equalizing e¤ect of personal income taxes is comparatively
small in Cyprus, Latvia and the Slovak Republic. Regarding the inequality con-
tribution of SIC, the equalizing e¤ect is particularly high (greater than 40%) in
Slovenia, Belgium, France and Latvia. The e¤ect is small in Portugal, Cyprus,
Denmark and the Anglo Saxon countries.
Again, we nd some evidence of a welfare state clustering of countries. Spe-
cically the Nordic countries reveal similarities in the size of the redistributive
contribution of the di¤erent tax benet instruments. Also the Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries and the Baltic states seem to form a rather homogeneous group with regard
to the total inequality contribution of the di¤erent tax benet instruments.
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GE(2) Inequality Redistributive E¤ects of Instruments
% change in GE(2)
EFI Market Gross Post-tax DPI Pensions Benets Taxes SIC
EU-24 0.65 0.44 0.37 0.31 0.31 31.86 14.77 18.30 -1.34
EU-15
AT 0.47 0.29 0.23 0.19 0.16 39.20 20.57 18.11 11.95
BE 0.42 0.29 0.22 0.19 0.15 31.75 23.44 11.37 20.87
DE 0.53 0.33 0.27 0.23 0.26 38.05 19.00 14.69 -13.65
DK 0.62 0.47 0.33 0.30 0.28 24.87 30.17 9.52 4.22
ES 0.36 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.20 34.48 8.69 11.05 -0.78
FI 0.57 0.41 0.30 0.24 0.25 28.48 25.92 20.31 -6.05
FR 0.58 0.35 0.28 0.24 0.18 39.93 18.93 13.87 24.86
GR 0.63 0.42 0.40 0.31 0.27 32.40 5.54 22.39 14.11
IE 0.67 0.54 0.39 0.30 0.30 18.52 28.50 22.17 0.04
IT 0.52 0.32 0.31 0.23 0.24 38.25 4.28 25.02 -3.01
LU 0.48 0.31 0.25 0.19 0.18 34.95 18.83 24.96 3.53
NL 0.48 0.33 0.27 0.22 0.24 30.87 18.69 16.36 -5.88
PT 0.75 0.55 0.49 0.40 0.34 27.35 9.79 19.79 13.04
SE 0.45 0.29 0.21 0.16 0.13 34.65 29.37 20.72 18.87
UK 0.73 0.56 0.46 0.33 0.36 23.19 16.92 28.31 -7.73
NMS
CY 0.38 0.34 0.32 0.29 0.32 10.09 6.35 9.33 -12.38
CZ 0.45 0.30 0.24 0.19 0.17 33.40 18.41 22.88 7.48
EE 0.70 0.54 0.50 0.42 0.46 22.74 8.44 15.81 -11.44
HU 0.57 0.36 0.27 0.20 0.16 37.03 23.76 26.46 19.43
LT 0.50 0.38 0.34 0.30 0.25 23.26 9.68 13.94 16.91
LV 0.47 0.37 0.33 0.30 0.28 21.73 9.79 10.44 6.64
PL 0.63 0.37 0.31 0.31 0.26 40.65 16.54 1.98 13.35
SI 0.37 0.24 0.19 0.15 0.09 33.70 21.44 19.24 40.05
SK 0.31 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.12 41.01 15.52 12.81 10.06
Table 2.4.1: GE(2) inequality measures and redistributive instruments
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC.
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2.4.3 Discussion of the results
When comparing both approaches, they lead to the same estimates of DPI in-
equality. However, the two approaches lead to somewhat contradictory results
with respect to the importance of benets for redistributing income, which would
imply very di¤erent policy implications. Why do we nd substantial di¤erences in
the redistributive importance of tax benet instruments across the two approaches,
although both approaches are based on the same inequality measure? Both ap-
proaches are used in the literature, and our results are in line with the respective
studies. In fact, studies analyzing the impact of tax benet instruments based
on the standard approach generally nd that benets are the most important
source of inequality reduction in European countries (e.g., Immervoll et al. (2005),
Mahler and Jesuit (2006), Whiteford (2008)). On the other hand, the results of
the factor source decomposition (e.g. Jenkins (1995), Jäntti (1997) and Burniaux
et al. (1998)) suggest that taxes have a larger contribution to DPI inequality.
First, an important di¤erence between the two approaches is that the account-
ing approach applies tax benet instruments sequentially; whereas, the decom-
position approach accounts for them simultaneously. Second, in order to further
investigate the sources of the di¤erences, we present the di¤erent components
which determine the relative inequality contribution of Shorrocks decomposition
analysis. As equation 2.2.5 suggests, the size of a factors relative inequality contri-
bution (sf) depends on its within factor inequality (I
f
2 ), the income share (f) of
the corresponding factor source f and its correlation with DPI (f ). From Table
2.4.2 it becomes evident that, in those countries where benets positively contrib-
ute to inequality, the correlation coe¢ cient f has a positive sign. The opposite
is true for the other countries, where they have an equalizing e¤ect. However, the
correlation between DPI and benets is weak. For example, if the EU is seen as
a single economic unit, the correlation is almost equal to zero, i.e. the benets
are fairly evenly distributed across households. The correlation between DPI and
public pensions is rather small as well. Personal income taxes, on the other hand
show a substantial negative correlation with DPIs in all countries. Furthermore,
the income share of benets is smaller than that of taxes or contributions, in ab-
solute terms. However, the within inequality for benets (and public pensions)
is as high as that for tax payments which can be explained by the large share of
people not paying taxes (receiving benets). The within inequality of SIC is much
lower for most countries and closer to that of EFI. This further break-down of the
decomposition results reveals that the negligible e¤ect of social benets on income
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inequality is due to the fact that they are hardly correlated with income in most
countries. Only the liberal welfare states of Ireland and the UK that mainly rely
on means-tested benets show a signicant negative correlation between benets
and DPI (combined with a low factor share).
Our nding that social benets account for a positive or negligible share of total
inequality in most countries - as revealed by the inequality decomposition above -
is perfectly consistent with our previous nding that benets on the whole reduce
income inequality - as revealed by the sequential accounting approach to distribu-
tional analysis in Section 2.4.1. In a related context, Stark et al. (1986) illustrate
similar results with a simple chemical experiment in which a highly concentrated
solution is mixed with a less (but still positively) concentrated one. Although the
resulting mixture will be less concentrated than the original, the added solution
is still responsible for a part of the concentration of the nal mixture. There-
fore, unless the correlation between benets and DPIs is negative, benets will
always account for a non-negative share of total income inequality. To put it more
technically, in order to nd a unique decomposition rule for any inequality meas-
ure, Shorrocks (1982) imposes the assumption of the normalization of equal factor
distributions. This restriction implies that according to Shorrocks decomposition
method, equally distributed lump sum transfers do not contribute to overall in-
equality. However, most aggregate inequality measures satisfy the axiom that such
equally distributed transfers (i.e. which are relatively higher for lower incomes)
reduce aggregate inequality; whereas, proportional transfers do not change it. This
axiom also holds for the GE(2) measure. According to the sequential approach,
therefore, equally distributed transfers imply a reduction in inequality. In the de-
composition approach, such transfers make no contribution to reducing inequality
because their correlation with DPI is equal to zero.27 In this framework, an in-
come component has to be higher in absolute terms for lower incomes in order to
achieve a negative contribution to total inequality. Therefore, the di¤erent norm-
ative foundations of the two approaches are to some extent responsible for the
di¤ering results.
27See also Burniaux et al. (1998) for a discussion of the e¤ect of equally distributed income
components in the Shorrocks decomposition.
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These di¤ering results have important policy implications. It would be wrong
to conclude from their positive contribution to overall inequality in the Shorrocks
approach that social benets increase inequality and should therefore, perhaps, be
abolished. This positive contribution has to be interpreted as the contribution of
the components of the tax benet system to overall inequality (like the di¤erent
solutions to the mixture in the chemical example) but not as the e¤ect of a change
in this instrument. Abolishing the benets would increase inequality, as shown by
the sequential approach. Nonetheless, from the decomposition approach and due
to the rather weak correlation between benets and DPI it appears that benets
may have other objectives than simply income redistribution (e.g. support of
families with children or elderly people).
From a policy perspective, it is important to take into account the results of
both approaches. The sequential accounting approach (and the literature applying
it) suggests that benets are the most important source of income redistribution.
However, the decomposition approach qualies this view by accounting for the
(weak) correlation between benets and income and therefore highlights the dif-
ferent functions of taxes and benets to redistribution.
2.5 Conclusion
The enhancement of economic and social cohesion is an important goal of EU
policies. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that there are sizeable di¤erences
across EU member states in the levels of within country income inequality - es-
pecially since the recent enlargement toward Eastern Europe. This holds true
for the inequality in DPIs as well as the inequality in pre-tax incomes, hinting
at substantial variation in the generosity of national income tax benet systems.
From a policy perspective, di¤erences in the inequality of DPIs and, in particular,
how these di¤erences are driven by a di¤erent design of tax benet instruments,
are of particular interest in order to evaluate the di¤erent welfare state designs of
European countries. In this study, we evaluate the impact of di¤erent tax benet
instruments (personal income taxes, SIC, public pensions, social benets) on in-
come inequality and specically ask the question if the role of instruments di¤ers
across the EU member states in our sample.
Our results reveal that according to the sequential accounting approach, social
benets are the most important source of inequality reduction in most European
tax and transfer systems; personal income taxes are less important. Also, public
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pensions play an important role in lowering the inequality of DPI, when com-
paring the hypothetical situation without public pensions. The factor source de-
composition approach suggested by Shorrocks, however, leads to very di¤erent
conclusions: income taxes and SIC are by far the most important contributors to
income inequality and the contribution of benets is negligible. Public pensions
even positively contribute to inequality of DPI in most countries.
An explanation for these somewhat contradictory results lies in the di¤erent
normative focus of the two approaches as discussed in Section 2.4.3. Based on
this evidence, it would seem that many social benets may have purposes other
than income redistribution. Whereas personal income taxes and SIC are clearly
correlated with income, transfers have a much less clear e¤ect on the income dis-
tribution, i.e. they are often relatively evenly distributed as they address other
issues. This is clearly illustrated by the almost negligible correlation between so-
cial benets and DPI. A clear negative correlation to DPI is evident only for some
specic transfers, like means-tested benets for the long term unemployed and
benets for social exclusion: however, these are only a small part of total transfers
in most countries.
With regard to the question of how the redistributive importance of tax benet
instruments di¤ers across countries, for Western Europe we basically observe the
typicalwelfare state clustering suggested by Esping-Andersen (1990) and later
modied by Ferrera (1996). The Nordic countries in particular reveal very similar
characteristics with regard to the redistributive e¤ects of their tax benet instru-
ments according to both approaches. Also the Continental and Southern European
countries form rather distinct groups. However, as opposed to the ndings of the
welfare state literature, we do not nd evidence to support the conclusion that the
Eastern European countries form a distinct group, at least according to the rel-
ative redistributive importance of tax benet instruments. Instead, the majority
of the Central Eastern European countries seem to naturally group together with
the traditional Continental Western European welfare states. The Baltic at tax
countries, on the other hand, are rather distinct from the other countries in our
sample. The Baltic countries are characterized by particularly small welfare states
compared to the other European countries.
Note, however, that there are limitations to our analysis. First and most import-
antly, the analysis only assesses the direct e¤ects of taxes and transfers on house-
hold incomes. But, the tax system has both a direct e¤ect on the post-government
income distribution and an indirect e¤ect as it may also inuence factor supplies
and thus the pre-government income distribution. However, this analysis does not
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account for any behavioral e¤ects caused by redistributive policies. Second, the
study is based on cross-sectional data which means that the distribution of life-
time incomes is not taken into account. Third, due to data limitations, we cannot
account for in-kind transfers, indirect taxes, or corporate income taxes which may
have di¤erent distributional impacts in di¤erent countries. These should be sub-
jects of future research as comparative data on these elements become available.
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2.6 Appendix
Data and denitions
Concept Definition / Imputation
Ex
pa
nd
ed
 F
ac
to
r 
In
co
m
e
Wages and
Salaries
Gross employee cash or near cash income (including e.g. holiday payments,
pay for overtime, bonuses etc.) plus non-cash employee income (e.g.
company car, free or subsidized meals etc.).
Self-employment
Income
Net operating profit or loss accruing to working owners of, or partners in, an
unincorporated enterprise less interest on business loans; royalities earned on
writing and inventions as well as rentals from business buildings, vehicles,
equipment etc.
Capital Income
Imputed rent; income from rental of a property or land; interest, dividends,
profits from capital investment in an unicorporated business; regular inter-
household cash transfers received.
Social Insurance
Contributions
Employer
Payments made by the employers for the benefits of their employees to
insurers (social security funds and private funded schemes) covering
statutory, convential or contractual contributions in respect of insurance
against social risks
Information on the amount of social insurance contributions paid by the
employer is not reported for DE, LT and the UK. In these cases, we use
country-specific legal rules to impute the SIC paid by the employer based on
the corresponding employee income.
Public Pensions
Old-age benefits (any replacement income when the aged person retires from
the labor market, care allowances etc.) and survivor’s benefits (such as
survivor’s pension and death grants).
Cash Benefits
Unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, disability benefits, education-
related allowances; family/children related allowances, housing allowances,
benefits for social exclusion not elsewhere classified (periodic income
support for people with insufficient resources and other related cash
benefits).
Income taxes
Taxes on income, profits and capital gains, assessed on the actual or
presumed income of individuals, households or tax-units
EU-SILC only reports income taxes and employee SIC as an aggregated
value. We subtract imputed SIC to isolate income tax payments as a single
variable.
Total Social Insurance
Contributions
Employer’s SIC (see above) and employees’ SIC (any contributions to either
mandatory government or employer-based social insurance schemes)
EU-SILC does not report SIC paid by the employee as a separate variable,
therefore values are imputed (see above) applying the appropriate legal rules
of each country.
Chapter 3
The development of scal
redistribution
In this chapter, we take a dynamic perspective and analyze the development of
the redistributive capacities of di¤erent tax benet instruments over time. In
particular, the analysis emphasizes the importance of considering indirect taxes in
welfare state analyses.28
3.1 Introduction
The reduction of income inequalities has been one of the major socio-political
achievements associated with the emergence of the modern welfare state. The
political will for redistributing income is mainly implemented through the den-
ition of scal policies. Progressive taxation and social benets are regarded as
appropriate political instruments for balancing income inequalities. The current
chapter investigates the redistributive e¤ects of the entire scal system with its
revenue-raising and spending instruments in a dynamic perspective. The leading
research questions are: Have the tax systems in Germany and the UK become less
progressive? Is there a trend toward more redistribution of income through cash
benets? Is the structure of scal systems changing and is there a relation between
changes in taxes and the transfer systems? It has been argued that the relation
between the scal instruments of taxation and transfer payments are changing un-
der the tightening inuence of globalization. Increasing empirical evidence from
the literature of political economy, known as the paradox of redistribution,29
28This chapter is based on Kammer and Niehues (2011).
29This dynamic paradox of redistributionhas to be distinguished from the paradox of redis-
tribution that refers to smaller redistributive budgets in the case of more targeted benets
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suggests that the progressivity of taxation and transfer payments are developing
a negative relation. However, we suggest a re-examination of this issue, due to
various methodological and empirical shortcomings in the existing contributions.
In particular, the mostly fuzzy denition of redistribution and the lack of micro-
founded evidence form the starting point of the current research project.
The theoretical explanations for changes in the scal systems that we are going
to draw on are political economic theories on the e¤ects of globalization on taxation
and the architecture of scal systems. These approaches suggest that increasing
economic integration and the related capital mobility limit policy makersability
for progressive taxation. At the same time, regressive tax systems are regarded
as being notably successful in providing the preconditions of a welfare state that
is able to achieve a high equality in the distribution of income. An extension of
these approaches motivates our hypothesis of substitution that predicts that the
redistributive capacities of tax and benet policies are empirical substitutes.
For an empirical test of this hypothesis, some methodological e¤ort is required.
This is especially true as most of todays political science literature on the sub-
ject of scal redistribution su¤ers from weaknesses in empirical foundation. Due
to incomplete evidence, their conclusions are often limited to hypothetical state-
ments based on restrictive assumptions rather than comprehensive empirics. The
present analysis intends to provide an interdisciplinary transfer of recent empirical
methods, which have been developed in the economics literature for the meas-
urement of scal progressivity, to questions raised by political science literature.
More specically, we introduce the methodological basics that are required for
conducting an empirical investigation of scal progressivity and e¤ective redistri-
bution. In addition, we also apply the so-called transplant-and-compare procedure
that has recently been developed by Dardanoni and Lambert (2002) to control for
the impact of changing pre-government income distributions on the assessment of
redistributive e¤ects. Relying on this methodology from economic research, we
then test the hypothesis of substitution, which is formulated in relation to polit-
ical economy literature. To our knowledge, this project is going to be the rst
comprehensive dynamic analysis of scal progressivity and redistribution that is
backed by micro evidence and includes the major scal elements: direct taxation,
payroll taxes, indirect taxes, and benets.30
(Korpi and Palme (1998)) and the redistributive paradox introduced by Sinn (1995) that
predicts a positive e¤ect of welfare state engagement on pre-government income inequality.
30Note, however, that we do not include in-kind benets or public services in our analysis which
may also be important for distributional outcomes (see Aaberge et al. (2008); Paulus et al.
(2009)).
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The setup of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents a brief
summary of the relevant literature that motivates our research and provides the
rationale for the guiding hypothesis of substitution. Section 3.3 introduces the
analytical categories and methodological techniques that provide the conceptual
toolkit for the empirical analysis of progressivity and redistribution. Thereafter,
in Section 3.4, the used data and income concepts are briey described. The
actual analysis is carried out in Section 3.5. Finally, Section 3.6 closes with some
concluding remarks.
3.2 Theory
In this section, we are going to deduce our leading dynamic hypothesis on the struc-
ture of national scal systems and the development of redistributive capacities of
discrete welfare state policies. Political economy literature made a concerted e¤ort
to understand the e¤ects of increased economic integration on political governance,
in general, and on the scal policies, in particular. Increased economic integration
is held responsible for causing structural changes of the welfare state and therewith
a¤ecting issues of the economic class conict. The e¢ ciency thesis, the compensa-
tion theory, and the tax mix argument build the theoretical background that give
reasons for the formulation of our expectation that the redistributive capacities of
scal policies are shifting from taxation to transfer policies over time.
The applied theories had been developed with the claim of validity for advanced
industrialized societies in the period from the mid-1980s until today. These scope
conditions also apply to the aspired contribution of our work. The selection of
relevant theories is based on the assumption that the development of scal and
welfare policies is fundamentally a¤ected by economic events (Scharpf (1997); Hall
and Soskice (2001); Iversen (2005)). However, there is a huge variety of theoretical
contributions with endless narrow specications that has not come to an agreement
on the direction of the causal e¤ects (Busemeyer (2009)). The majority of estab-
lished studies apply a static comparative approach to investigate the link between
economic integration and welfare policies. However, the tested models are highly
sensitive with regard to the denition and selection of variables that lead to the
vast amount of studies with signicant and, at the same time, partly contradicting
results. Since we are interested in the development of welfare statesredistributive
e¤ects and to test our hypothesis on structural changes in the scal welfare state,
we suggest a dynamic perspective on the political economy of redistribution.
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3.2.1 E¢ ciency thesis and tax competition
The central argument of the e¢ ciency thesis states that the intensied economic
integration increases the mobility of economic factors and nally displaces na-
tional welfare states into an intensied competitive environment that leads, among
other things, to international tax competition (Basinger and Hallerberg, 1998: 27;
Genschel (2005)). In this regard, the race-to-the-bottomthesis emerged in the
early 1990s and suggested that national states would lose their ability to raise
signicant tax revenues. Economic integration enforces political adjustments that
a¤ect the integrity of national welfare state outcomes in two ways. Tightened
competitive pressure not only punishes high-tax states by pulling down their tax
ratios, but continuously cutting down the tax levels also increases the threat of
cumulating public debts. Public decits then increase prices of government bonds
and result in high interest rates, which operate as a serious obstacle to growth
and force national states to cut their spending. This implies that globalization
also would have a signicant e¤ect on welfare statesspending and that national
welfare states would inevitably converge to the level of the lowest common de-
nominator (Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991); Genschel (2000)). However, empirical
research that has been conducted since then concludes that the conventional race-
to-the-bottomthesis does not pass the test. Policy makers still have the ability to
raise signicant amounts of tax revenues and the public expenditure quota and the
tax ratios remain stable (Busemeyer (2009)). Subsequently, this objection led to a
modication of political economic theories toward more di¤erentiated statements
on the e¤ects of globalization on welfare statesscal policies.
Current political economy research still deals with the question whether glob-
alization has perceptible e¤ects on scal welfare policies, even though the vicious
circle has not come true. Later research arrived at the conclusion that interna-
tional tax competition, even though it did not lead to the bleeding of public house-
holds, causes signicant changes in the structure of national tax systems (Ganghof
(2006a)). Increased economic integration, mainly through the relaxation of cap-
ital controls, increases capital mobility and therewith exposes national states to
an intensied competition for investments, location of production, and mobile tax
bases. Competitive pressure triggers market-friendly tax reforms that lead to a
decline of corporate tax rates (Devereux et al. (2008)). Thus, the specication of
the e¢ ciency thesis focuses on the development of tax rates and the structure of
the scal systems.
As corporate taxation serves a safeguard function (Mintz (1995)), which pre-
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vents an avoidance of income taxation, changes in corporate tax rates also a¤ect
personal income taxation. Situations in which top marginal tax rates for personal
and corporate income di¤er extensively provide strong incentives for shifting in-
comes to the corporate sector in order to withdraw personal income tax payments
(Fuest and Weichenrieder (2002)). For that reason, cutting top marginal tax rates
on corporate business also causes a reduction of tax rates for the whole income tax
system.31 This phenomenon became known as spill-overand describes the pull-
down-e¤ects that have an impact on the marginal tax rates of income taxation
(Ganghof (2006b); Ganghof (2006a)). However, under budget constraints of public
households, this trend has been executed mostly without loss of tax revenue. Tax
reforms in the style of tax-rate-cut-cum-base-broadening, in which marginal tax
rates are cut and tax bases are broadened, have become the blueprint in scal le-
gislation of the last two decades.32 This process primarily a¤ects income taxation,
which has the reputation of implementing the ability-to-pay principle most ad-
equately. In this regard, many authors have detected an extensive paradigm shift
in tax policies from equity to e¢ ciency (Swank and Steinmo (2002); Devereux
and Sørensen (2006); Swank (2006)). Tax reforms corresponding to this paradigm
shift were held responsible for causing a decline of tax progressivity and limit the
redistribution of income through tax policies (Ganghof and Genschel (2008)).
3.2.2 Compensation theory
In the debate of the impact of international economic integration on domestic
welfare policies the compensation thesis emerged as a competing thesis (Garrett
and Mitchell (2001)). In contrast to the direction of causality of the e¢ ciency
argument, which predicts tax cuts and a welfare state retrenchment as a result
of increased economic integration, the compensation thesis predicts an expansion
of the welfare state. It puts forward a correlation between economic openness
and economic integration on the one hand and public spending and welfare e¤ort
on the other (Rodrik (1998)). The common explanation for the interdependence
31This is of course not an automatism. Rather an independent lowering of corporate tax rates
makes tax administration very costly and ine¢ cient. The consequence then o¤ers two options
for policy makers: Either to deal with these losses of e¢ ciency and the related administrative
extra costs or to adjust all types of income taxation to the lower level. The maintenance of the
trade-o¤ can be managed through a Dual Income Taxation, but the general problem remains.
32Many competing explanations emphasize the e¢ ciency gains that are linked to such reforms
with potentially welfare increasing results. However, this does not call into question the em-
pirical fact of declining tax rates and their implications to our research issue.
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of welfare expansion and economic integration and trade openness is similar to
the double movement-argument of Polanyi (1944), where social protectionism,
likewise through welfare policies, are the response to expansion and liberalization
of markets. Later contributions specify the underlying mechanisms that cause a
growth of public insurances and also a growth of social expenditures. Globalization
intensies social and economic inequalities and increases peoples exposure to eco-
nomic risks, which subsequently increases demand for social policies to compensate
for these developments (Cameron (1978); Katzenstein (1985); Rodrik (1998)).
Some authors are skeptical about the direct link between globalization and wel-
fare policies. Iversen and Cusack (2000) suggest that economic insecurity, which is
held responsible for increasing the demand for welfare statesprograms, is rather
the result of deindustrialization. They argue that deindustrialization comes along
with structural changes in the working conditions. In this process, the threat of
unemployment rises due to increased economic vulnerability. Rapid technological
change devalues professional skills and intensies the already increased threat of
unemployment. Unemployment demolishes human capital, and workers have to
accept loss of income in case of untting reemployment. Furthermore, the in-
creased exibility of labor markets leads to discontinuous employment records,
which makes access to work-related benets, likewise occupational pensions, in-
creasingly di¢ cult. All of these factors taken together intensify peoplesdemand
for public insurance against income loss and insecurity. These mechanisms illus-
trate the positive e¤ect of deindustrialization on the size of the welfare state and
the public budget.
Summing up, in the recent literature on the political economy of the welfare
state, there are plenty of studies that argue in favor of a positive relation between
globalization and the importance of the welfare state. However, in this strand
of literature, theoretical reasoning as well as the empirical evidence focuses on
the compensatory capacities of the welfare state. When it comes to compensa-
tion, implicitly or explicitly the redistributive capacities of welfare programs, such
as public insurances and social expenditures, are addressed. The compensation
thesis then suggests that in the context of increased market integration and rising
inequalities, the redistributive capacities of the welfare state are increasing. Thus
if the compensation thesis focus on the spending side of the welfare states and,
as outlined above, the e¢ ciency thesis merely describes e¤ects on the revenue-
raising side, these two approaches are not necessarily competing or even mutually
exclusive.
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3.2.3 Tax mix argument: Fiscal policies and redistribution
The scal structure and the relation between the taxing and spending in welfare
policies is also subject to the tax mix argument that puts forward an empirical
relation between the composition of scal revenue-raising instruments and policy
makers ability to maintain an extensive welfare state (Wilensky (2002); Kato
(2003)). The tax mix is operationalized as the relative share of tax revenue, raised
by a particular tax type on the public budget. Kato refers to the widespread
assumption that consumption taxes are regarded as being the most e¢ cient tax
type with regard to their revenue-raising ability. In this rationale, a national state
that has the ability to realize a regressive tax mix through a heavy reliance on
consumption taxes is in the advantageous position to raise large tax revenues. Kato
states that an early shift from progressive to regressive taxation leads to high tax
revenues and therewith o¤ers the key precondition to realize and maintain a large
welfare state.33 Essentially, Katos tax mix argument provides a path-dependent
explanation on the co-evolution of regressive taxation and generous welfare states.
Within the tax mix argument, it is the regressive tax structure that enables a
generous welfare state. These scal strategies - regressive taxation and generous
social spending - seem to implement contradicting policies with regard to the
political goals of the redistribution of income. Even if the net e¤ect is unclear,
this challenges the overall redistributive ability of the welfare states. The hunch is
that the welfare state does not redistribute at all, if it only taxes the poor and then
donates benets to the poor. Several authors even came up with a supposition
that redistribution of income is limited to a within-class redistribution(Scharpf
(1987)), that welfare policies only reach majorities if the payer and the payee are
identical (Timmons (2005)), or proclaim a socialism within one class (Cusack
and Beramendi, 2006: 43). Against this, Kato suggests that nally scal systems
with a regressive tax system are most successful in equalizing di¤erences in income
distribution. Her conclusion claims that residual redistribution can be achieved
most e¢ ciently through generous welfare spending, which is nanced by regressive
revenue-raising techniques (Kato, 2003: 27). However, we want to emphasize
the fact that the predicted relation, that regards a regressive taxing and large
welfare spending strategy to be most e¢ cient in providing the most equal after-tax
33There are controversies on the direction of this causal mechanism. Ganghof (2006c) provides
strong arguments and counterexamples that suggest an inverse causality. However, the de-
scriptive evidence of the present analysis will not allow for any causal conclusions. Thus, the
aim of our study is the empirical investigation, whether we can identify a correlation between
a regressive tax structure and a large, redistributive welfare state - based on micro data and
all relevant scal instruments.
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income distribution, is justied on the basis of composite empirical examples. In
theoretical terms, Katos ndings lead toward a similar paradox of redistribution
as the one formulated by Korpi and Palme (1998: 2), which likewise suggests that
universal welfare states, in contrast to highly targeted welfare programs, are most
e¤ective in providing high after-tax income equality. In the full mapping of Katos
terminology, she claims a positive correlation between a regressive tax structure, at
low political costs, and a large universal welfare spending that is held responsible
a great equality of after-tax income. However, as the design of the taxing and
spending policies have contrarily redistributive e¤ects, and there are no theoretical
models o¤ered concerning the overall e¤ect, the scal structure of the welfare state
and the e¤ective redistributive e¤ects remain unexplained.
If the identied puzzle is correct and regressive taxation goes along with the
most e¤ective residual redistribution, then the corollary is that a highly redis-
tributive transfer policy has to rule out the regressive e¤ects of the tax structure
in order to achieve a net redistribution of income from rich to poor. Surprisingly,
Katos argumentation is incomplete in this regard, as she only claims a relation
between regressive revenue rising and the size of welfare state. However, as she
identies large welfare states with regressive tax mixes to possess the most extens-
ive residual redistribution of income, the causal chain has to be extended from
regressive taxation, over the maintenance of a large welfare state to, nally, an
implementation of highly equalizing benets. A coexistence of lower redistributive
e¤ects of taxation and higher redistributive e¤ects of benets has to follow from
that.
3.2.4 Development of the scal structure
In principle, both scal instruments, taxing and spending, would equally be ad-
equate for realizing an e¤ective redistribution of income. For that reason, one
would naturally expect to see these policies implemented in a complementary way.
However, in the same manner as Katos proposition, there are a couple of qualitat-
ive and quantitative studies that indicate an increasingly inverse relation between
the redistributive impacts of tax and benet policies (Steinmo (1993); Kenworthy
(2009); Prasad and Deng (2009)). In this regard, the reviewed theoretical ap-
proaches, which o¤er hypotheses on the development of welfare states policies
and the redistribution of income under the conditions of increased economic integ-
ration, are no more mutually exclusive, if one distinguishes the scal instrument.
Rather they o¤er the asymmetric dynamics that a¤ect tax and transfer policies
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with opposite signs in terms of redistributive capacities. Economic integration
pushes toward an increasingly regressive tax structure, as proposed by the e¢ -
ciency thesis, whereas it results in increased generosity of the welfare state, as the
subject matter of the compensation thesis and the tax mix argument.
In terms of redistributive political goals, these trends are antipodes. How-
ever, in matters of their political economic claims, both statements appear as
two complementary specications of an asymmetric e¤ect of economic integration
on taxation and spending. This asymmetric e¤ect is of central meaning for our
research. For this reason, the contemporary research interest is not whether eco-
nomic integration leads to welfare state expansion or retrenchment, but rather on
how economic integration a¤ects the structure of the scal welfare state, its e¤ect
on discrete scal instruments, and its e¤ect on the overall distribution of income.
It provides the basis from which we deduce our hypothesis on structural changes of
the scal welfare state that predicts that the redistributive function of tax policies
are incrementally transferred to transfer policies and both scal instruments are
becoming substitutes.
The intended empirical analysis of the development of welfare states scal
structure will be instructed by the rational of measurements of progressivity that
are introduced in the subsequent section. In the course of the analysis, we intend
for the empirical analysis to take a dynamic perspective. The presented theories
suggest that the substitutive relation initially developed with the occurrence of
increased economic integration and tightened international competitive pressure.
The impact of globalization was held responsible for a cutback of tax progressivity
during the last two decades. In references to the literature related to the com-
pensation thesis, we expect that, given a sustained political will for redistribution
of income, a simultaneous increase of redistributive e¤ects of benets comes along
with decreased tax progressivity. Such developments correspond with a shift of
redistributive capacities from the revenue side to the spending side of the welfare
state. Thus, as the assumed changes of the scal structure are resulting from
gradual process of ongoing economic integration, we expect to nd the formation
of the substitutive pattern as sequential events in the data.
3.3 Methodology
The present research interest requires insight in the structure and the redistributive
e¤ects of the most important elements of the scal welfare system as well as evid-
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ence on the aggregate a¤ect of scal welfare policies on the redistribution of in-
come. Until today, there is a serious shortage of evidence on progressivity and
redistributive e¤ects in political economy literature. Limited availability of ad-
equate data, the increased technical standards of recent empirical methods, and a
lack of interdisciplinary cooperation between economic research and comprehens-
ive political issues in political economy research are the present barriers for reliable
evidence on redistributive policies. Unfortunately, the few empirical studies that
apply highly sophisticated methods on this issue are often limited in their general-
izability since they only look at single time points and small country samples and
are therefore unfeasible to test our hypothesis on the structural developments of
scal systems (Immervoll (2004); Decoster et al. (2009)). Other contributions are
too narrow in the research question or exclude signicant parts of the scal system,
which does not allow inference on the welfare state in the aggregate (Zandvakili
(1994); Wagsta¤ et al. (1999); Corneo (2005); Piketty and Saez (2006); Duncan
and Sabirianova Peter (2008); Sabirianova Peter et al. (2009)). Also the lack of
micro-founded evidence is problematic, because it misses to conceptualize redistri-
bution adequately and inevitably ties the conclusions to strong assumptions. In
other examples, the presented empirical material is oftentimes incomprehensive
and limited to income taxation, or at best it considers redistribution as di¤erences
between pre-tax and post-tax Gini-coe¢ cients (Bradley et al. (2003); Alesina and
Glaeser (2004)) or the relation of discrete income groups (Moene and Wallerstein
(2001)). Since previous empirical studies on the dynamic paradox of redistribu-
tion su¤er from various methodological shortcomings, we intend to develop an
adequate and comprehensive research design for serving our empirical claim of
validity.34 The following section introduces concepts of empirical research that
seem most convenient for testing our hypothesis of substitution.
3.3.1 Conceptualization of redistribution and progressivity
Until today, most of the literature on scal redistribution in political economy
lacked clear-cut denitions of progressivity and redistribution. Commonly, they get
along with ascribing progressive or regressive e¤ects to certain scal instruments.
Income taxes are responsible for redistributive tax policies and welfare states do
34E.g. Garnkel et al. (2006) and Prasad and Deng (2009) use LIS (Luxembourg Income Study)
data to analyze the distributional impact of indirect taxes. However, LIS data does only
provide expenditure information for a small set of countries for very di¤erent time points.
Furthermore, there is no information on disaggregated expenditure subcategories and therefore
reduced consumption tax rates cannot be considered accurately.
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redistribute more income if they use income taxes more extensively. However,
with such assumptions, they more or less miss the target, when making claims
on redistributive policies. So far, the assessment of redistribution in comparative
political economy research is di¢ cult, since there is no practical informative basis
for redistribution of income lately because it is not a policy in itself. Rather,
redistribution is an abstract phenomenon that results from the interaction between
political conditions and institutions, on the one hand, and economic mechanisms
on the other.
Obviously, an empirical approach to scal redistribution and progressivity is
anything but trivial. Redistribution of income and progressivity are analytical cat-
egories that describe the economic consequences of scal policies on the distribution
of income. It is neither directly linked to any indicators, nor do any qualitative
political outcomes qualify for being especially progressive of redistributive. We are
going to argue that it is not su¢ cient to capture the size of a welfare statespolicy
instrument in order to evaluate its redistributive e¤ects. There is still a substan-
tial di¤erence between the level of social expenditures and e¤ective redistribution
of income. To give an example, we suggest that even if the spending on old-age
pensions (unemployment benets) in Europe is twice (six times) as high as in the
United States (Alesina and Glaeser (2004)), this does not imply that the pension
systems (unemployment insurances) in Europe are twice as redistributive as ana-
logous policies in the United States. What is obviously missing is information on
how many individuals benet from such spending, and whether beneciaries have
high or low market income before transfers. Also structural di¤erences between
contribution-based and tax-nanced social systems do not e¤ectually imply a re-
distributive or progressive welfare state. What is rather supposed to be addressed,
if one talks about redistributive e¤ects of a progressive tax system, is the fact that
the tax burden is relatively high for a rich person compared to the tax liability
of a poor individual, and reciprocally, the relatively high share of social benets
that goes to the poor compared to the one that goes to the wealthy. The relevant
aspect of redistribution and progressivity in political economy and welfare state
research is the equalizing e¤ect on the distribution of income. The following sec-
tion describes the basic analytic concepts and empirical methods that allow an
up-to-date examination of progressivity and redistribution.
Before we comment on the actual measurement concepts that are used for the
empirical investigation, some terminology has to be dened in order to clarify the
explored phenomenon. For the purpose of welfare state research, we are focusing on
two related but analytically distinguishable e¤ects of redistribution and progressiv-
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ity. First, one expects particular scal instruments to reduce inequalities of market
incomes; the residual equalizing e¤ect is called redistribution. The second aspect
is more related to the distribution of tax liability itself. Thus, in the strict sense,
progressivity denotes the fact that the tax burden is unequally distributed along
the income scale. Progressivity is then a form of deviation from proportionality.
In common speech, the concepts of progressivity and redistribution of income are
mostly used synonymously. However, for an adequate empirical research, we have
to distinguish these phenomena, particularly as they are analytically linked by a
principle of cause and e¤ect. The gain of di¤erentiating between progressivity and
redistribution is the ability for a comprehensible tracing of the interdependency of
a statutory tax system with the distribution of income and resulting redistributive
e¤ects. The causality is the following. The application of a progressive tax scale
on any non-zero distribution of income leads to a disproportional distribution of
tax burden and therewith brings about a redistributive e¤ect. The intermediate
step, the analysis of progressivity allows validation of partial e¤ects of discrete
scal instruments.
In the majority of works dealing with redistributive e¤ects of tax policy, one
nds statements on key characteristics of a taxation system. The relevant variation
is mostly attached to variations in tax rates, allowances, or tax ratios. These
indicators point toward the formal tax scales, which are very popular to analyze
in social science due to their observability, unambiguousness, and comparability.
A large share of welfare state research that deals with scal policy inconsiderately
ascribes certain types of tax scales certain welfare implications. For example, it
is mostly taken for granted that income taxation realizes redistributive e¤ects.
Against that, indirect taxation and social insurance contributions are considered
as proportional taxes, or occasionally as regressive revenue-raising instruments.
Thus, one nds operationalizations of scal redistribution, which deduce equalizing
e¤ects from tax ratios. Other popular objects of investigation are the details of tax
schedules, especially allowances and top tax rates. A progressive tax schedule, with
increasing average tax rates, introduces disproportionality into the distribution of
tax burden along a distribution of income. Evidence of this type is classied as local
measure of progressivity. Up to this point, an analysis is limited to the allocation
of tax burden to unspecied tax bases, which does not take into account the actual
empirical distribution of tax bases. However, local measures are ill-suited for the
recent concern of evaluating real-world scal systems, as inference only holds for
a hypothetical equi-proportional distribution of the tax base.
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3.3.2 Denitions and measurement
Annotations on the issue of redistribution and progressivity can already be found in
contributions to economic literature at the beginning of the 20th century. Dalton
(1923) suggests that when arguing about the redistributive e¤ects of taxation,
one has to di¤erentiate between the degree of progression of the tax scale itself,
regardless of the distribution of incomes along the scale, taking account of the dis-
tribution of incomes along it . . . [and the] e¤ective redistribution that results
from an interaction with the distribution of the tax base. Without considering the
distribution of market incomes and the varying population on the tax scale, state-
ments on the distributional e¤ects of progressive tax schedules remain hypothetical
assumptions. For example, a highly progressive income tax schedule does not res-
ult in any redistribution, as long as there is not at least a minimum of variation
in the distribution of primary income. Indeed, what is relevant for this analysis,
and not at least for policy making, are concepts that enable statements whether
one empirical tax system or tax practice is more progressive than an alternat-
ive one. Therefore, technical concepts have been developed that measure global
progressivity and redistribution as an interaction e¤ect between an instrument of
scal policy and income distribution that can be summarized in a one-dimensional,
standardized scalar index number.35
In the end, residual redistribution of income, conceptualized as an interaction
between income and tax instruments, is a purely empirical phenomenon. There-
fore, the following concepts build on the terminology of distribution functions.
In this regard, progressivity as a disproportional distribution of tax burden be-
comes apparent as a separation of the Lorenz curves of pre-tax income LX and
tax burden LT (Lambert 2001: 201).36 This simply formulizes the intuition of
progressive taxation in picturing the distribution of tax burdens in comparison to
the distribution of income. As, in practice, there is always a certain degree of
inequality in the empirical distribution of income, a progressive tax has to allocate
the tax burden marginally more unequal, in order to realize progressivity dened
as the disproportional distribution of tax burden. In such cases, the concentration
curves of income and tax burden deviate and the deviation indicates a progressive
structure of the discrete tax instrument. In contrast, in cases with perfect pro-
35The following methodological explanations and denitions base on Pfähler and Lambert (1992);
and Lambert (2001).
36Remember that Lorenz curves order income units by magnitude of their income, starting with
the lowest. Then, the cumulative proportion of the population (running from zero to one along
the x-axis) is plotted against the cumulative proportion of total income received by these units
(Lambert, 2001: 24-25).
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portionality, e.g., a at income tax without any allowances, the Lorenz curves of
pre-tax income and tax liability are congruent. The greater the separation of the
two concentration curves, the higher the progressivity. Kakwani (1977) developed
his index of progressivity from this relation and measures progressivity as twice
the space between LX(p), the distribution of income, and LT (p), the distribution
of tax liabilities, where LX(p) LT (p) measures the distance apart of LX and LT ,
at rank p of the pre-tax distribution x.
K = 2
Z 1
0
[LX(p)  LT (p)] dp (3.3.1)
Kakwani´s conception of progressivity can be interpreted as the deviation from
equi-proportional taxation.37 It takes values greater than zero in case of progressiv-
ity and values less than zero in case of regressivity. Again, if there is not at least a
minimal di¤erence between the two concentration curves, the Kakwani index takes
a value of zero and we are concerned with a state of perfect proportionality.
At the same time and on the basis of the same idea, Suits formulated a sim-
ilar index method (Suits (1977)). His approach calculates index values from the
distribution of tax liabilities, which themselves are dependent on the distribution
of pre-tax income; q = Lx (p) ) RT (q) = LT (p) (with p as ascending rank of
income units with pre-tax income x). The Suits index is calculated as twice the
space between the relative concentration curve RT (q) and the 45 line (in case of
a at tax RT (q) = 45 line).
S = 2
Z 1
0
[q  RT (q)] dp (3.3.2)
The di¤erence to the previous Kakwani index consists in the use of relative
concentration curves, where the concentration of tax liability is a function of the
concentration of primary income. This entails the great advantage of a xed codo-
main, where the Suits index takes values between S = +1 in case of maximum
progressivity and S =  1 in case of extreme regressivity. This characteristic
makes the Suits index highly recommendable, not only for partial analysis, but
also for purposes of international and sequential comparison.
In the beginning of this section, we stressed the analytical meaning of pro-
gressivity in contrast to redistribution. Indices of the rationale of Kakwani and
37Since the Gini coe¢ cient for pre-tax income equalsGx = 1 2
R 1
0
LX(p)dp and the concentration
coe¢ cient for tax liabilites CT = 1   2
R 1
0
LT (p)dp, the Kakwani index can also be expressed
as K = CT  GX :
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Suits respond to scal instruments deviation from proportional distribution of
tax liability. In contrast to progressivity measures, empirical measures of e¤ective
redistribution start from the di¤erence between the distribution of pre-tax income
and the distribution post-tax income, instead of capturing the relation between
the distribution of tax liability and income. However, what they have in common
is the algebraic rational of distribution functions of Lorenz curve type. In cases
of progressive taxation, one observes a reduced inequality in the distribution of
post-tax income compared to the distribution of primary income. This implies
the separation of the concentration curves LX , the distribution of pre-tax income,
and LX T , the distribution of post-tax income. By transformation to the familiar
mathematic syntax, one gets the index of redistribution accordant to Reynolds
and Smolensky (1977).
RS = 2
Z 1
0
[LX T (p)  LX(p)] dp = GX   CX T (3.3.3)
The Reynolds-Smolensky index measures redistribution as the space between the
distribution of pre-tax income, equivalent to the Gini-coe¢ cient and the distribu-
tion of post-tax income.
Under the assumptions of horizontal equity and di¤erentiable tax functions,38
it is possible to derive a relationship between the Reynolds-Smolensky index of
redistribution and the Kakwani-type measures of progressivity. The equation is
then only dependent on the weight g that is interpreted as the average tax rate or
public spending ratio (Lambert, 2001: 208):
RS =
g
1  g 
K (3.3.4)
The important conclusion that follows from this argues that redistribution
results from (a) the level of the tax rate and (b) the disproportionality or rather
the progressivity of a scal instrument. Micro-founded concepts of measuring
progressivity are built on the assumption that there is a direct link between income
and the size of a scal instrument such as the tax liability. The individual tax
burden then is a function of income t(x), with the assumption 0  t0 (x) < 1,
and serves the assumption of horizontal equity. However, in practice, tax liability
is not only determined by primary income. In fact, qualitative attributes are
often taken into account when it comes to the denition of the tax base. Tax
38Horizontal equity is valid in case of an income-dependent scal instrument, if the tax liability
rises with increasing income and tax liability is equal for equal incomes. Additionally, the tax
scale t(x) is di¤erentiable and for marginal tax rates it holds that 0  t0(x) < x.
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systems with child allowances, marriage penalty, and all forms of tax deductions
bring about that people with the same nominal pre-tax income may have to carry
di¤erent tax burdens. The result is a discrimination of equivalent incomes that
lead to a re-ranking of income units. In the empirical investigation of e¤ective
redistribution, we make use of these re-ranking e¤ects to measure the redistributive
e¤ects that are not induced by the size of the tax base, but rather by its non-income
characteristics. On the basis of their work on horizontal equity, Atkinson (1970)
and Plotnick (1981) developed a measure of re-ranking that is calculated in the
following form:
R = GY   CY : (3.3.5)
It measures the area between the Lorenz curve of pre-tax income and the
concentration curve of post-tax income. Horizontal inequity is captured by a re-
ranking e¤ect that brings about a divergent sequence of ascending ranked incomes
due to di¤erential scal treatment. High values indicate a high impact of non-
income characteristics in the calculation of tax liabilities and point toward high
levels of horizontal inequity. Therefore, the Reynolds-Smolensky index only as-
sesses the net e¤ect of scal redistribution, since it does not take into account
any re-ranking e¤ects. Whereas the Reynolds-Smolensky index might be seen as
a measure of vertical equity, the overall redistributive e¤ect of scal instruments
consists of both, vertical equity RS and horizontal equity as measured by R:
RE = RS   R = GX  GY : (3.3.6)
Therefore, the overall redistributive impact of scal instruments is simply meas-
ured by the di¤erence between the Gini coe¢ cient of the pre-tax income distribu-
tion and the Gini coe¢ cient of the post-tax income distribution.
Although the previous considerations mainly referred to taxes as scal instru-
ments, the concepts are likewise applicable to assess the redistributive impact and
the disproportionality of social benets. However, as transfer payments are pos-
itive cash ows, here a regressive distribution of benets leads to an equalization
of the distribution of incomes. The described concepts also allow for the measure-
ment of the redistributive e¤ects of the net scal system, meaning the combination
of all taxes and benets. However, assessing the disproportionality (progressivity)
of the net scal system is more problematic, since the disproportionality measures
are not dened in the case of equal tax and transfer payments.39
39See Lambert (2001: 274-275) for a more detailed discussion.
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3.4 Data
3.4.1 Data and indirect tax imputation
The empirical analysis is carried out on the cases of the UK and Germany, which
can both be regarded as advanced industrial societies and that have both ex-
perienced processes of economic integration, especially to the European internal
market. Comparing Germany and the UK is interesting in itself, as both coun-
tries have di¤erent welfare state regimes as well as varying political systems. The
exemplary case study on scal progressivity and redistribution of the UK is based
on the E¤ects of Taxes and Benets on Household Incomemicro data set pro-
duced by the O¢ ce for National Statistics of the UK and distributed via the UK
Data Archive.40 In fact, this is a generic micro data le and the underlying data
sets are the Family Expenditure Survey (until 2001/02) and the Expenditure and
Food Survey (from 2001/02 onwards), which report representative information on
incomes and expenditures of UK households. As opposed to the original data, the
generic data sets also include estimated amounts of indirect taxes that are essential
for this comprehensive analysis of the distributional impact of the scal system.41
Currently these annual data sets cover a time period from 1994 until 2008 and
contain around 6,000 and 7,500 households in each wave.
For the analysis of scal progressivity and redistribution in Germany, we gen-
erally rely on annual household data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP)42 In our study, we use data from 1988 until 2008, where data from 1991
onwards also includes respondents from East Germany. Unfortunately, SOEPs
micro data does not report household expenditures and, therefore, it is not pos-
sible to infer information on indirect tax payments of households. For that reason,
we additionally use information from the Einkommens-und Verbrauchsstrichprobe
(EVS), which is an o¢ cial micro data set on income and household expenditure
and is provided by the German Statistical O¢ ce.43 The EVS, however, is not
su¢ cient for our analysis on its own, since it is only conducted in ve-year inter-
vals and may not reveal important changes in tax benet policies in intermediate
40O¢ ce for National Statistics, E¤ects of Taxes and Benets on Household Income, 1994-2008
[computer le]. O¢ ce for National Statistics, [original data producer(s)]. Colchester, Essex:
UK Data Archive [distributor].
41For further information on this data and particularly on the estimation on indirect tax payments
please see http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Product.asp?vlnk=10336.
42A detailed overview of the SOEP is provided by Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2003) and Wagner
et al. (2007).
43For further information on EVS data and in particular on its comparability to SOEP data, see
e.g. Becker et al. (2003).
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Standard Reduced
Germany Rate Rate Application of reduced/ zero rates
01.07.1979 13 6.5 Reduced rates apply to food, water supplies, transport of
01.07.1983 14 7 passengers (<50km), books, newspapers/periodicals,
01.01.1993 15 7 admission to certain cultural and sporting events,
01.04.1998 16 7 agricultural inputs, social services, rewood, certain dental
01.01.2007 19 7 care services, cut owers and plants, hotel (since 2010)
Exempted: Building land, supply of building land, rents,
mailing, bank turnover, insurances, waterway transport
Standard Reduced
United Kingdom Rate Rate Application of reduced/ zero rates
18.06.1979 15 - Reduced rates apply to childrens car seats, certain
01.04.1991 17.5 - energy products such as natural gas, electricity and
01.01.1995 17.5 8 heating oil
01.09.1997 17.5 5 Zero rates apply to food, water supplies, pharmaceuticals,
01.12.2008 15 5 medical equipment, transport of passengers, books,
01.01.2010 17.5 5 newspapers/periodicals, children´s clothing
04.01.2011 20 5 Exempted: Social services, medical and dental care
Table 3.4.1: VAT rates in Germany and the UK
Source: European Commission (2011).
years. Therefore, in a rst step, we apply legal information of value-added tax
(VAT) rates for di¤erent consumer goods in combination with EVS expenditure
data to approximate household indirect tax payments. Table 3.4.1 illustrates the
evolution of VAT rates in Germany and the UK and provides a brief overview to
which goods and services the reduced rates apply.44 So far, we can rely on EVS
data from 1988, 1993, 1998, and 2003, which at least nicely corresponds to the
VAT rate reforms in 1993 and 1998.
We then estimate a simple OLS model in which we regress these indirect tax
payments on a number of household characteristics based on the following rela-
tionship:
ln(IndTaxit) = t+ lnYit+  ln(Y it)
2 + Xit + "it (3.4.1)
with IndTax as the approximated amount of indirect taxes for household i at
time point t (with t = 1988; 1993; 1998; 1999; 2003; 2007). Y represents household
disposable income and X a set of household characteristics such as household
44Note that particular goods in Germany are only virtually tax exempted. In these cases we
generally follow Fritzsche et al. (2003) and Bach (2005) and assume that only 89% of rents
are formally tax exempted and 11% underlie the standard VAT rate. In the case of medical
services we assume a standard rate on 50% of total turnovers.
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size and the number of children. X also includes the age and age squared of the
household head as well as a dummy variable whether the head of the household
is married or retired. Note that the choice of variables does not depend on a
particular theory, but we try to reproduce all partial correlations between indirect
taxes and household characteristics which are signicantly di¤erent from zero (see
ODonoghue et al. (2004)).45 The time index t indicates the underlying EVS
wave and VAT rules of the particular estimation. In fact, we estimate six OLS
models: One estimation per each EVS wave, one estimation for 1998 where we
apply the new VAT rules from the second quarter onwards (see Table 3.4.1), and
one additional estimation based on 2003 data and the new VAT rules of 2007.
Then we use the estimated coe¢ cients from the EVS wave 1988 to impute indirect
tax payments into SOEP waves 1988 until 1992, then the estimated coe¢ cients
from EVS wave 1993 to impute indirect tax payments from 1993 until 1997, and so
on. The underlying assumption of this approach is that apart from the impact of
observed household characteristics, indirect tax payments only change in response
to VAT rate changes. Although this procedure does not allow us to capture the
exact distribution of consumption every year, we can at least pick up changes in
consumption which are solely related to changes in those household characteristics,
which we control for in our regression model. Since we also account for changes
in VAT legislation, we think that, overall, we can quite adequately model the
distribution of indirect taxes.46
3.4.2 Income concepts
The phenomena of interest, redistribution, and progressivity are conceptualized in
relation to the distribution of household incomes. The unit of analysis is the house-
hold and to compensate for di¤erent household structures and possible economies
of scales within households, we use equivalent household incomes throughout the
analysis. In this chapter, equalized income is equal to unadjusted household income
divided by the square root of the number of persons in the household. We use this
45Using indirect taxes instead of household expenditures as dependent variable has the advantage
that we can also reproduce the structure of reduced VAT rates. An alternative procedure would
be the use of disaggregated subcategories of expenditures as dependent variables - however,
this would raise the problem of many observations with zero expenditures in certain categories.
46Table 3.7.1 in the Appendix provides information on the predictive power of the OLS models,
Table 3.7.2 compares our simulated tax revenues with aggregate statistics. We nd R2 values
above 0.50 for all indirect tax regressions and can reproduce about 60% of o¢ cial VAT revenues.
Furthermore, the redistributive e¤ects of the imputed indirect taxes based on SOEP households
are very similar to the results for EVS households in the corresponding year.
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concept of equivalence scales because the UK data does not provide more detailed
information on the household composition.47 In the remainder of the chapter, we
always refer to the equivalent measures of household income components unless
explicitly noted otherwise.
With respect to the income concept, several decisions have to be taken in order
to provide a standard benchmark that allows for cross-country and intertemporal
comparison. The starting concept of the analysis is household market income,
which is equal to the income before any government intervention. Market in-
comes therefore comprise all incomes that are received directly by the household
(primarily from labor, self-employment, rents, and capital income). To assess the
overall progressivity and redistribution of the scal system, we compare market
incomes with householdspost-tax incomes, which is equal to the common concept
of household disposable income less indirect tax payments. The post-tax income
concept represents the income that presumably matters for the general subjective
decision making at the household level. The di¤erence in the inequality of the dis-
tribution of market incomes and post-tax incomes therefore illustrates the overall
redistributive impact of the scal system.
As outlined above, we are specically interested in the progressivity and re-
distributive e¤ects of the separate elements of the scal system, such as income
taxes, social insurance contributions, social benets, and indirect taxes.48 Obvi-
ously, when measuring the redistributive e¤ect of single tax benet instruments,
the order in which di¤erent components are accounted inuences the measurement
of their redistributive impacts (see, e.g., Ferrarini and Nelson (2003)). Therefore,
to assess the progressivity and redistributive e¤ect of a discrete scal element, we
apply a similar approach as Immervoll et al. (2005) and start from a hypothet-
ical situation without the actual instrument (=market income) and ask how the
distribution of incomes is altered when introducing the component in question.49
Note that there are several limitations to our analysis. First and most im-
portantly, the baseline analysis only assesses the direct e¤ects of the scal system
other things being equal. For the interpretation, we have to keep in mind that
47However, the square root of household size is also the standard equivalence scale applied in the
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS).
48Note that in the baseline computations social benets also include public pension payments,
which must not necessarily be considered as part of the redistributive system. However, ac-
counting public pensions as market incomes only lowers the overall redistributive e¤ect of social
benets and does not qualitatively change the observed trends.
49We also applied the sequential accounting approach which we explained in Section 2.2.2. This
does not change the trends of the single scal components, however, each component becomes
slightly more progressive/less regressive.
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beside these rst-round e¤ects of tax benet systems on the post-government dis-
tribution of incomes, they may additionally induce indirect second-order e¤ects
by inuencing the pre-government income distribution. However, we will try to
deal with the impact of the pre-government income distribution on the assess-
ment of redistribution by applying a transplant-and-compare procedure that we
will explain later. Second, the analysis is static in so far that we are analyzing
cumulative cross-sectional data, which does not consider lifetime incomes. Thus,
we cannot disentangle redistribution over the lifecycle from redistribution from
the rich to the poor. Also, using annual incomes instead of lifetime incomes might
overestimate the regressivity of indirect taxes because often accumulated savings
are consumed at a later point of the life.50 Caspersen and Metcalf (1994) suggest
to relate the VAT burden to current consumption expenditures instead of current
incomes. Unfortunately, the UK data does not report the original household ex-
penditures. Third, the analysis only allocates those taxes and benets that can
be numerically attributed to households. Benets in kind, corporate taxes and
the consumption of public goods are not captured. Finally, we only take into
account VAT as indirect taxes since data on quantities are not readily available
in the scientic-use-les for Germany. However, VAT taxes represent the most
important element of overall indirect taxes in Germany.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Baseline estimations
In this section, we want to describe some evidence of the substitution thesis out-
lined above. So far, the results are based on Germany and the UK for which we
can include reasonably derived data on indirect taxes for a considerably long time
period. As described in Section 3.3, for assessing the impact of the scal system, it
is particularly important to look at the distribution of taxes and benets along the
income distribution. To motivate our analysis, we rst show some macro evidence
on the development of the tax mix, which has frequently been used to assess the
development of the tax structure and scal redistribution of welfare states.
Figure 3.5.1 illustrates the development of direct and indirect taxes and social
expenditures as a percentage of GDP from 1980 until 2008, for both Germany and
the UK.51 In line with the discussed theory, the gure reveals a decreasing trend
50See Metcalf (1994) and Bach (2005) for a detailed discussion of these issues.
51Note that here direct taxes combine taxes on income, prot and capital gains. Social insurance
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Figure 3.5.1: Development of taxes and social expenditures - some macro evidence
for the proportion of direct taxes for Germany, whereas there is no obvious trend
for the UK. There is, however, even some indication for an upward trend in the
UK since the end of the Thatcher government at the beginning of the 1990s. The
indirect tax ratio is clearly increasing for both countries. This is also true for the
proportion of social expenditures as percent of GDP, which increased from 16.5%
of GDP to 20.5% in the UK, and from 22.1% to 25.2% in Germany.
The majority of previous studies then ascribe indirect taxes a rather regressive
structure, while direct taxes, on the other hand, are presumed to have a progress-
ive structure. Given the evidence of an increasing indirect-direct tax ratio, many
studies conclude decreasing redistributive capacities of taxes. Therefore, when
considering the whole time period of the last three decades, the macro evidence
suggests for both countries that taxes have become less progressive, accompanied
by higher social benets. Indeed, the bivariate correlations between the indirect-
direct tax ratios and social expenditures as proportion of GDP are negative (even
if we control for the German reunication in 1990). The negative relationship
is more pronounced in Germany and for the UK the picture becomes less clear
from the beginning of the 1990s. However, pure macro evidence does not allow for
conclusions about redistributive capacities since it does not provide any informa-
tion of the distribution of tax burden across households. An increasing share of
contributions are not considered in this illustration.
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indirect taxes need not necessarily lead to increasing income inequality. The ef-
fective redistributive impact of indirect taxes does not only depend on the average
tax rate (the importance of indirect taxes) but also on its structural progressivity
and, most importantly, on the consumption patterns of households. Admittedly,
there are good reasons to assume that the liability of indirect taxes is unequally
distributed and disproportionally levied on low income households. However, the
micro evidence to justify this assumption is missing and, furthermore, the dispro-
portional distribution of indirect tax liability might vary considerably across time
and space. Therefore, as a next step, we use micro data of household´s incomes
and tax payments to assess the e¤ective distribution of taxes (and benets) and
to validate the regressivity (progressivity) of indirect (direct) taxes and attach
this information with the distributive e¤ects of other scal instruments to get a
comprehensive picture of the redistributive e¤ects of the scal welfare state.
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Figure 3.5.2: Development of progressivity of separate scal instruments
Figure 3.5.2 illustrates the di¤erent levels of progressivity of both, the spend-
ing and nancing side of the welfare state for 1988 until 2008 for Germany and
1994 until 2008 for the UK. Progressivity levels are indicated by the Suits Index.
Beside the progression level of the overall nancing side (all taxes), the progres-
sion levels of income taxes, social insurance contributions, and indirect taxes are
illustrated separately. It should again be noted that, in the case of benets, neg-
ative progressivity (=regressive) levels indicate a pro-poor distribution of benets.
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Alternatively, one can also speak of target e¢ ciency of transfer payments, where
regressivity values of -1 indicate a maximum targeting toward the poorest. The un-
equal distribution of benets over the income distribution then has similar e¤ects
on the inequality of market incomes as progressive income taxation. Therefore, the
large negative values of the Suits index (on average, -.81 for Germany and -.82 for
the UK) in the case of benets show that benets are directed toward low-income
households. Figure 3.5.2 also conrms an expected progressive structure of income
tax payments across households, meaning that households with higher incomes pay
relatively more taxes. The gure also reveals that income tax progressivity is, on
average, higher in Germany than in the UK (a Suits index of .22 as compared to
.15 in the UK). However, Germany has another major source of revenue raising:
social insurance contributions. In Germany, social insurance contributions display
a slightly regressive structure and thus favor the wealthy. For the UK, the low
levels of the Suits index for social insurance contributions indicate that contribu-
tion payments are almost proportionally distributed along the income scale and
do not change income inequalities. In contrast, indirect taxes reveal a substan-
tial regressive structure with Suits indices of less than -.25 in both countries. On
average, indirect taxes are slightly less regressive in the UK. This might be attrib-
uted to the di¤ering VAT legislation in the UK that generally applies zero rates to
unelastic goods such as food, childrensclothing, and pharmaceuticals (see Table
3.4.1).
The empirical measurement so far conrms all common expectations about
the established patterns of progressivity of separate scal instruments. The pro-
gressivity of income taxation is equally conrmed as the assumption that the
indirect tax burden is disproportionally higher for low-income households, due to
their higher marginal propensity to consume. With respect to time trends in the
e¤ective progressivity of taxes and benets, we cannot identify any clear trends
for the UK. Rather, short-term positive and short-term negative developments
cancel each other out over the whole observation period. For Germany, we see
that the progressivity of income taxes is increasing over time, whereas the indir-
ect taxes seem to become more regressive. What is, however, a surprising result
is the fact that the regressive structure of indirect taxes (and social insurance
contributions) almost balances the progressive structure of incomes taxes in both
countries. Thus, taken all revenue side sources together, their structure is almost
proportional (see all taxes in Figure 3.5.2). This is true for the average value
and for the development of all taxesover time.
The above-presented theories imply statements about changes of the scal ar-
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chitecture of the welfare state over time. We expect the redistributive capacities
of scal welfare state instruments to shift from the revenue-raising side to the
spending side as a result of economic integration. In contrast to Figure 3.5.2,
Figure 3.5.3 displays the level of redistributive e¤ects of the taxes and benets,
as measured by the Reynolds-Smolensky index. Therefore, besides the structure
and the distribution of tax benet components, here we also take into account the
average tax rates, meaning the importance of nancing and spending sources.52
If we rst look at the overall levels of redistribution (average values of RS-index)
of the di¤erent instruments, Figure 3.5.3 reveals that benets achieve the highest
amounts of e¤ective redistribution. Benets substantially decrease the inequality
in the distribution of incomes along households. With an average RS-index of .16
in Germany and .13 in the UK, the redistributive e¤ects of benets are higher in
Germany than in the UK, although above we revealed similar values of regressivity.
This illustrates the higher benet generosity in the German welfare state. Also, as
suggested by the approximately proportional structure of the nancing side, vir-
tually no redistribution is achieved by the total tax system. In fact, with respect
to the nancing side, only income taxes reveal a signicant redistributive e¤ect,
illustrated by a positive Reynolds-Smolensky index of on average .03 in Germany
and .02 in the UK. On the other hand, the gure shows that indirect taxes lead to
a considerable increase in the inequality of incomes, with increasingly larger dis-
equalizing e¤ects in Germany. In Germany, the contribution payments also have a
considerable negative impact on income inequality, whereas in the UK they rarely
reveal any e¤ect. Overall, the redistribution by the overall system is substantially
larger in Germany with an average RS-index of .23 compared to .16 in the UK.
If we then look at the development of the redistributive e¤ects of the separate
scal instruments over time, one might rst become aware of the measurements
unfortunate high sensitivity to economic cycles, which might explain the waved
shape of the lines. However, some discreet interpretation may be allowed in order
to gain evidence for the validity of the suggested causal mechanisms. For Germany,
we nd a slight increase in the redistributive e¤ect of income taxes. Therefore,
we nd no evidence for increasingly regressive income taxes as suggested by the
e¢ ciency theory. However, this trend is overbalanced by negative trends in social
insurance contributions and even more in indirect taxation. Thus, the RS index
of the revenue side displays a clear negative trend over the observation period.
For social benets, we nd an apparent upward trend. Overall, this involves an
52The development of average tax rates, the residual component in this examination, is illustrated
in Figure 3.7.2 in the Appendix.
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Figure 3.5.3: Development of redistribution of separate scal instruments
increasing redistributive e¤ect of the total scal system. Therefore, we nd some
evidence that supports the hypothesis of substitution in Germany, indicating a shift
of redistributive capacities from the revenue-raising side to the spending side. The
decreasing progressivity of taxation due to upgraded meaning of regressive indirect
taxes is on the horizon. As predicted in the theory section, benets are increasingly
important for equalizing incomes. For the UK, the di¤erent revenue sources do
not reveal any clear trends. The redistributive e¤ects of social benets seem to be
slightly decreasing over time. Thus, for the UK, the micro evidence suggests quite
di¤erent trends than suggested by the macro developments in Figure 3.5.1. This
e¤ect is also recovered in the development of the e¤ective redistribution achieved
by the entire scal system. Thus, we do not nd any evidence for a substitution of
the redistributive capacities of taxes and benets in the UK in the period under
observation.
As outlined in the Section 3.3, the Reynolds-Smolensky measure captures the
impact of scal instruments on vertical equity. However, as Figure 3.7.1 in the Ap-
pendix shows, the trends are very similar when we look at overall redistribution
that takes into account e¤ects on horizontal equity (re-ranking e¤ects). A com-
parison of Figure 3.7.1 with Figure 3.5.3 also shows that re-ranking e¤ects quite
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substantially decrease the equalizing e¤ects of income taxes and social benets in
both countries. The e¤ects are particularly pronounced in Germany where the
redistributive impact of the total scal system decreases from .23 to .19 (from .16
to .14 in the UK).
3.5.2 Robustness checks
In the analysis so far, we have neglected that the redistributive e¤ect is determ-
ined by both tax benet policies and the inuence of the pre-government income
distribution. As already noted, pre-government incomes are inuenced by a num-
ber of factors other than policy changes, such as socio-economic and demographic
changes, as well as the behavioral e¤ects induced by tax benet policies. Musgrave
and Thin (1948: 510) stated decades ago, The less equal is the distribution of in-
come before tax, the more potent will be a progressive tax structure in equalizing
income. See Figure 3.5.4 for the development of pre- and post-government income
inequality in Germany and the UK. Dardanoni and Lambert (2002) developed a
so-called transplant-and-compare procedure (also referred to as DL procedure) that
seeks to correct for such distributional di¤erences in pre-government incomes in or-
der to isolate the pure redistributive e¤ect of tax benet policies. The general idea
of the approach is to nd the post-government distribution of incomes that may
have occurred if a certain tax benet regime operated on some reference/baseline
distribution of pre-government incomes rather than on the actual distribution.53
More formally, dene N as an income schedule that maps pre-government in-
comes x into post-government incomes y. The pre-government distribution of in-
comes is symbolized by F (x) and the pair hN;F i represents the overall tax benet
regime. The DL procedure then sets out to nd a modied post-government income
schedule N g, which would occur if the income schedule N was applied to a de-
formed pre-government distribution F g 1, where g(x) represents the deformation
function and is the composition operator. By identifying an appropriate transform-
ation function g(x), any tax benet regime can be transplanted into a reference
distribution F0. Thus, hN;F ig is the tax benet regime induced by the regime
hN;F i on the distribution on deformed incomes F  g 1, with hN;F ig = hN;F0ig,
when F0 is the reference distribution in which regimes are transplanted by g(x).
After such transplantation, we will nd redistributive e¤ects that are invariant
to the choice of the reference distribution if, and only if, candidate distributions
53The formal framework which is explained in the following is based on Dardanoni and Lambert
(2002) and Lambert and Thoresen (2009).
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Figure 3.5.4: Development of pre- and post-government inequality
Note: Solid lines represent inequality levels based on the same sample as the baseline estimations in Section
3.5.1, dashed lines are based on the adjusted samples on which the transplant-and-compare procedure is applied.
are isoelastic transformations of one another, meaning that the pre-government
distributions only di¤er by location and scale.
In practical terms, the transformation function g(x) can be estimated by a
simple bivariate OLS regression, where the logs of the reference pre-government
incomes at each quantile are regressed on the logs of the quantiles of the actual
pre-government incomes of year t:
lnxF0i = at + bt lnx
Ft
i + "i (3.5.1)
with "i as an idiosyncratic error term and i as the rank of observations in the
income distribution (in equal-sized samples). If there exist at and bt > 0 such that
the distribution of at + bt lnx
Ft
i is su¢ ciently close to the reference distribution
F0(x), then the post-government incomes y can be adjusted by the location and
scale parameters as revealed from equation 3.5.1:
yg^i = e
a^+bb ln yi+2=2 (3.5.2)
where yg^i indicates post-tax incomes that have been adjusted by a tted de-
formation function g(x).54 Similarly, we derive the transplanted distribution of
54Lambert and Thoresen (2009) also add a random component to the tted values because it
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pre-government incomes.55 The measure of goodness-of-t is the R2 of the OLS
regression, which then becomes the key indicator of the isoelastic link between the
reference and the actual distribution of pre-government incomes. Thus, the R2
should be su¢ ciently close to 1 to ensure isoelasticity and baseline independence
of the results. If relative pre-government income di¤erentials are smaller in the
baseline distribution than in the respective actual distribution, we will nd b < 1,
if the reference distribution displays higher inequality, then b > 1.
However, before we can apply the transplant-and-compare approach based on
our data, some practical problems have to be solved. First, we can only identify
deformation functions in the case of equal-sized samples across the di¤erent years.
Thus, all sample sizes of the di¤erent years have to be adjusted to the smallest
sample size over the observation period (see footnote 23 in Dardanoni and Lam-
bert (2002)). In the UK, where sample sizes only di¤er slightly across years, we
thus downsize all samples to 5,764 observations (sample size from 2008). In Ger-
many, however, the sample size of the SOEP micro data almost doubled in 2000.
Therefore, we decided to separately apply the transplant-and-compare method to
19881999 (4,636 observations) and 20002008 (11,067 observations). For the UK,
we choose 1994 as the reference distribution and 1988 and 2000 for Germany.
Second, in order to dene identical ranks in the pre- and post-government distri-
bution of incomes, we have to ensure that there is no re-ranking of observations
(no horizontal inequality). The simplest approach to achieve this is to separately
sort pre- and post-government incomes, such that in the end there is perfect as-
sociation between householdspre- and post-government living standards.56 The
results of the OLS regressions for the di¤erent years are illustrated in Table 3.7.3
in the Appendix. For Germany, we nd R2 values above 0.97 in all estimations
which provides strong support for an isoelastic relationship between the di¤erent
pre-government income distributions. With R2 estimates slightly above 0.75 in
some years, the t is somewhat poorer in the UK.
increases the t between the baseline and the deformed distribution. However, in our case the
t becomes poorer if we add such a random component.
55Instead, we could also use the actual values of the baseline pre-government income distribution
(see Appendix C in Lambert and Thoresen (2009) for a discussion of this issue). However,
if we use actual values of the baseline distribution instead of tted values of the deformed
distribution, this does not change the general trends of the variables (only the shape of the
trend becomes more similar across the di¤erent scal instruments).
56If we observe equals among pre- or post-government incomes, we add a small random number
between zero and one to one of such observations, thereby ensuring that we have no ties in the
ranking of incomes. Similarly, we revert zero and negative incomes into small random numbers
since logarithms are not dened for zero or negative numbers. We shall refer to this again
later.
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Figures 3.5.5 and 3.5.6 represent the results for the transplant-and-compare
procedure for Germany and the UK, respectively. Due to the various adjustments
to the original samples in the di¤erent years, we contrast the resulting vertical re-
distribution from deformed incomes with redistributive e¤ects from the standard
approach based on identical samples. We rst observe that the sample adjust-
ments substantially change the resulting redistributive e¤ects. In Germany, the
redistributive e¤ects of all revenue-raising instruments increase (income taxes be-
come more redistributive, social insurance contributions, and indirect taxes less
regressive) and the redistributive e¤ect of social benets and the overall scal sys-
tem signicantly decreases. We also nd that the regressivity of all taxes is not
robust to these sample adjustments. Basically, the same is true for the UK, ex-
cept that here all taxes together still reveal an inequality increasing e¤ect. With
respect to the di¤erences of the redistributive e¤ects based on deformed incomes
rather than those based on the standard, year-specic approach, we only nd small
changes and the overall trends remain the same across all scal instruments. In
Germany, the only noteworthy di¤erence is slightly smaller redistributive e¤ects
of income taxes until the early 2000s. Since we also observe an increase in pre-
government inequality over this time period (see Figure 3.5.4), this would be in
line with the claim by Musgrave and Thin (1948) that more unequal distributions
mechanically lead to higher redistributive e¤ects. However, we also nd this de-
crease of the redistributive e¤ects of income taxes for the UK where we do not
observe an increase in the inequality of pre-government incomes. Furthermore, in
the UK, we observe larger redistributive e¤ects of social insurance contributions
and social benets when based on the 1994-transformed pre-and post-government
distributions, resulting in a larger redistributive e¤ect of the overall scal system.
Overall, the trends and qualitative ndings remain very robust across the two ap-
proaches which would suggest that behavioral and other factors do not play a large
role in our analysis.
Note, however, that there are limitations to the transplant-and-compare ap-
proach as applied here (and similarly in Lambert and Thoresen (2009)). First,
the approach does not allow for the inclusion of zero or negative incomes in the
assessment of distributional outcomes. Second, decisions have to be taken how to
treat equal incomes across households. Finally and most importantly, inequality
orderings based on logarithms may be di¤erent from those based on levels. Thus,
although inequality levels may suggest greater dispersion in pre-government in-
comes in the reference year (b > 1), the opposite may be true for the inequality in
logarithmic incomes (thus we may nd b < 1 in our logarithmic regressions). This
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may be problematic since comparisons of the redistributive e¤ects are based on
levels again. Accordingly, we also applied the transplant-and-compare procedure
based on a linear specication of the OLS regression. However, for some years
the goodness-of-t is rather poor, resulting in arbitrary deformation functions and
ambiguous results.
An alternative to the transplant-and-compare procedure is the so-called xed-
income approach.57 Here, counterfactual simulations are used to identify what
redistributive e¤ects would have been if either the pre-government distribution
or the tax benet policies remained unchanged.58 For example, Bargain et al.
(2011) provide a detailed analysis of the redistributive e¤ects of income taxes for
the United States. In contrast to our ndings, they found that other factors,
in particular, behavioral e¤ects, played an important role in the assessment of
distributional outcomes. However, we are not able to replicate their approach
here, since comprehensive tax benet simulation models for both countries and all
years would be needed.
3.6 Conclusion
The main concern of this chapter is to o¤er a reliable examination of scal redistri-
bution in modern welfare states. Starting from a methodological critique of studies
using macro indicators as a proxy for redistribution, this leads to some concep-
tual and methodological modications of major empirical relevance. As opposed
to the majority of existing studies, we rely on annual micro data and sophistic-
ated progressivity measures to analyze structural changes in the composition of
national scal systems and to evaluate the development of e¤ective redistributive
outcomes over time. Thus, our project provides a comprehensive dynamic analysis
of e¤ective scal progressivity and redistribution by including the majority of rel-
evant scal elements: direct taxation, payroll taxes, indirect taxes, and benets.
Another important achievement of this analysis is to test dynamic hypotheses
about the development of welfare states in the context of economic integration
and globalization. In the review of established political economic theories, we
57See Kasten et al. (1994), Clark and Leicester (2004), Alm et al. (2005), Bargain and Cal-
lan (2010) and Bargain et al. (2011) for applications of this simulation approach to identify
distributional (tax) policy e¤ects.
58Note that Lambert and Thoresen (2009) show that this approach may not be independent of the
choice of the baseline income distribution. However, this problem may be solved by simulating
counterfactuals for all possible combinations of pre-government income distributions and tax
benet schedules (see Bargain and Callan (2010) and Bargain et al. (2011)).
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Figure 3.5.5: The transplant-and-compare Reynolds-Smolensky index for Germany
Note: Triangles represent redistributive e¤ects based on the standard approach as applied in Section 3.5.1, dots
illustrate redistributive e¤ects based on the transplant-and-compare approach based on the reference year 1988
for the period until 1999 and the reference year 2000 from then onwards.
deduced our guiding hypothesis that predicts that redistributive capacities shift
from the revenue-raising side to the spending side. That is because, on the one
hand, increased competitive pressure is held responsible to trigger market-friendly
tax reforms that cut top tax rates and increasingly rely on more e¢ cient indirect
taxes, which both reduce overall tax progressivity. On the other hand, under the
assumption of strategic voting and utility maximizing individuals, increased social
risk should lead to an increased demand for compensating social policies. This
should translate into increased generosity of welfare spending and more target
e¢ ciency of transfer payments. Thus, the leading hypothesis is that the redis-
tributive capacities shift from the taxation to the spending side, meaning that the
redistributive e¤ects of taxes and benets are empirical substitutes.
In our empirical analysis, we then consider the distribution of a scal instru-
ment along the income scale, which allows statements about the structure of scal
instruments (progressivity) and its redistributive capacities. Our study contributes
to the empirical evaluation of welfare state e¤ort, by exploring the redistributive
e¤ects of the entire welfare state and discrete scal instruments. Additionally,
the decomposition of redistributive e¤ects into structure and size e¤ects reveals
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Figure 3.5.6: The transplant-and-compare Reynolds-Smolensky index for the UK
Note: Triangles represent redistributive e¤ects based on the standard approach as applied in Section 3.5.1, dots
illustrate redistributive e¤ects based on the transplant-and-compare approach based on the reference year 1994.
the scal architecture of redistributive policies of the welfare state. What distin-
guishes our project from other studies is our attempt to consider indirect taxes
in the mix of redistributive scal instruments. Our results, in fact, reveal that
the regressive structure of indirect taxation absorbs the redistributive e¤ects from
other progressive revenue-raising instruments. However, in the case of Germany,
this nding is not robust with respect to certain sample adjustments. With regard
to the test of our substitution hypothesis, the shift of redistributive capacities only
takes place in Germany in the expected manner, but not in the UK. Thus, even
though both states are subject to the same external pressure, the politics and
the economic outcomes obviously seem to depend on national specications. We
are not observing a universal reform trend in response to economic integration and
globalization. These diverging trends in Germany and the UK remain qualitatively
the same, even when we control for the impact of changes in the pre-government
distribution.
There is an obvious restraint to this conclusion: so far, for the UK, we only
observed data from 1994 onwards. Therefore, the shift might already have taken
place before our observation period. Indeed, the former Prime Minister Margaret
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Thatcher had implemented radical tax cuts and major welfare reforms. At least
for the later period, we still identify clearly diverging trends - an important result.
Future research should particularly draw attention to the political process that
varies with di¤erent political institutions. Political institutions come into question
as explanatory variables for di¤erent patterns in the development of redistributive
policies as the political system in the UK - with its strictly pluralist and major-
itarian tradition - di¤ers considerably from the corporatist tradition in Germany
and its multitude of veto points. Indeed, this analysis shows that redistribution
is caused by the interaction between politics and economics or, more precisely,
redistribution is an interaction e¤ect that results from the distribution of a scal
instrument over the distribution of economic resources. Finally, we would like to
motivate further research to follow our micro approach of measuring redistribu-
tion and to add evidence for other countries. It would be of special interest to
analyze cases from the family of Nordic welfare states and to test whether the tax
mix of these countries, which is known for high income-tax ratios, is still realiz-
ing an e¤ective redistribution of income when all revenue-raising instruments are
considered.
Also, we only provide evidence on descriptive bivariate relationships between
taxation and spending that does not allow for the identication of any causal e¤ects
between the two variables of interest. Nevertheless, we believe that our analysis
is a necessary rst step in analyzing the development of redistributive capacities
of welfare states, founded on appropriate data and methodology of capturing the
e¤ective redistribution of di¤erent scal instruments. The analysis provides a good
foundation for future research on this topic. In particular, it would be interesting to
look at some exogenous variations in national tax codes that imply decreases in the
structural tax progressivity and to evaluate their impacts on both the redistributive
capacities of taxes and social benets.
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3.7 Appendix
Dependent variable: Log of indirect taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES 1988 1993 1998 1999 2003 2007
Log of dpi 2.075*** 1.171*** 1.712*** 1.727*** 0.789*** 0.805***
(0.085) (0.076) (0.084) (0.085) (0.075) (0.076)
Log of dpi squared -0.064*** -0.023*** -0.048*** -0.049*** -0.006* -0.007*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Age 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of children -0.043*** -0.049*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.063*** -0.063***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Household size 0.023*** 0.041*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.082*** 0.081***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Married 0.053*** 0.076*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.083*** 0.082***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Retired 0.056*** 0.070*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.066*** 0.065***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 44,185 40,227 49,710 49,710 42,730 42,730
R2 0.621 0.599 0.517 0.516 0.538 0.535
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.7.1: OLS coe¢ cients of indirect tax imputation
Source: Own computations based on EVS data.
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1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Actual VAT revenue (in bn) 34.60 34.77 39.89 50.51 59.96 89.22 99.84
Simulated VAT revenue (in bn) 35.75 37.49 39.41 42.15 51.57 59.64 61.98
Simulated/ actual VAT revenue 103.3% 107.8% 98.8% 83.5% 86.0% 66.9% 62.1%
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Actual VAT revenue (in bn) 101.49 102.45 102.23 104.14 111.60 107.14 104.46
Simulated VAT revenue (in bn) 62.38 63.96 65.30 61.41 66.08 68.73 69.41
Simulated/ actual VAT revenue 61.5% 62.4% 63.9% 59.0% 59.2% 64.2% 66.5%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Actual VAT revenue (in bn) 105.46 103.16 104.72 108.44 111.32 127.52 130.79
Simulated VAT revenue (in bn) 69.80 71.93 72.03 72.88 73.47 83.86 85.71
Simulated/ actual VAT revenue 66.2% 69.7% 68.8% 67.2% 66.0% 65.8% 65.5%
Table 3.7.2: Actual and simulated VAT revenues in billions of Euro
Source: Bundesministerium der Finanzen, Kassenmäßige Steuereinnahmen; own computations based on SOEP
(and EVS) data.
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Dependent variable: Log of reference pre-government incomes F0
GERMANY
Reference year 1988 at (s.e.) bt (s.e.) Obs. R
2
lnF1989 0.547 (0.020) 0.936 (0.002) 4,636 0.976
lnF1990 0.164 (0.019) 0.971 (0.002) 4,636 0.980
lnF1991 -0.322 (0.008) 1.016 (0.001) 4,636 0.997
lnF1992 0.067 (0.028) 0.984 (0.003) 4,636 0.959
lnF1993 -0.123 (0.021) 0.999 (0.002) 4,636 0.977
lnF1994 0.026 (0.005) 0.982 (0.001) 4,636 0.999
lnF1995 0.230 (0.006) 0.962 (0.001) 4,636 0.998
lnF1996 0.615 (0.019) 0.919 (0.002) 4,636 0.978
lnF1997 0.433 (0.010) 0.940 (0.001) 4,636 0.994
lnF1998 1.236 (0.021) 0.860 (0.002) 4,636 0.970
lnF1999 1.047 (0.019) 0.876 (0.002) 4,636 0.977
Reference year 2000
lnF2001 0.215 (0.007) 0.976 (0.001) 11,067 0.993
lnF2002 -0.409 (0.011) 1.017 (0.001) 11,067 0.986
lnF2003 -0.174 (0.014) 0.999 (0.002) 11,067 0.976
lnF2004 -0.306 (0.013) 1.014 (0.001) 11,067 0.979
lnF2005 -0.123 (0.015) 0.998 (0.002) 11,067 0.972
lnF2006 0.604 (0.008) 0.932 (0.001) 11,067 0.991
lnF2007 0.517 (0.013) 0.937 (0.001) 11,067 0.977
lnF2008 0.286 (0.009) 0.958 (0.001) 11,067 0.990
UNITED KINGDOM
Reference year 1994 at (s.e.) bt (s.e.) Obs. R
2
lnF1995 0.110 (0.005) 0.970 (0.001) 5,764 0.994
lnF1996 0.333 (0.036) 0.879 (0.007) 5,764 0.755
lnF1997 0.090 (0.037) 0.915 (0.007) 5,764 0.763
lnF1998 -0.362 (0.038) 1.005 (0.007) 5,764 0.778
lnF1999 -0.186 (0.037) 0.961 (0.007) 5,764 0.769
lnF2000 0.037 (0.036) 0.899 (0.006) 5,764 0.771
lnF2001 0.442 (0.019) 0.823 (0.003) 5,764 0.918
lnF2002 0.002 (0.020) 0.909 (0.003) 5,764 0.922
lnF2003 -0.002 (0.019) 0.905 (0.003) 5,764 0.931
lnF2004 -0.663 (0.032) 1.006 (0.006) 5,764 0.843
lnF2005 -0.273 (0.024) 0.940 (0.004) 5,764 0.899
lnF2006 -0.152 (0.019) 0.906 (0.003) 5,764 0.929
lnF2007 0.040 (0.017) 0.871 (0.003) 5,764 0.943
lnF2008 0.183 (0.018) 0.839 (0.003) 5,764 0.934
Table 3.7.3: Bivariate OLS estimations of location and scale parameters
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Figure 3.7.1: Development of overall redistribution
Note: This graph illustrates the absolute reduction in Gini coe¢ cients achieved by the di¤erent scal
instruments (inclusive re-ranking e¤ect).
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Figure 3.7.2: Development of average tax rates of separate scal instruments
Chapter 4
Social spending and income
inequality
Using a dynamic panel approach, in this chapter we assess the causal relationship
between social spending policies and income inequality. Whereas spending gener-
osity signicantly reduces income inequality, the positive e¤ect of more low income
targeting on the pre-government distribution of incomes hints at the importance
of second-order e¤ects when analysing the redistributive e¤ects of social policies.59
4.1 Introduction
The relationship between redistributive policies and income inequality has gener-
ated much debate among social scientists and policy makers. In particular, the
equity e¢ ciency trade-o¤ is fundamental in the public nance literature, and state
interventions are often considered to decrease e¢ ciency. Market forces alone, how-
ever, do not necessarily bring about a desirable distribution of income in terms of
equity. This is seen as a justication for government intervention, and it is widely
accepted that public policies can play a key role in redistributing income. However,
while there is supposedly no doubt that all nations would ceteris paribus prefer less
income inequality among their citizens, they di¤er dramatically in the extent to
which they reach this goal. Therefore, understanding the di¤erences in the design
of scal and social policies and their corresponding distributive outcomes is crucial
not only to public economics, but also to other social sciences.
Using a dynamic panel approach with European countries and a time period
from 1993 until 2007, this chapter investigates whether a more generous welfare
59This chapter is based on Niehues (2010).
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state is indeed causally related to more equality in the distribution of incomes.
Besides the overall e¤ect of social spending, this study also asks which kind of
benets are most e¤ective in reducing income inequality by examining the specic
structure and characteristics of benets. In particular, the theoretical framework
of the analysis elaborates on how far inequality reducing rst-round e¤ects might
be o¤set by negative behavioral responses induced by redistributive social policies.
As a consequence, the total e¤ect on income inequality is ambigous. While the
most extensive part of the empirical analysis looks at the determinants of post-
government income inequality (i.e., the overall e¤ect), behavioral second-order
e¤ects are identied by using next-period pre-government income inequality as a
dependent variable.
Generally, the approach can be regarded as part of the large body of literat-
ure that tries to identify the determinants of income inequality in cross-national
comparison (see Atkinson and Brandolini (2004) for a survey). One of the most
tested theories of income inequality is the well-known Kuznets hypothesis (Kuznets
(1955)), which predicts an inverted-U relationship between inequality and the level
of economic development (see, among others, Galor and Tsiddon (1996); Barro
(2000), Li et al. (2000)). Further studies focus on other macroeconomic factors
such as globalization (Edwards (1997), Alderson and Nielsen (2002), Dreher and
Gaston (2008)), ination (Bulir and Gulde (1995), Galli and van der Hoeven
(2001)) or nancial development (Clarke et al. (2006)) to explain variations in
income inequality across countries.
The e¤ect of institutional factors on income inequality has been analyzed less.
This is certainly due to the inherent endogeneity of policies with respect to in-
equality levels. Because social policies might be thought of as mechanisms for
reducing income inequality, they might also be determined by inequality levels.
This raises the problem of reverse causality. Recently, some studies have become
available that focus on the impact of labor market institutions on income inequal-
ity, using instrumental variable approaches to handle endogeneity issues. For ex-
ample, Checchi and García-Peñalosa (2008, 2010) develop a formal model of how
labor share, union density, and unemployment benets inuence income inequal-
ity. Using three-stage least squares, they nd that labor market institutions indeed
reduce income inequality, but that this e¤ect is associated with higher unemploy-
ment rates. Calderón and Chong (2009) apply the System GMM-IV approach and
nd that both de jure and de facto labor market regulations tend to improve the
equality of incomes. They also evaluate the e¤ect of separate regulations and re-
veal distinct e¤ects. In the context of scal policies, Duncan and Sabirianova Peter
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(2008) analyze the e¤ect of the structural progressivity of income taxes on inequal-
ity in observed and true incomes. They use a two-stage least squares approach
with weighted averages of tax/progressivity measures in neighboring countries as
instruments for their scal policy variable.
Although most studies of inequality determinants also control for the impact of
social spending, to the best of our knowledge, the e¤ect of social policies as a key
explanatory variable of income inequality has not yet been analyzed. Also, none
of these studies has accounted for the endogeneity of social policies with respect to
income inequality. Thus, in line with Dreher and Gaston (2008) and Calderón and
Chong (2009), we apply the System GMM estimator, which is capable of dealing
with the issue of reverse causality in a dynamic panel design, to evaluate the
impact of social policies on income inequality. Instead of relying only on internal
instruments, however, we also use the presumably random incidence of certain
diseases to instrument for the possible endogeneity of redistributive policies.
The regression results suggest that a larger redistributive budget is strongly
related to lower income inequality levels. The e¤ect also remains robust when using
di¤ering numbers of instruments and data restrictions, supporting a causal e¤ect of
social spending levels on income inequality. Looking at the structure of benets,
the age-related and unemployment benets in particular are responsible for the
inequality reducing impact. More targeted benets, however, do not signicantly
reduce income inequality. Rather, the positive e¤ect on pre-government income
inequality hints at the importance of possible disincentive e¤ects associated with
means-testing.
The chapter is organized thus: In Section 4.2, we introduce the theoretical
considerations underlying the analysis. Section 4.3 describes the data and meth-
odology. Section 4.4 presents the regression results, and Section 4.5 summarizes
the main ndings.
4.2 Theoretical framework
Some mechanisms correlate the welfare state to income inequality, wherein the
term welfare stateis used as shorthand for the total of social benets provided
by the state. The objective, however, is not to provide a complete theoretical
picture of all possible e¤ects of policies that inuence inequality, but rather to
highlight some major mechanisms to develop testable hypotheses. The focus of
this study is certainly the empirical exploration of the impact of social spending
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on income inequality.
At rst glance, the impact of the welfare state on income inequality seems
trivial, since as long as social benets are somehow redistributive, the rst-round
e¤ect on the inequality of post-government incomes is by denition negative. This
e¤ective redistributive e¤ect is usually measured in micro studies by comparing
pre-government income inequality with the inequality in post-transfer incomes.
Indeed, Immervoll et al. (2005), Whiteford (2008) and Fuest et al. (2010) nd sub-
stantial redistributive e¤ects of social benets. Consequently, one might expect
a negative e¤ect of social benets on income inequality. However, this standard
approach of measuring redistribution is problematic because it neglects the fact
that the pre-government distribution of income is not independent of welfare state
policies. Social benets are generally associated with behavioral second-order ef-
fects that then inuence the distribution of market incomes before government
intervention. In fact, the provision of income transfers might inuence behavior in
manifold ways, with each having di¤ering impacts on income inequality.60 we will
focus on the labor-supplyrelated responses induced by social policies and their
possible impact on the distribution of incomes.
Generally, all forms of social protection create some disincentives to work. As
standard consumer theory suggests, any additional transfer payments shift the
recipientsbudget constraints, which means that recipients have to work less to
obtain a given standard of living. Assuming that leisure is a normal good, the pos-
itive income e¤ect reduces the labor supply. If the design of the benet involves
a benet reduction as income increases, this will impose an implicit marginal tax
rate on additional earnings that also unambiguously decreases the labor supply.
Supposing that low income earners reduce their labor supply more than high in-
come earners, social benets will lead to an increase of pre-government income
inequality. In the empirical labor supply literature, it is a robust nding that av-
erage labor supply elasticities (taking into account participation elasticities as well
as hours of labor supply) strongly decline with income (as pointed out in Røed
and Strøm (2002) and also recently found in Aaberge and Colombino (2006)). If
benet levels discourage recipients from taking part in the labor market at all,
this leads to an increase in the unemployment rate, which in turn also increases
pre-government income inequality. Given these considerations, we expect a posit-
60Income transfers may have an impact on private savings and investments, on demographic
choices, the unemployment rate, consumption decisions, and the formation of human capital
(see Danziger et al. (1981) for further references). In addition, the nancing sources of benets
such as taxes and contributions are also associated with their own behavorial responses, which
are not discussed here.
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ive e¤ect of social benets on pre-government income inequality.61 Thus, taking
into account second-order disincentive e¤ects, the redistributive e¤ects of social
benets might be smaller than the micro-studies would suggest. In fact, at the
macro level, the distributional e¤ect of social benets on post-government income
is a priori not clear. The hypothesized e¤ects of the welfare state on pre- and
post-government income inequality are also illustrated in Figure 4.2.1.
The welfare state,however, is a complex construct that consists of several
di¤erent social programs, each with di¤erent objectives and thus di¤erent e¤ects
on the distribution of pre- and post-government incomes. Most generally, social
benet programs can be divided into two groups: social insurance versus social
assistance benets (Danziger et al. (1981), Barr (2004)). Whereas social assistance
benets are generally provided on the basis of an income test to help people with
low incomes, the main objective of social insurance benets is to maintain income
in the face of adverse risks (such as unemployment, disability, and sickness) or
to redistribute income across the life-cycle (age-related benets, family-related
benets).
Figure 4.2.1: Social spending policies and income inequality
These di¤erent objectives of the benet functions imply di¤erent expectations
about their distributional outcomes.62 For example, insurance-related benets
such as unemployment, sickness, and disability benets need not necessarily be
organized to redistribute from the rich to the poor. In the case of insurance-
related benets, one does not have to claim nancial need, but eligibility and
61The redistributive paradoxon introduced by Sinn (1995) strengthens the expectation of a
positive e¤ect of the welfare state on pre-government income inequality. The underlying argu-
ment is that the social security system induces increasing investment in risky assets and moral
hazard e¤ects. Therefore, paradoxically, more redistribution may result in more post-tax in-
equality.
62The following explanations about expected distributional outcomes of di¤erent social benets
mainly draw upon Barr (1992) and Barr (2004).
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benet level depend on past contributions and the event of unemployment, illness,
or invalidity. If the benets are completely actuarial and designed exclusively to
maintain status and income, they should have no equalizing e¤ect. However, in
most developed countries, the social insurance benets of low income earners are
disproportionally higher than their past contributions. Redistribution also occurs
if benet claims are more common in the low income part of the population, which
is often the case. The argumentation in the context of public pensions is similar:
Although redistribution is not an inherent part of pensions, most systems apply
some redistributive formula that favors the poor. With respect to family-related
programs, they usually imply redistribution (from rich to poor and across the life-
cycle), since most families with children are typically among the younger segments
of the populations that are characterized by low incomes. Housing benets, on the
other hand, are directly designed to help recipients meet the cost of housing, and
eligibility is usually based on a kind of nancial need test. Similar to the case of
pure social assistance benets (such as a minimum income guarantee), the main
motive is vertical equity. Consequently, their expected rst-round e¤ect on income
inequality is particularly high. Housing benets and minimum income guarantees
generally belong to the category of social assistance benets.
With respect to the incentive e¤ects of these di¤erent benet functions, it is
certainly possible to identify some expectations about typical behavioral e¤ects.
For example, it is generally assumed that extremely high unemployment benets
(replacement rates) provide little nancial incentive to work, causing unemploy-
ment traps(Barr (2004); Meyer (2002)), which in turn increase pre-government
income inequality. In the context of public pensions and labor-supplyrelated re-
sponses, it is discussed if they induce early retirement (Gruber and Wise (1998);
Blundell et al. (2002)).63 Family-related benets are often expected to reduce the
labor supply of second-income earners. In the case of unemployment benets,
however, empirical evidence suggests that the labor supply depends more on other
characteristics such as the maximum duration of benets than on the pure level
of benets (Atkinson and Micklewright (1991)). Furthermore, many programs
involve some further eligibility conditions (e.g., working-tax credits, in-work bene-
ts) that may partly o¤set behavioral disincentive e¤ects (Blundell (2000)). Thus,
to develop testable hypotheses of the behavioral e¤ects of di¤erent benet func-
tions, further information on the specic design and nancing of the program is
63Another debate relates to the question of whether public pensions reduce private savings (see
for example Feldstein (1974)), with negative e¤ects on economic growth and adverse e¤ects on
aggregate income inequality.
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needed. Thus, the overall e¤ect of di¤erent benet functions on post-government
income inequality remains an empirical matter.
From a theoretical viewpoint, the e¤ect of means-tested benets on pre-govern-
ment income inequality is less controversial. Means-tested benets generally in-
volve a reduction in the level of benets as earnings increase. This leads to impli-
cit marginal tax rates above 100% and major labor-supply disincentives (Danziger
et al. (1981); Pestieau (2006)). Since means-tested benets are expected to reduce
the labor supply more for low income earners than for high income earners, pre-
government income inequality is expected to increase (Bergh (2005)). Therefore,
the equalizing rst-round e¤ects of more targeting are likely to be counteracted by
negative behavioral e¤ects on pre-government income inequality.64 As Atkinson
(1995: 224) states, the case for greater targeting is typically based on the assump-
tion of a xed total budget for the social security ministry. . . .Account has to be
taken of changes in the behaviour of recipients, and the limits to targeting may
arise from the adverse incentives created. Accordingly, we expect a clear pos-
itive e¤ect of the proportion of means-tested benets on pre-government income
inequality. The overall e¤ect on post-government income inequality, though, is a
priori not clear.
Figure 4.2.1 also illustrates the endogeneity problem of social programs with
respect to inequality in the pre-government distribution of incomes. Following
the famous median voter theorem, higher inequality levels may also lead to higher
redistribution (Meltzer and Richard (1981)). We will deal with this issue of reverse
causality in the empirical part of the chapter. Figure 4.2.1 also hints at further
control variables that are expected to inuence income inequality. The choice of
indicators is based on previous analyses of the income inequality determinants
already described. Basically, we will use three sorts of indicators: macroeconomic
factors, socio-economic society characteristics, and indicators for the inuence of
labor market institutions.
64Korpi and Palmes (1998) considerations of less political support and smaller redistributive
budgets in the case of greater low-income targeting also provide arguments for the counteracting
e¤ects of redistributive e¤ects of means-testing.
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4.3 Data and methods
4.3.1 Data and conepts
The dependent variable of the main part of the empirical analysis is the Gini Coef-
cient of equivalized disposable income.65 Disposable income means factor income
originally earned at the market minus taxes plus social transfers; it therefore rep-
resents the income that nally matters for the individual. The unit of analysis
is the individual. To compensate for di¤erent household structures and possible
economies of scales within households, we use equivalized household incomes for
computing Gini coe¢ cients. For each person, the equivalized (per-capita) total
net income is its household total net income divided by the equivalized household
size, according to the modied OECD scale.66 The data for the Gini coe¢ cient
is based on three di¤erent micro data sources. Data for the income reference
period 1993 until 2000 is based on the ECHP (European Community Household
Panel), a household survey with a common conceputal framework conducted in the
member states of the EU, co-ordinated by the Statistical O¢ ce of the European
Communites (Eurostat). The survey covers the old EU-15 member states, al-
though data for Austria (1993), Finland (1993, 1994), and Sweden (1993-1995) is
missing for the rst periods. Gini coe¢ cients for the year 2001 are based on the
statistics of the baseline tax benet systems of EUROMOD, a micro-simulation
model for European countries.67 Gini Coe¢ cients from 2003 until 2006 are based
on EU-SILC (Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) micro data, which is
the successor of ECHP data. The EU-SILC provides harmonized cross-sectional
and longitudinal multidimensional micro data on income and social exclusion in
European countries. After its start in 2003 with seven European countries, in the
2004 wave, it covered all old EU-15 member states except Germany, the Nether-
lands, and the UK (Gini coe¢ cients for these countries are also taken from the
EUROMOD statistics). Since wave 2005, the dataset covers the 25 EU member
states (except Malta), plus Norway and Iceland.
65In the case of maximum inequality, the standardized Gini coe¢ cient equals one, and it corres-
ponds to zero when all incomes are equal. Concerning the sensitivity on the distribution scale,
the Gini coe¢ cient attaches most weight to transfers among mid-level incomes.
66The modied OECD scale assigns a weight of 1.0 to the head of household, 0.5 to every
household member aged 14 or more, and 0.3 to each child aged less than 14. Summing up the
individual weights gives the household-specic equivalence factor.
67EUROMOD statistics on Distribution and Decomposition of Disposable Income, accessed at
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod/statistics/ using EUROMOD version no. D21
(June 2008). For further information on EUROMOD, see e.g., Sutherland (2001), Lietz and
Mantovani (2006) and Sutherland (2007).
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Overall, we have 223 observations for the Gini coe¢ cient of post-government
income, until 2003 covering the EU-15 countries and from 2004 onward also in-
cluding the new European member states (except Malta, Slovenia, Romania, and
Bulgaria) plus Norway, which is also included in the sample. Unfortunately, there
are no comparable data sources for the EU-15 for 2002. Also, there is an unavoid-
able disruption in the time series of indicators produced when using di¤erent data
surveys that has to be kept in mind when one interprets the results.68 However,
this is the best annual data available for EU member states. In fact, the cross-
national comparability of the micro data and the time period covered are major
contributions of this study.69 In particular, the usage of micro data ensures that
all Gini coe¢ cients are based on the same income concept.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Post-government Gini coe¢ cient 223 29.02 4.43 20.48 39.24
Pre-government Gini coe¢ cient 80 48.40 3.43 38.80 55.30
Social benets/GDP 223 23.90 5.03 11.90 32.60
Means-tested/Soc Ben 223 9.08 6.55 0.82 33.12
Unemployment/Soc Ben 223 7.11 4.07 0.90 21.68
Family-related/Soc Ben 223 9.19 3.49 1.89 17.58
Invalidity/Soc Ben 223 9.39 3.31 3.75 19.06
Health and sickness/Soc Ben 223 27.72 4.61 17.53 42.66
Old-age and survivor/Soc Ben 223 43.26 7.92 24.68 64.09
Housing and exclusion/Soc Ben 223 3.33 2.06 0.11 7.78
GDP per capita (in 1000$) 223 31.36 14.30 6.19 78.89
Dependency ratio 223 49.14 3.33 39.36 59.05
Proportion higher education 223 63.28 18.47 17.80 90.30
Union density 223 37.87 21.26 8.00 85.10
Table 4.3.1: Descriptive statistics
In the second part of the analysis, we also use the Gini coe¢ cient of original
incomes as a dependent variable, meaning incomes before any redistributive gov-
68In various robustness checks, however, we check how far this structural break inuences the
results. Also, we restrict the sample to EU-15 countries and EU-SILC data only. The results
are illustrated in the Appendix.
69See Atkinson and Brandolini (2001: 772), who comment on the pitfalls in the use of secondary
inequality data: Gini coe¢ cients of income inequality may be published for a range of coun-
tries, but there is no agreed basis of denition. [. . . ] We cannot therefore be sure whether results
of comparative or econometric analyses obtained using such data are genuine or a product of
data di¤erences.
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ernment intervention. Unfortunately, data on pre-government incomes is only
available from 2003 onward and then only for a limited country sample. Alto-
gether, this totals at most 80 observations for the Gini coe¢ cient of pre-government
incomes. Still, comparability concerns decrease because the computation of the
pre-government Gini coe¢ cients is based on a single data source, which is EU-
SILC micro data. Throughout the analysis, Gini coe¢ cients are measured on a
scale from 0 to 100. Descriptive statistics for the Gini coe¢ cient of pre-government
and post-government incomes are illustrated in Table 4.3.1.
Following this theoretical framework, the key explanatory variables of the ana-
lysis are indicators for the social spending structure of the welfare state. All data
for these variables is taken from the Eurostat database. Thus, we use total so-
cial benets to operationalize the overall spending generosity of the welfare state.
Social benets encompass all expenditures incurred by social protection systems
apart from any operating expenditures. However, there are critical views of us-
ing such data.70 In fact, it would be more accurate to use, for example, net social
expenditures, which also take into account the impact of taxation and private bene-
ts on social expenditures (see Adema and Ladaique (2009)). Unfortunately, this
data is not available for the countries and time period we investigate. Throughout
the analysis, total social benets are expressed as proportion of GDP to account
for di¤erent country sizes. To analyze the impact of di¤erent social spending cat-
egories on income inequality, we rely on the di¤erent benet functions of the core
system of the Social Protection Statistics provided by Eurostat.71 Thus, we look at
unemployment, family, health, and invalidity-related benets separately. We add
survivorsbenets to the category of old-age-related benets and combine housing
and social exclusion benets, whereas social exclusion benets only represent a
small residual function in the Eurostat Social Protection Statistics. To measure
the degree of low income targeting of welfare states, we apply the proportion of
means-tested social benets as a percentage of total social benets. Means-tested
benets are social benets that are explicitly or implicitly triggered by the bene-
ciary´s income falling below a specic level.
Besides social spending, there obviously are also a number of further variables
that are expected to inuence income inequality. The choice of the indicators
that we will control for in our empirical anaylsis is based on previous studies
70See for example De Deken and Kittel (2007), who critically assess using data on social ex-
penditures as they are available in Eurostat. For further information on methodological issues
regarding variables of the spending dimension of social protection schemes, see Eurostat (1996).
71See Eurostat (1996) for further information on the denition of di¤erent spending categories
in the Social Protection Statistics as published by Eurostat.
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on income inequality determinants, which we briey surveyed at the beginning
of the chapter. Thus, we include three sorts of indicators: macroeconometric
factors, socio-economic society characteristics, and indicators for the inuence of
labor market institutions. As macroeconomic indicators, we use GDP per capita
(measured in constant international 1000 $) and GDP per capita squared to control
for the aggregate income levels of countries. The data for the level of economic
development is taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) from the
World Bank Group.
Variables that represent the socio-demographic and -economic structure of the
society such as the dependency ratio (the proportion of population aged under
15 and over 64 as a percentage of total population) and the proportion of the
population aged between 25 and 64 that has at least a higher secondary education
are again from the Eurostat database.
Measures of the inuence of labor market institutions are taken from the ICT-
WSS Database on International Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting,
State Intervention and Social Pacts in 34 countries between 1960 and 2007. Union
density presents the net union membership as a proportion of wage and salary
earners in employment.72 Finally, we also include a dummy for post-socialist new
EU member states since their inequality levels may di¤er for reasons not captured
by the control variables.
4.3.2 Estimation strategy
As has been indicated, this study is based on an unbalanced, pooled cross-sectional
time series (CSTS) of at most 183 cases in 24 European countries. To empirically
estimate the hypotheses derived in Section 4.2, we will use a reduced form equation
such as
yit = yi;t 1 + Sit + Xit + i + t + "it (4.3.1)
with yit as the inequality measure of country i at time point t, which is
either the Gini coe¢ cient of post-government income or the Gini coe¢ cient of
pre-government income. Sit represents the variable of interest, the overall gener-
osity of the welfare state, represented by total social benets per GDP. X is a
vector of control variables as described in the previous section. Finally, ui presents
72Within robustness checks, we also included GDP growth, the ination and unemployment
rate, population growth, and di¤erent openness indicators as additional control variables. We
dropped these variables in the nal estimations because they either did not have a signicant
impact on inequality or due to multicollinearity concerns. However, the inclusion of these
additional controls did not substantially change the results.
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country-specic e¤ects, ut period-specic e¤ects, and "it the idiosyncratic error
term. The lagged dependent variable is included because income inequality is
rather persistent over time. In the presence of country xed e¤ects, OLS will lead
to biased and inconsistent estimates in this dynamic panel setting.73 Thus, our
preferred method of estimation is System GMM, which was introduced by Blundell
and Bond (1998). More specically, we use the System GMM estimator as imple-
mented by Roodman (2009b) in Stata. In contrast to Di¤erence GMM (Arellano
and Bond (1991)), in which di¤erences are instrumented with levels, the Blundell-
Bond estimator instruments levels with di¤erences. The underlying idea is that
in the presence of persistent processes, past changes may be more predictive of
current levels than past levels of current changes. Consequently, the instruments
become more relevant. System GMM uses both the equation in di¤erences and
the equation in levels. Thus, System GMM also allows for including time-invariant
variables in the level equation. In some additional specications, we will also ana-
lyze the impact of specic social programs Sk (such as unemployment benets,
family-related benets, old-age related benets, and so on) on income inequality.
To avoid omitted variable biases, we also include a measure of total social benets
less the specic benets k in question (S1 kit ) to simultaneously control for other
social benets:74
yit = yi;t 1 + 1S
k
it + 2S
1 k
it + Xit + i + t + "it (4.3.2)
The Di¤erence and System GMM regression approaches are particularly useful
because they can deal with endogenous regressors and reverse causality. Since we
look at the impact of social policies on income inequality, there is no appropriate
counterfactual without the social policy in place. In fact, in our particular set-
ting, the long-established median voter theorem suggests that higher inequality
could also lead to more redistribution (Meltzer and Richard (1981)). Accordingly,
inequality levels might also inuence the design of redistributive policies. This
possible reverse causality implies that the results for the generosity of the welfare
state are likely to be biased upward. Generally, System GMM is intended to build
internal instruments for the predetermined dependent and additional endogenous
regressor variables.
73In fact, OLS will tend to produce an upward bias in the coe¢ cient of the dependent variable; for
a xed e¤ects model, the opposite is true. Thus, a valid specication should produce coe¢ cient
estimates for the lagged dependent variable that lie within or near this range of estimates.
74See Calderón and Chong (2009) for a similar approach to analyzing the impact of specic labor
market regulations on income inequality.
4.3. DATA AND METHODS 87
To deal specically with the endogeneity of our social policy variable, we also
include external instruments in our estimations. In the macro-context of developed
countries in particular, appropriate instruments, and therefore an exogenous vari-
ation in social spending, are di¢ cult to nd. This analysis uses the presumably
random incidence of certain diseases to instrument for the possible endogeneity of
redistributive policies. Unfortunately, comparable data on the incidence of such
diseases is rare. Finally, we include the number of hospital discharges of mul-
tiple sclerosis patients per 100,000 and the standardized death rates for malignant
melanoma of skin and maligant neoplasms of the prostate as proxies for the in-
cidence of these diseases.75 We assume that they are not systematically related
to behavioral e¤ects, income, or income inequality, but that the incidence of these
diseases is not clear and mainly arises from unsystematic genetic predisposition.
On the other hand, an increasing incidence of such diseases is obviously associated
with an increase in health-care expenditures and can therefore be regarded as an
exogenous variation in social spending. Of course, the pure incidence of such dis-
eases would be more appropriate because the indicators actually used might again
be related with the social health-care system of a particular country. However,
such data is not available for a su¢ cient number of countries. Beside the social
spending variables and the lagged dependent variables, we treat all other regressors
as strictly exogenous, meaning they instrument themselves.
System GMM involves many specication choices. Since our case involves
a rather unbalanced panel, we use forward orthogonal deviations (Arellano and
Bover (1995)) instead of di¤erences to maximize the sample size. Also, we apply
the one-step estimator with small sample correction and robust standard errors
to account for heteroskedastic error structures. Recently Roodman (2009a)) dis-
cusses the problem of having too many instruments that might overt endogenous
variables. In fact, System GMM uses all available instruments, and the number
of instruments increases quartic to the number of time points. In our specic set-
ting of being only slightly larger than, this might especially be an issue. Thus,
we test the robustness of the results to severely reducing the instrument count by
collapsing instruments and restricting the number of lags used as instruments. In
addition, we look at the Di¤erence-in-Hansen test for the instruments of the level
equation as recommended by Roodman (2009a). Obviously, another concern in
75Additionally, we used the incidence of female breast cancer and the number of hospital dis-
charges of musculoskeletal system and connective tissue disease patients from the European
Health for All Database (HFA-DB). However, data is only available for a very restricted sample
of countries. The corresponding results are qualitatively the same and can be obtained from
the authors upon request.
88 CHAPTER 4. SOCIAL SPENDING AND INCOME INEQUALITY
our setting is the structural break in the time series of the underlying micro data
for the Gini coe¢ cient. Thus, we conduct several robustness checks by testing
for the existence of structural breaks in the full sample and restrict the sample to
using EU-SILC data only.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Post-government income inequality
Table 4.4.1 presents the results of the impact of total welfare spending on post-
government income inequality, measured by the Gini coe¢ cient of disposable in-
come. The specication in column (1) uses all available instruments as suggested
by the System GMM estimator. As the results reveal, the lagged dependent vari-
able is signicantly di¤erent from zero at a one percent signicance level, emphas-
izing the persistence of inequality levels over time. Also, the ndings in column
(1) reveal a negative e¤ect of the overall generosity of the welfare state in terms
of social benets per GDP. The e¤ect is signicant at a ve percent signicance
level. With respect to the macroeconomic control variables, the results support a
U-shaped relationship between GDP per capita and income inequality. Accord-
ingly, in line with comparable studies on developed countries (e.g., Dreher and
Gaston (2008)), the ndings do not support the Kuznet hypothesis of an inverted
U-shaped relationship between inequality and the level of economic development.
The dependency rate and the proportion of higher education do not show signi-
cant e¤ects on income inequality in this specication. Post-socialist EU member
states reveal income inequality levels that are on average 3 Gini points lower than
do countries without a socialist history. According to this specication, union
density does not seem to have a signicant e¤ect on income inequality. As the
identication statistics at the bottom of Table 4.4.1 suggest, the specication
passes the Sargan overidentication test and the Arellano-Bond test of second-
order serial correlation in error terms. However, the perfect Hansen statistic of
1.000 indicates that instrument proliferation might be an issue in this specication
with all available instruments.
Thus, in the next estimations, we signicantly reduce the instrument count
by rst collapsing the instruments and then using only the collapsed second-lag
instruments, as suggested in Roodman (2009b) and Roodman (2009a). Even when
severely reducing the number of instruments, the e¤ect of social spending on in-
come inequality remains signicant, suggesting that redistributive rst-round ef-
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fects outweigh any negative second-order e¤ects. With respect to the other cov-
ariates, the lagged dependent variable loses its signicance in these specications,
whereas the intuitive positive e¤ect of the dependency rate now turns signicant.
It should be noted that specication (3) also passes the Di¤erence-in-Hansen test
for both the full instrument set for the level equation as well as those based on
the lagged dependent variable, supporting the nding of a causal e¤ect from social
spending on income inequality.
Dependent variable: Gini coe¢ cient post-government income
(1) (2) (3)
Full instrument Collapsed Collapsed
VARIABLES count instruments second-lag
Lagged Gini coe¢ cient 0.650*** 0.205 0.338
(0.088) (0.165) (0.219)
Social benets/GDP -0.157** -0.275** -0.329**
(0.062) (0.102) (0.124)
GDP pc (in 1000 int $) -0.150** -0.324*** -0.290***
(0.058) (0.089) (0.083)
GDP pc squared (in 1000 int $) 0.001* 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dependency rate 0.108 0.239* 0.224*
(0.076) (0.119) (0.118)
Prop secondary education -0.013 -0.048 -0.020
(0.014) (0.030) (0.035)
Post-communist -3.297** -5.052** -5.858***
(1.213) (1.901) (1.977)
Union density -0.009 -0.038* -0.029
(0.013) (0.019) (0.019)
Period E¤ects X X X
Observations 183 183 183
Number of countries 24 24 24
No of instruments 145 49 23
Sargan test 0.186 0.435 0.210
Hansen test 1.000 1.000 0.510
A-B test 2nd-order corr 0.327 0.407 0.358
System GMM estimations with robust standard errors, small sample correction,
and forward orthogonal deviations. All equations also include external instruments.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.4.1: Social spending generosity and post-government income inequality
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As indicated, another concern might be the structural break in the time series
of the underlying micro data for the Gini coe¤cient. Therefore, Table 4.6.1 in
the Appendix also reports the results of some data robustness checks. In the
rst specication, we restrict the sample to EU-15 member states to check the
sensitivity of the results with respect to the inclusion of new EU member states.
The result of social spending remains negative and signicant. Yet, the p-value of
the Sargan test does not pass the 10% level, indicating that the instruments may
not be valid in this specication. The second specication in Table 4.6.1 only uses
EU-SILC micro data. Thus, all observations before 2003 are dropped, and the
number of observations decreases to 75. Again, the inequality-reducing e¤ect of
social spending is signicant. Specication (3) indicates that, indeed, inequality
levels after the data break in 2002 are on average one Gini point higher. Still, as
the interaction e¤ect in the last column shows, this does not signicantly inuence
the e¤ect of social spending on income inequality.76
The robustness of the results with respect to the instrument count and di¤erent
data restrictions strongly supports a negative relationship between social spending
and income inequality. Therefore, even if social benets might be associated with
negative disincentive e¤ects that are positively correlated with pre-government
income inequality, the overall e¤ect on post-government income inequality is neg-
ative. Table 4.4.2 reports the e¤ects of di¤erent social benets on post-government
income inequality. The estimations basically follow equation (2) and estimate the
isolated e¤ects of specic benets, while simultaneously controlling for the other
social benets. The specication of each row is similar to that in Table 4.4.1 column
(4), including the additional control variables and period e¤ects. All models pass
the Sargan and second-order serial correlation tests. As the results show, only the
unemployment-related benets and the old-age and survivor benets reveal statist-
ically signicant e¤ects on income inequality. Both e¤ects are negative, indicating
implicit redistribution formulas in both unemployment and pension benets. The
e¤ect of family-related benets is negative, but not statistically signicant. On
the other hand, the disability benets and health-related benets display positive
signs, which might give some support to the idea that they have other objectives
rather than redistribution. Nevertheless, both e¤ects are statistically insignicant.
Although the rst-round e¤ect of housing and social exclusion benets is expected
to be clearly inequality reducing, the overall e¤ect on post-government income
inequality is not signicant and positive. Thus, there is some evidence that neg-
76Table 4.6.2 in the Appendix also illustrates the e¤ects of social spending on income inequality
when using the OLS and FE estimator. The e¤ects are similar and remain signicant.
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ative behavioral e¤ects induced by these social assistance benets outweigh their
inequality decreasing rst-round e¤ects. Overall, the results of Table 4.4.2 show
that di¤erent social benet functions display distinct e¤ects on post-government
income inequality. These ndings indicate that the category of social assistance
benets is not responsible for the negative e¤ect of social spending on income in-
equality, but insurance-related benets such as unemployment and pension benets
are.77
Dependent variable: Gini coe¢ cient post-government income
VARIABLES Coe¢ cient Std.Dev. Obs. Sargan AB AR(2)
Social Benets -0.275 ** (0.102) 183 0.435 0.407
Unemployment -0.198 * (0.098) 183 0.721 0.385
Family-related -0.139 (0.169) 183 0.596 0.409
Invalidity 0.053 (0.145) 183 0.778 0.465
Health-related 0.032 (0.143) 183 0.470 0.418
Old-age and survivor -0.119 ** (0.047) 183 0.809 0.469
Housing and exclusion 0.057 (0.188) 183 0.741 0.428
Full specication of each row includes the same control variables as the estimations in
Table 4.4.1 column (4). System GMM estimations with robust standard errors, small sample
correction, forward orthogonal deviations, and collapsed instruments. All equations also
include external instruments. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.4.2: Income inequality and di¤erent benet functions
4.4.2 Pre-government income inequality
Within the theoretical framework, we also derived expectations about the e¤ects
of social spending and the benet targeting structure on pre-government income
inequality. Therefore, in Table 4.4.3, we contrast the results of social spending
and the proportion of means-tested benets on post-government inequality with
the corresponding e¤ects on pre-government income inequality. Column (1) is
identical to column (4) in Table 4.4.1. In the second specication, we include the
proportion of means-tested benets along with the proportion of non-meanstested
benets, to control for the rest of social benets. Since in specications (3) and (4)
we specically try to identify second-order behavioral e¤ects that go along with
social policies, we include lagged measures of social spending and means-tested
77Using OLS and FE as estimation methods, unemployment benets and family-related benets
reveal a signicant inequality reducing impact. Public pensions, though, lose signicance in
the FE model (see Table 4.6.2 in the Appendix).
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benets.78 It should be noted that the number of observations is rather small
in these specications, with pre-government income inequality as a dependent
variable, since data is only available for a restricted sample. In fact, estimations
are only based on 56 observations in 20 countries.
The results in column (2) suggest that the proportion of means-tested benets
does not have a signicant e¤ect on post-government income inequality, although
they are specically targeted at low income groups. This nding is line with the
previous nding of housing and social exclusion benets, which make up a large
part of means-tested benets. When looking at the e¤ects on pre-government
inequality, the lagged value of social benets reveals a positive correlation, though
the e¤ect is not signicant at conventional signicance levels. With respect to the
lagged value of the proportion of means-tested benets, we nd a comparatively
large positive e¤ect on pre-government inequality, which is signicant at a 5% level.
This strongly corroborates with our hypothesis that a more targeted spending
structure is associated with higher pre-government income inequality.79
Regarding the other covariates, model (3) gives weak support for the exist-
ence of an inverted U relationship of economic development and pre-government
inequality. Yet, this nding vanishes when controlling for the targeting structure
of benets. Furthermore, there is some evidence that a higher dependency rate is
associated with more inequality in pre-government incomes. Also, post-socialist
countries display signicantly larger levels of pre-government income inequality.
As expected from theory, stronger labor market institutions are negatively related
to pre-government inequality.
78We should emphasize that the results remain qualitatively the same when including current
instead of lagged values for the social spending variables.
79This nding is also conrmed when using OLS as estimation method. However, the e¤ect
becomes insignicant and negative in the FE model (see Table 4.6.2 in the Appendix).
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Dependent variable: Gini coe¢ cient post- and pre-government income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Post-government inequality Pre-government inequality
Lagged Gini coe¢ cient 0.205 0.401** 0.579*** 0.194
(0.165) (0.159) (0.200) (0.155)
(Lagged) Social benets -0.275** 0.130
(0.102) (0.085)
(Lagged) Means-tested/Soc ben -0.047 0.479**
(0.147) (0.175)
(Lagged) Non means-tested -0.405* 0.364**
(0.201) (0.140)
GDP pc (in 1000 int $) -0.324*** -0.331** 0.317* -0.058
(0.089) (0.140) (0.171) (0.264)
GDP pc squared (in 1000 int $) 0.003*** 0.003* -0.003* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Dependency rate 0.239* -0.026 0.080 0.596***
(0.119) (0.184) (0.160) (0.180)
Prop secondary education -0.048 -0.001 -0.038 -0.056
(0.030) (0.030) (0.044) (0.038)
Post-communist -5.052** -8.451** 5.087 8.771***
(1.901) (3.371) (3.313) (2.660)
Union density -0.038* -0.011 -0.055* -0.054*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.031)
Period e¤ects X X X X
Observations 183 183 56 56
Number of countries 24 24 20 20
No of instruments 49 48 37 40
Sargan test 0.435 0.953 0.251 0.099
A-B test 2nd-order corr 0.407 0.350 0.187 0.502
System GMM estimations with robust standard errors, small sample correction, and forward orthogonal
deviations. Models (1) and (3) also include external instruments.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.4.3: Social spending and pre-government income inequality
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4.5 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to analyze whether more generous social spending
policies are indeed associated with lower income inequality levels. Specically, it
examines to what extent negative behavioral e¤ects might counteract the redis-
tributive rst-round e¤ects of social benets. According to the theoretical frame-
work, the overall e¤ect of social spending on post-government income inequality
is a priori not clear, since social spending policies are expected to have a posit-
ive e¤ect on pre-government income inequality. In addition, it is suggested that
di¤erent benet functions have di¤erent objectives and might, thus, be related to
di¤ering distributional outcomes
One major result of the regression analysis reveals that a larger social budget
is strongly related with lower inequality levels in post-government incomes. This
suggests that overall, redistributive rst-round e¤ects outweigh any inequality-
increasing second-order e¤ects. This negative e¤ect of social spending on income
inequality is robust to various specication choices. In particular, the e¤ect re-
mains statistically signicant when severely reducing the instrument count and
when using di¤erent data specications, suggesting a causal e¤ect of social spend-
ing levels on post-government income inequality. With respect to the inequality in
pre-government incomes, we cannot identify any statistically signicant e¤ect of
the overall spending generosity of welfare states. The empirical evidence suggests,
however, that if there is an e¤ect, it is positive. In terms of the di¤erent functions
of social benets, the results reveal that not all benets are associated with lower
inequality levels. More specically, unemployment benets and public pensions
seem to be responsible for the inequality reducing impact.
Regarding the targeting structure of social policies, the empirical results reveal
that social protection systems that specically target low income groups are not
associated with lower inequality levels in post-government incomes. This nding
hints at the importance of possible disincentive e¤ects created by low income tar-
geting that counteract equalizing rst-round e¤ects. Additional regressions show
that a higher proportion of means-tested benets is indeed associated with more
inequality in pre-government incomes. This strengthens the argument that more
low income targeting comes at the cost of substantial negative second-order e¤ects.
Note, however, that there are limitations to our analysis. First, the analysis
only discusses behavioral e¤ects related to labor-marketrelated decisions. How-
ever, social spending policies also a¤ect pre-government incomes in ways other
than through labor market outcomes. Redistributive policies might also a¤ect the
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behavior of market actors with regard to investment and saving decisions, geo-
graphical mobility, and so on. All these e¤ects and their impact on inequality
are not discussed. Second, the study only analyzes the e¤ect of overall benet
levels on income inequality. However, specic additional characteristics such as
the duration of benets and other eligibility criteria might be responsible for the
e¤ects on income inequality. Thus, to make more specic statements about the
distributional and behavioral e¤ects of social programs, more information on the
characteristics of these programs is needed. This information is also important for
specic policy recommendations.
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4.6 Appendix
Dependent variable: Gini coe¢ cient post-government income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES EU-15 EU-SILC structural break
Lagged Gini coe¢ cient 0.411*** 0.143 0.615*** 0.408*
(0.108) (0.141) (0.149) (0.214)
Social benets -0.227** -0.468** -0.200* -0.273**
(0.084) (0.180) (0.103) (0.103)
GDP pc (in 1000 int $) -0.255*** -0.250* -0.115 -0.126
(0.061) (0.128) (0.075) (0.098)
GDP pc squared (in 1000 int $) 0.002*** 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dependency rate 0.149 0.467* 0.406** 0.602***
(0.089) (0.240) (0.161) (0.206)
Prop secondary education -0.032 -0.047* -0.012 -0.028
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.035)
Post-communist -4.906*** -2.041 -3.256
(1.640) (1.831) (2.006)
Union density -0.020 -0.049* -0.024 -0.039
(0.014) (0.026) (0.024) (0.034)
Data 1.033*** 5.828
(0.260) (3.693)
Data * Social Benets -0.173
(0.130)
Period e¤ects X X X X
Observations 161 75 183 183
Number of countries 15 24 24 24
No of instruments 48 43 38 39
Sargan test 0.097 0.753 0.466 0.611
A-B test 2nd-order corr 0.549 0.060 0.286 0.304
System GMM estimations with robust standard errors, small sample correction, forward orthogonal
deviations, and collapsed instruments. All equations also include external instruments.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.6.1: Data robustness checks
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Dependent variable: Gini coe¢ cient post-government income
VARIABLES Coe¢ cient Std.Dev. R2 Obs.
Pooled OLS
Social Benets -0.159 *** (0.043) 0.908 183
Unemployment -0.096 ** (0.037) 0.909 183
Family-related -0.130 ** (0.057) 0.909 183
Invalidity -0.062 (0.042) 0.908 183
Health-related -0.067 (0.049) 0.908 183
Old-age and survivor -0.039 ** (0.017) 0.909 183
Housing and exclusion -0.050 (0.061) 0.908 183
Means-tested -0.021 (0.033) 0.908 183
Dependent variable: Gini coe¢ cient pre-government income
Lagged Social Benets 0.059 (0.048) 0.898 56
Lagged Means-tested 0.203 ** (0.090) 0.908 56
Fixed-E¤ects
Social Benets -0.214 ** (0.108) 0.336 183
Unemployment -0.309 *** (0.115) 0.358 183
Family-related -0.251 * (0.130) 0.346 183
Invalidity -0.268 * (0.147) 0.346 183
Health-related 0.075 (0.105) 0.360 183
Old-age and survivor 0.101 (0.088) 0.348 183
Housing and exclusion -0.235 (0.220) 0.339 183
Means-tested -0.039 (0.107) 0.337 183
Dependent Variable: Gini coe¢ cient pre-government income
Lagged Social Benets -0.052 (0.367) 0.536 56
Lagged Means-tested -0.211 (0.367) 0.540 56
Full specications include the same additional control variables as the previous
estimations as well as period e¤ects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.6.2: OLS and FE specications
Chapter 5
Inequality of opportunity
In this chapter we introduce the concept of inequality of opportunity instead of the
traditional inequality of outcome approach used in the previous analyses. While
scal policies reveal a substantial impact on outcomes, we nd no di¤erential
impact of tax benet systems on unequal opportunities.80
5.1 Introduction
Preferences for redistribution are systematically correlated with beliefs about the
relative importance of e¤ort and luck in the determination of outcomes (see Konow
(2003), Alesina and Giuliano (2011) and Gaertner and Schokkaert (2011) for over-
views). Individuals are more willing to accept income di¤erences which are due to
individual e¤ort (or laziness) rather than exogenous circumstances (Fong (2001)).
Theories of distributive justice distinguish ethically acceptable inequalities (e.g.
due to di¤erences in e¤ort) from unfair inequalities (e.g. due to endowed char-
acteristics).81 In empirical applications, the main problem is the identication of
the latter, i.e. the amount of inequality which is due to circumstances beyond the
sphere of individual responsibility. It has been recognized that previous estim-
ates of such inequality of opportunity (IOp henceforth) yield only lower bounds
because of the unobservability of the full set of circumstances (e.g. Bourguignon
et al. (2007) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011)). In this chapter, we suggest a new
estimator of IOp based on a xed e¤ects model which additionally allows identi-
fying an upper bound for unfair inequalities in order to provide the full range
of IOp estimates. We illustrate our approach by comparing estimates for Ger-
80This chapter is based on Niehues and Peichl (2011).
81See Sen (1980, 1985, 1992), Dworkin (1981a,b), Arneson (1989), Cohen (1989), Roemer (1993,
1998, 2002) and Fleurbaey (2008).
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many and the US two countries with di¤erent welfare state regimes, attitudes
toward inequality and redistribution (see Figure 5.7.1 in the Appendix) and social
mobility.82
The concept of equality of opportunity (EOp) in contrast to equality of out-
comes (EO) has received considerable attention since the seminal contributions of
Roemer (1993, 1998), Van de gaer (1993) and Fleurbaey (1995).83 The traditional
notion of EO refers to an equal distribution of economic outcomes (e.g. well-being,
consumption or income) across the population.84 The EOp theory, in contrast, is
interested in the sources of inequality and separates the inuences on the outcomes
of an individual into circumstances and e¤ort. Circumstances are dened as all
factors beyond the sphere of individual control, for which society deems individuals
should not be held responsible, such as parental education, gender or ethnic ori-
gin. E¤ort, on the other hand, comprises all actions and choices within individual
responsibility for which society holds the individual (partially) accountable, e.g.
schooling or labor supply decisions. Inequalities (in income) due to di¤erences in
e¤ort are deemed equitable, whereas inequalities due to endowed circumstances
are not.85
In empirical estimations of EOp it is impossible to observe all characteristics
that constitute individuals circumstances (e.g. innate talent or ability). Hence,
in practice, all existing estimates of IOp are only lower bound estimates of the
true share of unfair inequalities due to circumstances.86 Estimating lower bounds
of IOp has important implications for the design of redistributive policies. As
82According to Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Americans believe that social mobility is important
and high in the US, whereas Europeans perceive lower chances to climb the social ladder.
Hence, Germans are more in favor of redistribution than Americans (Alesina and Angeletos
(2005)).
83See e.g. Roemer et al. (2003), Dardanoni et al. (2005), Betts and Roemer (2006), Lefranc et al.
(2008, 2009), Devooght (2008), Checchi et al. (2010), Checchi and Peragine (2011), Dunnzla¤
et al. (2011), Aaberge et al. (2011), Almås et al. (2011) as well as Björklund et al. (2011).
84See, e.g., Katz and Autor (1999) for an overview as well as Autor et al. (2008) and Dustmann
et al. (2009) for recent applications to the US and Germany.
85This is related to the literature on wage discrimination (see, e.g., Altonji and Blank (1999)
for an overview). However, a fundamental di¤erences exists between the two elds. Labor
economists studying discrimination are usually interested in estimating the direct e¤ect of
endowed characteristics (e.g. race, gender) on income and try to separate it from confounding
e¤ects due to between-group di¤erences in e¤ort. In contrast, the EOp literature believes that
the confounding indirect e¤ect is also a source of unfair inequalities, i.e. a circumstance, itself
that should not be separated from the direct e¤ect of circumstances on income (see, e.g., the
discussion in Roemer (1998)). We discuss this issue in more detail in Section 5.2.
86This is due to the fact that adding another circumstance variable to the analysis increases
the explained variation and hence the share of inequality due to circumstances just like an
R2-measure increases when adding another variable to the analysis. See Ferreira and Gignoux
(2011) for an extensive discussion.
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most theories of distributive justice are based on ethical principles which only de-
fend compensation for inequalities due to circumstances, underestimating the true
amount of this IOp might lead to too little redistribution when designing a fair tax
benet system (Luongo (2010)) or to too much if the implicit assumption is that
the upper bound is 100%. In addition, especially when comparing countries, the
observed and unobserved circumstances might behave di¤erently which can lead to
di¤erent conclusions when looking only at a(n observed) subset of all (potential)
circumstances.
In order to tackle the lower-bound problem, we suggest a new estimator for
IOp which takes into account the maximum value of (observed and unobserved)
circumstances. Our method is based on a two-step approach. First, we estimate
a xed e¤ects model using panel data. We argue that the time-constant unob-
served heterogeneity is the maximum amount of circumstance variables which an
individual should not be held responsible for as, by denition it comprises all
exogenous circumstances as well as some unchanging e¤ort variables. Second, we
use this estimated individual e¤ect to estimate the maximum extent of inequal-
ity which can be attributed to IOp, i.e. inequality due to circumstances. This
two-stage estimator allows us to quantify an upper bound of IOp. Together with
the well-known lower bound we thus provide a range for the extent of IOp which
allows to better compare income distributions and to give guidelines for the design
of redistribution policies.
To empirically illustrate our new estimator, we rely on the Cross-National
Equivalent Files (CNEF) for Germany and the United States (US) which contain
harmonized micro-level panel data from national surveys which cover long time
periods and include a comprehensive set of income, circumstance and e¤ort vari-
ables. The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) data has been widely used for
income inequality analyses (see, e.g. Fuchs-Schündeln et al. (2010), Peichl et al.
(2011)). However, it has not yet been used to analyze IOp. We compare our es-
timates to US data taken from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) which
has been used by Pistolesi (2009) to analyze IOp in the land of opportunities.
Comparing the US with a Continental European country like Germany is interest-
ing in itself (see, e.g. Piketty and Saez (2007)), as both countries have di¤erent
welfare state regimes and people have di¤erent beliefs about redistribution and
social mobility.87 Almås (2008) uses data from the Luxembourg Income Study to
87There are a number of studies investigating social and economic mobility (see, e.g., Corak and
Heisz (1999), Björklund and Jaentti (1997, 2009), or Björklund et al. (2010). While these
studies only implicitly measure IOp, we can directly estimate it in our approach.
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compare estimates of unfair inequalities for Germany and the US and shows that
the results depend on the fairness ideal and the measure used.88
Our lower bound estimates yield IOp shares of up about 16% for annual earn-
ings in the US, which is comparable to previous ndings. The upper bound of
IOp, in contrast, accounts for around 35% of the observed inequality. Results for
Germany are signicantly higher with shares of 30% and 50% respectively which
is in line with the ndings of Almås (2008). The signicant di¤erences between
lower and upper bounds suggest that previous (lower bound) estimates of IOp
might demand for too little redistribution in order to equalize unfair inequalities.
Furthermore, our results based on annual incomes seem to indicate that EOp is
higher in the "land of opportunities". However, as it has been shown in the liter-
ature, IOp is usually higher in permanent than in annual incomes (Aaberge et al.
(2011)). We are able to conrm this result for the lower and upper bound shares
for the US, which increase to 30% and 70% respectively. However we do not nd
a large increase for Germany. Hence, when looking at permanent income, IOp
is even slightly higher in the US. We relate this interesting country di¤erence to
di¤erent degrees of mobility and persistence in di¤erent parts of the distribution
(Björklund and Jäntti (2009)).
Results are similar for gross and net earnings. This implies that there is no
di¤erential e¤ect of redistribution on IOp, i.e. there is no implicit tagging on
circumstances in the tax systems of Germany and the US. Our results further
indicate that unobserved circumstances, such as ability and talent, are important
determinants of inequality (in line with ndings for Sweden, see Björklund et al.
(2011)). Furthermore, we identify gender as an important source of IOp which is
mainly driven by the indirect e¤ect of gender on earning outcomes through the
selection into part-time employment. A policy simulation reveals that the switch
from joint taxation to individual taxation signicantly reduces IOp in Germany.
88Two di¤erent approaches have been used in literature to estimate IOp (see, e.g., Fleurbaey
and Peragine (2009)): ex-ante vs. ex-post. The former partitions the population into types,
i.e. groups of individuals endowed with the same set of circumstances, and IOp is measured
as inequality between types. In the latter case, individuals are classied into responsibility
groups (tranches) of individuals at the same e¤ort level and inequality within tranches is
investigated. Note that Almås (2008) argues that the ex-ante approach gives a lower bound
because it treats the unexplained variation as an responsibility variable (see also the discussion
in Ferreira and Gignoux (2011)), whereas the ex-post approach would give an upper bound
because it treats the residual as a circumstance. This, however, is only true for a given set
of (observed) circumstances. Dening the upper bound as in our case, gives lower and upper
bounds both for the ex-ante and ex-post approaches. In our empirical application, we focus
on the ex-ante approach due to practical reasons and data limitations. We discuss the two
approaches in more detail in Section 5.2.
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The setup of the chapter is as follows: In Section 5.2, we introduce the concep-
tual framework of EOp and the methodology to estimate the upper bounds of IOp.
Section 5.3 describes the data and income concepts used. Section 5.4 presents the
results of our empirical analysis which are discussed in Section 5.5. Section 5.6
concludes.
5.2 Conceptual framework and methodology
5.2.1 Measuring IOp: a simple model
In order to compare our new estimator to previous IOp estimates, we follow stand-
ard practice in the literature to dene our theoretical and empirical approaches. In
accordance with Roemer (1998), we distinguish between two generic determinants
of individual outcome yis of individual i at time point s. First, circumstances Ci
are characteristics outside individual control (think of race, gender, family back-
ground)  and hence a source of inequitable inequalities in outcomes. Second,
e¤ort Eis is representing all factors a¤ecting earnings that are assumed to be the
result of personal responsibility.
Following Roemer (1998), we explicitly recognize the fact that e¤ort is shaped
by circumstances, i.e. that the distribution of e¤ort within each type is itself a
characteristic of the type. This approach, which is common in the literature on
EOp, di¤ers from the literature on wage discrimination (see Altonji and Blank
(1999) for an overview) where economists are usually interested in a cleanmeas-
ure of the direct e¤ect of circumstances. Suppose there in an unobservable aspect
of e¤ort that is correlated with an endowed characteristic. Then a regression of
earnings on circumstances only (e.g. a gender dummy) overestimates the direct
e¤ect of gender on earnings because it confounds the e¤ects of the endowed char-
acteristic with a dimension of e¤ort that it is correlated with. Hence, economists
studying discrimination control for between-group di¤erences in e¤ort in order to
arrive at a cleanmeasure of the direct e¤ects of circumstances. In the literature
on EOp, in contrast, the confounding indirect e¤ect (of circumstances on income
via e¤ort) is also seen as a source of unfair inequalities itself which should be com-
pensated and hence not be separated from the direct e¤ect of circumstances on
income89. Therefore, IOp is related to wage discrimination, but it is not the same.
Unfair income di¤erences in the IOp framework can be indeed caused by discrim-
89Note, however, that there is disagreement about the degree of compensation (see, e.g., the
discussion in Roemer (1998) and Fleurbaey (2008)).
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ination, but they could also be due to between-group di¤erences in productivity
or preferences. Therefore, the two approaches imply di¤erent normative choices
about the compensation of the indirect (confounding) e¤ect. While we focus on
the traditional notion of EOp in this analysis, the di¤erent normative choices of
the underlying fairness principles can be made explicit (see Fleurbaey (2008) or
Almås et al. (2011)) and, in principle, it is possible to extend our approach of
estimating an upper bound to other normative frameworks as well.
We assume that the outcome variable of interest depends both on exogenous,
i.e. time-invariant, circumstances Ci belonging to a nite set   = fC1; C2; :::; CNg ;
as well as personal e¤ort Eis, which can be shaped by Ci; belonging to a set

 = fE1; E2; :::; ENg. In our analysis, we focus on (annual or permanent) labor
earnings wis of individual i at time point s which is generated by a function
f :   
! R+ :
wis = f(Ci; E(Ci)is) (5.2.1)
As it is common in most parts of the literature, we do not explicitly take into
account the role of luck. Hence, we (implicitly) assume that luck belongs to the
sphere of individual responsibility and in our deterministic model, the individual
is held responsible for any random component that may a¤ect the income and
that cannot be attributed to the observed circumstances.90 The same is true for
potential measurement errors in the earnings data.
We follow the ex ante approach of equality of opportunity and partition the
population of discrete agents i 2 f1; :::Ng into a set of types  = fT1; T2; :::Tkg;
i.e. subgroups of the population that are homogeneous in terms of their circum-
stances.91 The income distribution within a type is a representation of the op-
portunity set which can be achieved for individuals with the same circumstances
Ci by exerting di¤erent degrees of e¤ort. EOp is achieved if the mean advantage
levels  are identical across types:
k(w) = l(w);8l; kjTk 2 ; Tl 2  (5.2.2)
90We further discuss and relax this assumption in Section 5.3. See also Lefranc et al. (2009)
for the extension of the EOp framework to explicitly take into account luck.
91See Fleurbaey and Peragine (2009) or Checchi et al. (2010) for a extensive discussion of ex-ante
vs. ex-post approaches. We choose the ex-ante approach in our context because it is easier
to estimate it empirically when accounting for numerous circumstance variables and a large
number of types in the presence of small samples or cell sizes. Our method is, in general, also
applicable to the ex-post approach which will be discussed in more detail later on.
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Measuring IOp thus means capturing the extent to which k(w) 6= l(w), for k 6= l.
To compute a measure of IOp, a hypothetical smoothed distribution (Foster and
Shneyerov (2000)) is constructed: k(w) = f(Ci; E); which is obtained when each
individual outcome wki is replaced by the group-specic mean for each type 
k(w)
(for a given reference value of e¤ort E).
Based on this smoothed distribution, we compute two scalar measures of IOp
for any (scale invariant) inequality index I:
a = I(fki g) (5.2.3)
r =
I(fki g)
I(w)
(5.2.4)
where a is a measure of the absolute inequality of opportunity level (IOL), and r
is the inequality of opportunity ratio (IOR) measuring the share of total inequality
that can be attributed to circumstances. This allows to decompose the total
income inequality into inequality within types (i.e. e¤ort inequality) and inequality
between types (i.e. opportunity inequality).
In order to respect the axioms of anonymity, Pigou-Dalton transfer principle,
normalization, population replication, scale invariance and subgroup decomposab-
ility, we choose a member of the Generalized Entropy class (Shorrocks (1980)) as
inequality measure. By introducing the further requirement of path-independent
decomposability (see Foster and Shneyerov (2000)), the set of eligible indices re-
duces to the mean logarithmic deviation (MLD) I0 = 1N
X
ln w
wi
.
5.2.2 Empirical strategy to estimate IOp
Lower bound of IOp In our empirical estimation approach we follow Bour-
guignon et al. (2007) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) who use a parametric
specication to estimate lower bounds of IOp. Relying on a parametric approach
allows us to estimate the impact of numerous circumstance variables even in the
presence of small sample and cell sizes which, unfortunately, is the case in the
data that we use for our empirical illustration.92 Log-linearization of equation
92In contrast, non-parametric methods avoid the arbitrary choice of a functional form on the
relationship between outcome, circumstances and e¤ort (e.g. Lefranc et al. (2009), Ferreira
and Gignoux (2011) or Aaberge et al. (2011)). The drawback of the non-parametric approach,
however, is that a consideration of more than one circumstance variable is di¢ cult due to
practical reasons in the presence of small cell sizes which is usually the case in survey data.
Access to large-scale administrative panel data with information on circumstances (family
background), which is not available in Germany and rather restrictive in the US, would allow
to estimate lower and upper bounds of IOp also non-parametrically.
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(5.2.1) and adding an error term yields the following empirical specications
ln(wis) = Ci + Eis + uis (5.2.5)
Eis = HCi + vis (5.2.6)
Equation (5.2.5) represents the direct e¤ect of circumstances, equation (5.2.6)
the indirect e¤ect of circumstances on e¤ort. Since it is unlikely that we will
observe all relevant circumstance and e¤ort variables that constitute individuals
outcomes, estimating this model will likely yield biased estimates. However, in
order to compute IOp shares, it is not necessary to estimate the structural model
and to derive causal relationships. By substituting the e¤ort equation (5.2.6) into
the earnings equation (5.2.5), we obtain the following reduced-form relationship:
ln(wis) = (+ H)| {z }
 
Ci + vis + uis| {z }
is
(5.2.7)
This reduced-form equation can then be simply estimated by OLS to derive the
fraction of variance which is explained by circumstances. Including all available
k observed circumstances CK in equation (5.2.7), the estimates b measure the
overall e¤ect of circumstances on labor earnings, combining both, the direct and
indirect e¤ects. Based on this, we can construct a parametric estimate of the
smoothed distribution:
eLB = exp[b CKi + 2=2] (5.2.8)
As we replace earnings outcomes by their predictions (with 2 being the es-
timated residual variance in the earnings equation, see Blackburn (2007)), all in-
dividuals with the same circumstances necessarily have the same advantage levels.
Thus, in the case of absolute EOp, i.e. no income di¤erences due to (observed)
circumstances CKi , all predicted earning levels would be identical. Consequently,
IOp can then be measured as the inequality of these counterfactual earnings levels,
where di¤erences are only due to di¤erences in circumstances. By inserting (5.2.8)
into (5.2.3), we derive a measure of the absolute IOp level (IOL), whereas inserting
(5.2.8) into (5.2.4) gives a measure of the relative IOp share (IOR).
The approach has so far been in line with the existing literature such as Bour-
guignon et al. (2007), Checchi et al. (2010) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011). It
has been recognized that this procedure leads to lower bound estimates of the true
106 CHAPTER 5. INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
share of unfair inequalities due to circumstances. The intuition to this is just like
that of an R2-measure which increases when adding another variable to the ana-
lysis: adding another circumstance variable to the analysis increases the explained
variation (or at least does not decrease it in the case it is orthogonal), and hence
the share of inequality due to circumstances cannot decrease. In the next step, we
suggest a new estimator for IOp to tackle the lower-bound problem.
Upper bound of IOp Our method to derive an upper bound of IOp is
based on a two-step approach. First, we estimate a xed e¤ects model using
panel data to derive a measure of time-constant unobserved heterogeneity. Second,
we use this estimated unit e¤ect to estimate the maximum extent of inequality
which can be attributed to inequality due to circumstances. The intuition for
the di¤erence between lower and upper bounds of IOp is comparing the explained
variance of an earnings equation with all observed circumstance variables (lower
bound) to (one minus) the explained (within) variance of an xed e¤ects regression
(upper bound). However, instead of comparing the (explained) variances of the log
earnings equations, we compute an inequality measure with well-dened properties
based on the smoothed distributions.93
To estimate the xed-e¤ects model, we apply our setting to a longitudinal
data structure. This implies that individual earnings at time point t (with t 6= s)
might be inuenced by time-constant observable circumstances Ci (economically
exogenous by denition), by time-varying observable e¤ort variables Eit as well
as time-constant unobserved factors ui, time-specic unobserved factors ut and an
independent error term "it:
wit = f(Ci;Eit; ui;ut; "it) (5.2.9)
Log-linearization yields the empirical specication
ln(wit) = Ci + Eit + ui + ut + "it (5.2.10)
which corresponds to the data generating process of a xed e¤ects model with
time-specic e¤ects. Thus ut takes up serial e¤ects such as ination and other
time-specic earnings shocks which are common for all individuals and "it comprise
unsystematic factors which inuence wages. Using this longitudinal design enables
93We do this, because the variance of logarithms in contrast to the MLD and other GE-measures
is not a good measure of inequality because it violates the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle as
well as the Lorenz criterion (Foster and Ok (1999)).
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us to derive consistent estimates for the e¤ort variables despite their endogeneity
with respect to the unobserved circumstances. As opposed to other studies which
assess the impact of e¤ort variables in EOp settings, we can also estimate the e¤ect
independently of unobserved circumstances.
If one argues that all e¤ort variables are not exogenous in the sense that they
vary over time (at least to some extent), then  given the time period is long
enough all time-constant unobserved heterogeneity is attributable to exogenous
circumstances. Furthermore, assuming that no circumstance variables were ob-
servable, all circumstances were accounted for by the individual specic unit-e¤ect
ci.:
ln(wit) = Eit + ci + ut + "it (5.2.11)
As data limitations do not allow us to look at the whole earnings history of
individuals, of course, we cannot be sure that there are no unobserved e¤ects
in ci, which might rather be attributed to e¤ort, such as long-term motivation
and work e¤ort. As this cannot be ruled out, we argue that the time-constant
unobserved heterogeneity ci is the maximum amount of circumstance variables
which an individual might not be held responsible for.94 Estimating equation
(5.2.11) by a simple FE model with period dummies then yields estimates for c^i:
c^i = wi  
X
^
FE
k xik   "i (5.2.12)
We use this estimate of the person e¤ect as an indicator for the maximum value
of time-constant circumstances which an individual should not be held responsible
as by denition, it comprises all exogenous circumstances as well as some not
changing e¤ort variables. Thus, this regression can be regarded as a pre-stage for
estimating our nal model of interest, where we use c^i as a circumstance variable
which includes all unobservable and observable (which we treat as unobserved)
time-constant circumstances of an individual.
When estimating our model of interest we go back to a cross-sectional setting
and use the annual earnings ln(wis) of time point s (with s 6= t) as depend-
ent variable (identical with the lower bound estimation) and simply estimate the
94Note that the estimation of the unit-e¤ect relies on the consistent estimation of coe¢ cients
in the FE model. Omitting any e¤ort variables that interact with circumstances biases our
results upwards, emphasizing that we should interpret our results as upper bounds of IOp.
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reduced-form (bivariate) model:
ln(wis) =  c^i + is (5.2.13)
Again, as in the lower bound case, we construct a parametric estimate of the
smoothed distribution by replacing individual earnings by their predictions:
eUB = exp[b c^i + 2=2] (5.2.14)
Based on these predicted counterfactual levels, we derive upper bound measures
of IOp, by inserting (5.2.14) into (5.2.3) for the upper bound IOp level and into
(5.2.4) for the upper bound IOp share in total inequality. Again, as our estimated
circumstance variable includes all observed and unobserved time-constant charac-
teristics of an individual which might have an inuence on earnings, these measures
can be interpreted as upper bound estimates of IOp. Thus, by accounting for un-
observed circumstances and observed circumstances, we are able to estimate lower
and upper bounds of IOL and can identify a reasonable range for the true values
of IOp.
Ex-ante vs. ex-post upper and lower bounds for e¤ort inequality
In the (empirical) EOp literature, two di¤erent approaches have been used to
estimate IOp (see, e.g., Fleurbaey and Peragine (2009)): ex-ante vs. ex-post. The
(lower-bound) IOp shares from the ex-ante approach are smaller than the IOp
shares from the ex-post approach (Checchi et al. (2010)). The di¤erence between
the two approaches can be explained with how unobserved factors are treated.
Almås (2008) argues that the ex-ante approach treats the unexplained variation
as an responsibility variable and hence gives a lower bound, whereas the ex-post
approach, in contrast, treats it as a circumstance which would give an upper bound.
This, however, is only true for a given set of (observed) circumstances. Dening
the upper bound as in our case (observed vs. unobserved circumstances), gives
lower and upper bounds both for the ex-ante and ex-post approaches.95
95The fact that the ex-post approach gives lower bounds only is also discussed by Aaberge
and Colombino (2011) who estimate optimal income tax rules using di¤erent social welfare
functions (SWF). They recognize that for the (ex-post) EOp approach "[...] there might be
other exogenous factors that a¤ect individualsachievements" which are not captured by the
observed circumstances. Hence, the within-type distribution of income might still depend on
unobserved circumstances. Their solution is using an inequality measure based on an extended
EOp-SWFwhich (partially) accounts for the within-type inequality. Applying this approach
in our setting yields an intermediate case with an IOp measure between the lower and the
upper bound.
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The ex-ante (lower bound) approach di¤erentiates between inequality due to
observed circumstances vs. residual inequality which is assigned to e¤ort. This
gives a lower bound for IOp as described above and hence an upper bound for
e¤ort inequality. Our (ex-ante) upper bound for circumstance inequality is also a
lower bound for e¤ort inequality, as the unobserved (not changing) residual e¤ort
is picked up by the circumstance IOp in this case.
While the ex-ante approach focuses on measuring inequality between types
(individuals with the same circumstances), the ex-post approach looks at inequal-
ity within tranches of individuals, i.e. people at the same quantile of the ef-
fort/outcome distribution with di¤erent circumstances. Due to practical reasons,
however, the number of circumstances which are incorporated in the analysis is
limited to a small number of types (e.g. three types according to fathers educa-
tion). By doing this, the residual is implicitly assigned to IOp. This is, however,
not an upper bound as adding another circumstances variable in this setting can
still increase the contribution of explained variance due to circumstances. It is
straightforward to apply our method for an upper bound of IOp to the ex-post
setting as well by dening types based on the unit e¤ect. In the extreme case that
everybody is his/her own type, the upper bound of IOp equals outcome inequal-
ity, i.e. the share is 100%. In our empirical application, we focus on the ex-ante
approach due to practical reasons and data limitations.96
5.3 Data
We use the Cross-National Equivalent Files (CNEF) of the SOEP for Germany
and the PSID for the US for our estimations. The CNEF contains harmonized
data from the respective national panel surveys. The SOEP is a representative
panel study of households and individuals in Germany that has been conducted
annually since 1984.97 We use information from all available waves from the SOEP
from 1984 until 2009 (since 1991 also including East Germany). The PSID began
in 1968 (since 1997 only biennially) and the most current wave is from 2007. In
our analysis we use information from 1981 onwards, since specic information on
96In our application, we have more than 500 types for the lower bound approach. In order
to apply the ex-post approach based on percentiles of the earnings distribution, we would
need at least 100 observations per cell, i.e. in total more than 50,000 observations per year.
Unfortunately, we do not have access to such a large panel data set.
97A detailed overview of the SOEP is provided by Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2003) and Wag-
ner et al. (2007). Issues concerning sampling and weighting methods or the imputation of
information in case of item or unit non-response is well documented by the SOEP Service
Group.
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the occupation and industry of the individual is not available in previous PSID
waves.98
In line with the previous literature, the units of our analysis are individuals
aged 25-55 who are in (part- or full-time) employment. The dependent variables
are logarithmic real (annual or permanent) labor earnings, adjusted by consumer
prices indices. Inequality measures are based on the corresponding absolute levels
of earnings. To derive satisfying estimates of the unit-e¤ect, a long time period is
needed. Consequently, we base our analysis only on those individuals who report
positive earnings for at least ve subsequent points in time.99 We further restrict
our sample to individuals with data on parental background.
We rst estimate lower bounds of IOp by using either log annual earnings of
the most current wave (2009 for Germany, 2007 for the US) or log permanent
incomes proxied by average real earnings over the whole period.100 In a second
set of estimations, we rely on permanent log earnings which are computed as the
individuals mean income over the observation period.
As circumstance variables, we include gender, a dummy whether the individual
was born in a foreign country, categorical variables of the occupation and education
of the father, the degree of urbanization of the place where the individual was born
as well as the height and year of birth of the individual. In the case of Germany,
we include a dummy if the individual was born in East Germany, and for the
US we include a corresponding dummy whether the individual was born in the
South. Additionally, we include a variable for the US which indicates the race of
the individual. Summary statistics on the mean annual earnings and all employed
circumstance variables are illustrated in Table 5.7.1 in the Appendix.
In our longitudinal xed e¤ects earnings regressions, we include as e¤ort vari-
ables weekly working hours, age-standardized experience, individuals education
in years, as well as industry dummies. We term these variables e¤ort variables
since they can be a¤ected by responsible individual choices. In the case that these
variables do not vary over time, they are included in the xed e¤ect and hence
counted as a circumstances. This is why the FE model gives an upper bound for
IOp. Summary statistics of these variables are illustrated in Table 5.7.2 in the
Appendix.
98Note that the income reference period in both surveys is the year before the interview. Hence,
we actually cover the period 1983 until 2008 for Germany and 1981 until 2006 for the US.
99This is a rather arbitrary restriction. However, as our robustness checks show the number of
time points does not qualitatively change the results.
100In principle, it would be possible to compute more sophisticated measures of permanent income
as, e.g., recently proposed by Aaberge et al. (2011).
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5.4 Empirical results
5.4.1 Estimation of earnings equations
Derivation of lower bound of IOp The rst step of our analysis is the
estimation of the log earnings equation (5.2.7) for the most current survey wave
(Germany: SOEP 2009; US: PSID 2007) on all observable circumstances which
are expected to have an impact on individual labor earnings. The results of these
reduced-form OLS regressions are illustrated in Table 5.7.4 in the Appendix. The
specications in the rst column are based on the whole sample, in the second and
third columns the sample is restricted to male and female individuals, respectively.
The rst set of regressions for each country is based on periodical incomes, the
second set on permanent incomes.
The rst column for each set shows that women have signicantly lower labor
earnings than men in all specications the well-known gender wage gap, with val-
ues around 50%. A large fraction of the earnings di¤erence is due to the fact that
women are more likely to be employed in part-time employment. However, the
e¤ect is still negative and signicant when only looking at full-time employed (res-
ult available upon request), implying that there are further negative opportunities
for women.
The e¤ect of being born in a foreign country is negative and signicant in
Germany. In the US, being non-whitereveals an earnings decreasing e¤ect for
permanent incomes but not for annual incomes.101 Being born in a disadvantaged
region is related to signicantly lower earnings in both countries. In Germany, the
e¤ect is more pronounced in the male subsample, whereas in the US, this is the
case in the female subsample. Individuals who were born in a larger city have on
average larger earnings than individuals who grew up in the countryside.
The regressions also reveal that the education of the father matters for the
acquisition of individual earnings. If the father has an upper secondary (college)
education, the childrens wages are signicantly higher in both countries. Accord-
ingly, the occupational status of the father also matters in both countries. If the
father was occupied as a white-collar worker or as a professional rather than in
blue-collar professions, this is associated with signicantly higher earnings in Ger-
many. In the US, a self-employed father seems to be particularly favorable for the
earnings acquisition of their children.
101The non-e¤ectof race for periodical incomes might be explained with the fact that blacks
are more likely to be out of the labor force or even in prison, which leads to underestimated
racial wage gaps in cross-sectional data (Chandra (2000)).
112 CHAPTER 5. INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
As expected, later born (i.e. younger) individuals have smaller earnings. Here
the e¤ect is more robust in Germany. The same is true for body height, which
has a substantial positive impact in all specications in Germany. Interestingly,
in the US this e¤ect is only evident in the male subsample. Overall, the observed
circumstances can explain up to 26.3% of the overall variation in log earnings in
Germany, and up to 29.5% in the US. In a world of equal opportunities, these
exogenous circumstances should actually have no e¤ect on earnings hinting that
at least some degree of IOp exists in both countries.
Derivation of upper bound of IOp To derive upper bounds of IOp, the
rst step is the FE estimation of the earnings equation (5.2.11) on the observable
time-varying e¤ort variables. Table 5.7.5 in the Appendix presents the results.
Again, we run separate regressions for periodical and permanent income as well as
men and women. Overall, the models explain up to 42% of the within-variation
of real earnings in Germany and up to 36% in the US. The unexplained part is a
rst hint for the existence (and size) of the upper bound IOp.
In Germany, we nd a clear non-linear relationship between age-standardized
experience and earnings in almost all specications with the exception of the male
subsample in the US. Not surprisingly, working hours have a signicant positive
impact on earnings in both countries and the e¤ect is robust across all specica-
tions. The same is true for education. With regard to the industry dummies, in
both countries, an occupation in the energy and mining, manufacturing, construc-
tion, transportation, nancial (only in the US) and health sector is associated with
higher earnings than if you are employed in the public sector (reference).
5.4.2 Lower and upper bounds of IOp
In the next step, the coe¢ cients of the reduced-form OLS regression (5.2.7) are
used to predict counterfactual advantage levels eLB in annual earnings which are
only due to di¤erences in circumstances. Thus, if there were an absolute EOp,
all predicted advantage levels eLB would be exactly the same. This smoothed
distribution eLB is then used to compute the lower bound IOp measures.
The upper bound measures are derived from the FE model. Based on the
rst-stage FE wage regressions, we predict the unit-e¤ects for all individuals, as
suggested by equation (5.2.12). In the next step, we use these indicators of the
maximum amount of circumstances c^i as independent variables to estimate equa-
tion (5.2.13). Now, the dependent variable are the individuals logarithmic labor
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earnings in 2009 (2007) for Germany (the US). The coe¢ cients of this OLS re-
gression are then used to predict counterfactual advantage levels eUB in annual
earnings which are only due to di¤erences in the unobserved heterogeneity.
The MLD for inequality in outcomes (total bar) as well as the counterfactual
smoothed distributions for the lower (dark grey) and upper (medium grey) bounds
are presented in Figure 5.4.1. Inequality in periodical (permanent) incomes is
reported in the upper (lower) panel both for the US and Germany for the full
sample as well as separated by gender. Furthermore, for each subgroup, the left
bar is based on gross earnings whereas the right bar is based on net earnings.
Inequality levels We start by examining annual labor earnings (upper panel).
Our results reveal a MLD of 0.26 (0.21) for Germany and 0.35 (0.29) in the US for
gross (net) earnings. Not surprisingly, redistribution reduces outcome inequality
in both countries and in all samples. Inequality of outcomes is substantially larger
in the US than in Germany in all samples, which is in line with previous ndings.
In Germany, the inequality in earnings is substantially smaller (higher) if we look
at the male (female) sample separately. This indicates that men are more likely
employed in full-time jobs and thus earnings are distributed more homogenously
than across women which have a much higher variation in hours worked. In the
US, the outcome inequality levels are similar in the male and female subsamples.
Inequality in permanent incomes is substantially lower in the US than inequality
in annual incomes. In Germany, this is only the case for the female subsample
whereas the decrease is rather small for the full sample which could hint at lower
income mobility in Germany (van Kerm (2004)). Therefore, inequality in perman-
ent incomes is surprisingly similar between Germany and the US.
The lower bound IOp estimations control for a full range of observed circum-
stance variables such as gender, country and region of origin, height as well as
fathers education and occupation. Based on annual incomes, the MLD levels
are rather similar between Germany (0.07) and the US (0.06) for the full samples.
However, the di¤erence is statistically signicant as suggested by the bootstrapped
condence intervals in Table 5.7.3 in the Appendix. Redistribution has only a small
e¤ect on the lower bounds in both countries. When looking at the male and fe-
male subsamples separately, the IOp levels decrease. This is a rst indication that
gender is an important (observed) circumstance and in line with the large male-
female wage gap found in Table 5.7.4. The results for permanent incomes are
almost identical suggesting no great di¤erence between the two income concepts
in terms of (lower bound) IOp levels.
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Figure 5.4.1: Upper and lower bound indices of IOp
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP and PSID. The two graphs on the top illustrate IOp levels in annual
incomes (2009 for Germany, 2007 for the US); the graphs at the bottom IOp levels in permanent incomes.
The upper bound IOp levels are also rather similar for annual income in all
samples in both countries. With MLD values of 0.12 for both countries in the full
sample, the IOp levels are signicantly (and about two times) larger than the lower
bound estimates that control for a comprehensive set of observed circumstances.
Again, we interpret these numbers as upper bounds of IOp, since they represent
all constant characteristics of an individual which may have an impact on labor
earnings.102 When looking at permanent incomes, the pictures changes. The IOp
level is similar to annual incomes only for Germany in the full sample and the male
subsample. When looking at the female subsample separately as well as in all US
samples, the IOp levels increase signicantly.
IOp shares In order to get a feeling for the relative importance of IOp, Figure
5.4.2 presents the range for IOp shares, i.e. the IOp levels divided by the MLD for
outcome inequality (between group inequality as fraction of total inequality). The
102It should be noted that the upper bounds of IOp decrease if we, e.g., add the marital status or
the number of children in the FE wage regressions, which can be expected to have an indirect
impact on annual earnings. This provides additional evidence that our results can indeed be
interpreted as upper bounds of IOp.
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upper (lower) line corresponds to the upper (lower) bound share. Again, results
are presented for periodical (permanent) incomes in the upper (lower) panel both
for the US and Germany for the full sample as well as separated by gender for
gross (left, darker bar) and net (right, lighter bar) earnings.
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Figure 5.4.2: IOp shares in outcome inequality
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP and PSID. The two graphs on the top illustrate IOp shares in annual
incomes (2009 for Germany, 2007 for the US); the graphs at the bottom IOp shares in permanent incomes.
The IOp shares are signicantly higher for Germany than for the US for annual
incomes, which is due to lower absolute levels of outcome inequality while having
similar values of IOp which is in line with the ndings of Almås (2008). The
lower bound shares equal 30% in Germany and 16% in the US  the latter is
comparable to previous ndings (Pistolesi (2009)). Based on these results, it would
be possible to deduce that individual earnings are mainly driven by individuals
e¤ort choices and only to a lesser extent by circumstances. Our upper bound
estimates, however, suggest that earnings are to a larger extent pre-determined by
exogenous circumstances. We nd upper bounds of IOp of around 50% in Germany
and 35% in the US. The di¤erences are statistically signicant.
Thus, it seems that there is substantially less IOp in the US compared to
Germany, i.e. one could conclude that equality of opportunity is higher in the
"land of opportunities". However, using permanent instead of annual incomes
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matters for inequality levels, especially in the US, where IOp levels are much
higher for permanent incomes (comparable to the ndings of Pistolesi (2009)). In
Germany, the di¤erence between inequality levels for the two income concepts is
much smaller. Therefore, inequality levels (and hence the IOp shares) are similar
for both income concepts. Hence, the IOp shares for permanent incomes are higher
in the US than in Germany.
Again, the lower bound IOp shares are substantially smaller when we look
at the female and male sample separately. This again hints at gender as an im-
portant source of IOp. However, the e¤ect is not as strong for the upper bounds
based on the unit-e¤ect as circumstance variable. This indicates that a large share
of the inequality in outcomes can be explained by unobserved heterogeneity of
individuals.
Gross vs. net incomes We nd that the di¤erences between gross and net
income inequality, i.e. the redistributive e¤ects of the tax benet systems, are
rather similar between Germany and the US. This might be surprising at a rst
glance, since European welfare states are usually said to be more redistributive.
But in our exercise, as we focus on the working age population, this is not the
case. The main di¤erence in redistribution between Germany and the US is due
to benets (especially for the unemployed) and not due to the progressivity of the
income tax which is rather similar in both countries. In our sample, we focus on
individuals who are working. They pay taxes and receive almost no benets 
except for child credits which are comparable between both countries. Hence, the
redistributive e¤ects for this subgroup of the population is rather similar between
Germany and the US.
5.5 Discussion of results
5.5.1 Explainingthe results
Annual vs. permanent incomes The result that IOp in permanent in-
comes in the US is much higher than for annual incomes which is not the case
for Germany, might be explained by di¤erent mobility patterns between both
countries. In general, mobility is higher in the US (van Kerm (2004)). How-
ever, in the US much higher persistence and hence lower mobility compared to
European countries is observed at the tails of the distribution (Björklund and
Jäntti (2009)). Whereas in countries like Germany, mobility is on average lower, it
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is more equally spread across the distribution. In the US, in contrast, there is much
higher mobility in the middle, but, compared to other countries, the probability
for the poor (rich) to make it to the top (bottom) is much lower. This persistence
of inequality at the tails of the distribution might help to explain IOp levels in
permanent incomes are much higher in the US, i.e. the rags-to-riches story is less
common than usually thought, as it has been shown that IOp is generally higher
at the tails (Aaberge et al. (2011)).
Gross vs. net incomes We have seen that there is basically no di¤erence
between the IOp shares between gross and net earnings in both countries. This
does not imply that policy does not matter in contrast, the IOp levels are con-
siderably lower in both countries. However, the results indicate that there is no
di¤erential e¤ect of the tax benet system in our sample. This is not surprising
for two reasons. First, tagging, i.e. the use of exogenous circumstance information
to determine tax liabilities and benet eligibility, is usually not explicitly used in
existing tax benet systems due to anti-discrimination laws. Second, we focus on
the working population between 25-55. These individually usually pay taxes but
receive little benets in both countries. Implicit tagging, i.e. designing rules and
conditions such that individual with certain circumstances are more likely to be
eligible for it, is much less common in the tax system than for benets. Hence,
one would expect that existing tax benet systems do not account for the source
of inequalities whether equitable (due to e¤ort) or not (due to circumstances) 
when redistributing income. Therefore, in order to improve the fairness (and e¢ -
ciency) of the redistributive system, tagging on circumstances has to be increased
(Ooghe and Peichl (2010)).
Policy simulation As we have seen, gender di¤erences play an important
role for the EOp gap. Most of it was due to the indirect e¤ect that women tend
to work fewer hours. Part of this is due to the tax benet rules  especially
the system of joint taxation which yields high marginal tax rates for the second
earner usually the wife. Based on IZAs behavioral microsimulation model for
the German tax and transfer system (IZA	MOD, see Peichl et al. (2010) for an
overview), we simulate the abolishment of the joint taxation system in Germany
by introducing pure individual taxation to illustrate the importance of policy for
the extent of EOp.
The abolishment of joint taxation increases (decreases) married womens (mens)
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labor supply.103 When looking at the resulting IOp levels, we nd that this policy
change indeed leads to lower IOp (the upper and lower bound indices decrease
by more than 10% each). Given the fact that this policy a¤ects only married
couples and that we focus on the intensive margin, this reduction is quite sub-
stantial. Furthermore, this policy is also associated with higher tax revenue which
could be used to promote child care policies to further increase female labor force
participation and reduce IOp.
5.5.2 Robustness checks
Di¤erent inequality measures Although the other measures from the GE
family violate the path-independent decomposability axiom, it is still insightful
to see that the results are not driven by the choice of MLD which can be seen
in Figure 5.5.1. For both, Germany and the US, the resulting lower and upper
bound IOp shares of the MLD compared to the Theil (1) index (GE(1)) are very
similar. With respect to the half squared coe¢ cient of variation (GE(2)), which
is particularly sensitive to changes at the top of the income distribution, we do
observe some di¤erences. Using this inequality measure generally leads to lower
IOp shares in all samples. The di¤erences are more pronounced in the US than in
Germany, and the range of IOp shares particularly decreases in the case of annual
incomes.
Di¤erent samples In order to further check the sensitivity of our results,
we examine di¤erent samples. The results are illustrated in Table 5.5.1. First, we
restrict our sample to full-time employed individuals. For Germany, this leads to
a decrease of the lower bound share of IOp of almost ten percentage points. This
substantial decrease may be explained by the less explanatory power of the gender
dummy when only looking at full-time employed individuals. The upper bound
increases, on the other hand. For the US, the results remain fairly similar to those
in the baseline sample. Thus, the qualitative di¤erences between Germany and the
US remain. Note, however, that the sample size are substantially smaller than in
the baseline estimations. When we restrict our sample to prime-aged 30-45 aged
individuals, the results are very similar as those in the baseline estimations, except
for the US where we nd a substantial increase in the upper bound IOp share.
103The largest e¤ect of the policy change can be observed at the extensive margin, which is not
relevant in our case since we only look at individuals who are already working. However,
we can also observe labor supply e¤ects at the intensive margin which then lead to di¤erent
individual earning outcomes for married couples.
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Figure 5.5.1: IOp shares in outcome inequality for di¤erent inequality measures
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP and PSID. The two graphs on the top illustrate IOp shares in annual
incomes (2009 for Germany, 2007 for the US); the graphs at the bottom IOp shares in permanent incomes.
In our baseline estimations we derive the unit-e¤ect based on observations from
unbalanced panels. Thus, we also run estimations which we base on balanced
panels over a time period of ten years. The results for the most current balanced
panel are very similar as our baseline results. For Germany, however, we nd a
considerable decrease of the upper bound for the previous time period, whereas in
the US the upper bound share is larger when looking at the earlier time period.
Finally, we also test the responsiveness of our results with respect to sample
selection due to missing values in circumstances variables. As expected, the lower
bound decreases when reducing the circumstance set. In line with our model
the results for the upper bound IOp shares remain very stable and are therefore
independent of the circumstances set.
5.5.3 The role of luck
So far, we have assumed that luck belongs to the sphere of individual responsibility.
In the (philosophical) debate about whether luck should be compensated or not,
a distinction is made between brute luckon the one hand and option luckon
the other. The former is a random shock not associated with any (e¤ort-related)
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Germany US
Annual Permanent Annual Permanent
N LB UB N LB UB N LB UB N LB UB
Baseline 3,410 28.2 47.3 7,632 29.0 56.6 1,293 16.3 33.5 7,081 30.2 70.0
Full-time employed only 1,894 19.1 67.9 5034 21.8 72.7 590 15.4 32.9 4,539 26.7 55.5
Age range 30-45 only 1,364 29.5 56.7 4,767 35.0 71.5 375 22.3 46.3 5,199 30.1 79.7
Balanced-panel 10 years
2008-1999 (2005-1992) 1,327 27.3 63.6 1,503 31.1 78.6 859 19.1 44.6 1,498 40.2 76.0
1998-1989 (1991-1982) 841 33.1 43.8 889 38.9 60.0 1,704 20.1 52.9 2,427 33.5 86.7
Missing values circumstance variables
Without fathers occ. 3,856 26.0 48.5 9,296 28.9 55.1 1,475 14.8 31.3 8,026 28.1 69.2
Without fathers occ., 4,091 23.9 45.8 9,801 26.0 52.3 1,634 14.2 32.1 8,938 24.8 68.4
region, ethnicity, urbanity
Only gender, birth, height 4,633 20.6 45.2 11,273 22.8 52.1 1,741 9.7 32.2 9,850 18.4 67.1
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP and PSID. N illustrates the underlying number of observations, LB
(UB) the lower (upper) bound IOp share. Year intervals without (with) brackets indicate time periods for
Germany (the US). All robustness checks rely on log gross earnings as dependent variables.
Table 5.5.1: Sensitivity analysis
choices (e.g. being struck by a lightning), whereas the latter is a consequence
of a choice (e.g. winning or losing money while gambling) and should not be
compensated. Hence, by neglecting (brute) luck, we (implicitly) assumed that
all individual shocks are option luck, which was reasonable since our empirical
analysis was mainly meant to illustrate the di¤erence between lower and upper
bound estimates.
Additionally accounting for brute luck gives the trueupper bound. However,
the empirical identication of the two forms of luck is not straightforward. Non-
etheless, our approach of estimating an upper bound can be extended following
Lefranc et al. (2009). In order to illustrate this, and as a further robustness check,
we now assume that all unobserved factors are non-responsibility characteristics,
i.e. brute luck. Hence, we modify equation (5.2.13) in the following way in order
to separate the e¤ect of observed e¤ort variables and unobserved factors:
ln(wis) =  c^i + Eis + is (5.5.1)
We then construct a parametric estimate of the smoothed distribution explicitly
taking into account the error term is :
eUB;L = exp[b c^i + bis + 2=2] (5.5.2)
Based on these predicted counterfactual levels, we then derive new upper bound
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measures of IOp taking into account luck. This gives an upper upper bound
estimate of IOp as we do not only capture time-constant e¤ort (in the unit e¤ect)
but also unobserved e¤ort as well as option luck in the error term. The results are
illustrated in Figure 5.5.2. The darker grey bar line shows the range between the
lower and upper bound as previously dened, whereas the upper, lighter grey line
shows the di¤erence to the upper bound when additionally accounting for luck.
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Figure 5.5.2: Upper and lower bounds of IOp when accounting for luck
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP and PSID.
When accounting for luck, the upper bound does not change much in the
German data for the full sample and the female subsample. The change is higher
for the male subsample as well as in the US data for all samples. These results
point toward a higher importance of unobserved e¤ort or indeed luck in the cases
where the luck-adjusted upper bound is much higher. The results for the US are
also much more in line with the ndings for permanent incomes, where we found
higher upper bound IOp shares for the US than for Germany.
To sum up, our approach of estimating an upper bound does not depend on
the assumption about the responsibility cut for luck. With the appropriate data
and identication strategy that would allow for separating brute luck from option
luck, it would be possible to estimate the trueupper bound.
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5.6 Conclusion
The existing literature on EOp provides only lower bound estimates of IOp. We
suggest a two-stage estimator based on a xed e¤ects model to tackle this issue.
The maximum amount of circumstances which an individual should not be held
responsible is the persons xed e¤ect, as by denition, it comprises all exogenous
circumstances as well as some not changing e¤ort variables. Using this unit e¤ect as
a circumstance measure enables us to quantify the maximum amount of inequality
which can be attributed to IOp. We apply the method to a rich set of harmonized
micro-level panel data for Germany and the US in order to empirically illustrate
our new estimator and to compare it to the well-known lower bound.
The IOp levels are rather similar between Germany and the US in terms of the
lower and upper bounds for annual incomes and the lower bound for permanent
incomes. For the latter, the upper bound levels are higher in the US than in
Germany. The IOp shares are higher for Germany (30-50%) than for the US (16-
35%) for annual incomes which is due to lower absolute levels of outcome inequality
while having similar values of IOp. This result might help to explain why attitudes
toward inequality and redistribution di¤er substantially between both countries
(Figure 5.7.1 in the Appendix). Contrary to Germany, the majority of respondents
in the US thinks that larger income di¤erences are necessary as incentives, while
40% of the respondents think that the most important reason why people live in
need is laziness the numbers are only half as high in Germany. However, when
moving to a measure of permanent income, we nd larger (lower and upper bound)
IOp shares for the US, which increase to 30% and 70% respectively. However, we
do not nd a substantial increase for Germany. We explain this di¤erence with
di¤erent degrees of mobility and persistence in di¤erent parts of the distribution
(Björklund and Jäntti (2009)). The persistence of inequality at the tails of the
distribution suggests that the rags-to-riches (or vice versa) story is less common
than usually thought.
To sum up, we nd signicant and robust di¤erences between lower and upper
bound estimates for both countries for all specications. At a rst sight, the high
IOp shares for the upper bound might seem surprising. However, it should be
noted that our estimate of unobserved heterogeneity also includes all unobserved
abilities and innate talent. This is in line with Björklund et al. (2011), who indicate
that the intelligence quotient (IQ) is the most important circumstance among
the variables that they consider to explain di¤erences in earnings. In addition,
results from the literature on sibling correlations also emphasize the importance
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of family background and genetic material (Solon (1999), Björklund et al. (2009)).
Furthermore, recent results from the literature on the e¤ect of human capital on
wage dispersion show that individual characteristics (e.g. Bagger et al. (2010))
as well as initial conditions (e.g. Hugget et al. (2011)) account for most of the
variation in annual as well as lifetime earnings. Although we do not claim that our
upper bound estimates present the true amount of IOp, they provide evidence that
the existing lower bound estimates substantially underestimate IOp and thus might
demand for too little redistribution to equalize inequalities due to circumstances.
Our results also reveal the importance of gender as one driving force of IOp.
The e¤ect of gender is considerably smaller when only looking at full-time employed
individuals. Thus, the gender opportunity gap is mainly due to the indirect e¤ect of
gender on earnings: women are more likely employed in part-time jobs. Introducing
a policy change which is likely to increase female labor supply such as the move
from joint to individual taxation indeed reduces the IOp bounds by about two
percentage points. This suggests that policies can be a useful tool to change IOp 
and also that existing policies might actually increase IOp. It would be interesting
to analyze the e¤ect of tax systems that are based on exogenous characteristics
(Ooghe and Peichl (2010)) on IOp in future research.
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Figure 5.7.1: Attitudes towards inequality and redistribution
Source: Own calculations based on WVS.
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Chapter 6
Concluding remarks
We started the book with the empirical observation that over the last three dec-
ades, income inequality has increased considerably in most developed welfare
states. Therefore, redistributive policies are high on the political agenda. From a
policy perspective, the correct assessment of the redistributive e¤ects of taxes and
benets is important for developing an e¤ective redistributive policy mix. The
aim of the book was to contribute to the understanding and measurement of the
redistributive e¤ects of national tax benet systems.
Chapter 2 analyzed the redistributive e¤ects of di¤erent tax benet instru-
ments in the enlarged EU based on two di¤erent approaches. It showed that
di¤erent measurement approaches might lead to very di¤erent results. However,
cross-country groupings with respect to the redistributive capacities of tax bene-
t instruments remain fairly robust regardless of which approach is used. The
analysis revealed the relative positions of the new EU member states among the
well-established welfare states from Western Europe, thereby identifying the cur-
rent state of social cohesion in the enlarged EU.
Based on di¤erent political economy theories, in Chapter 3, we deduced our
hypothesis of substitution, meaning that the redistributive capacities of taxes and
benets become empirical substitutes. We found clearly divergent trends for Ger-
many and the United Kingdom. While for Germany there is some evidence that
increasingly regressive taxes are accompanied by larger redistributive benets, we
do not observe this structural change in the United Kingdom. The ndings hint
at the importance of political institutions and indicate that the political will for
redistributive policies might di¤er substantially between the two countries.
Chapter 4 provided a multivariate analysis of the e¤ect of social spending
policies and di¤erent benet functions on income inequality. By using some pre-
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sumably exogenous variation in social spending levels as an instrument, we sought
to identify causal e¤ects. While the analysis revealed a robust inequality-reducing
e¤ect of social spending generosity, more means testing does not result in reduc-
tions of income inequality. In fact, more low-income targeting reveals a positive
e¤ect on pre-government income inequality, indicating the importance of second-
order disincentive e¤ects.
Chapter 5 distinguished between inequality of outcomes and inequality of op-
portunity. We nd that the unobservability of some relevant circumstances might
lead to an underestimation of inequality of opportunity and might thus demand for
too little redistribution. Also, opportunities are more equal in the United States
than in Germany. Therefore, distinguishing between fair and unfair inequalities
might help to explain di¤erent attitudes toward inequality and redistribution in
di¤erent countries.
The following statements summarize the main ndings of the four analyses
and discuss their policy implications. Finally, we also outline directions for further
research.
The choice of the measurement approach matters. The rst analysis
showed that it is absolutely necessary to understand the normative assumptions
of the measurement methods applied; otherwise citizens or policy makers might
draw the wrong conclusions about the redistributive capacities of the tax benet
system. While the factor source decomposition method is suitable for learning
more about the objectives of di¤erent tax benet instruments, the sequential ac-
counting approach is more appropriate for assessing the e¤ective impact on income
inequality. In fact, the factor source decomposition approach might underestimate
the e¤ective equalizing impact of benets that are not dependent on recipients
income.
Indirect taxes have to be taken into account. Due to data limitations,
most studies on income redistribution do not consider the distributional impact
of indirect taxes. However, we found that the inclusion of indirect taxes might
even absorb the progressive e¤ects of income taxation. Studies that do not con-
sider indirect taxes might severely overestimate the redistributive e¤ects of scal
policies and might thus fail to represent the true structure of the welfare state.
Unfortunately, so far, comparable micro data on indirect taxes or expenditures is
rare. We hope that our analysis serves as motivation for collecting and publishing
such data in the future.
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Second-order e¤ects can be important. Due to second-order e¤ects,
identied redistributive e¤ects at the micro level do not necessarily result in equal-
izing e¤ects at the macro level. Indeed, we found that means-tested benets, which
reveal highly equalizing e¤ects at the micro level, do not reduce income inequal-
ity at the macro level. In contrast, means testing is associated with higher pre-
government income inequality, hinting at substantial second-order e¤ects. These
ndings have important implications for the design of public policies. While the
size of the social budget e¤ectively reduces income inequality, more low-income
targeting might be associated with undesirable e¤ects on the pre-government dis-
tribution of incomes. Therefore, possible behavioral e¤ects should be taken into
account when designing redistributive policies.
Tax benet systems equalize outcomes, but not opportunities. People
have di¤erent attitudes toward inequality and redistribution, depending on whether
di¤erences in incomes are due to e¤ort or exogenous circumstances. Therefore,
distinguishing between unequal outcomes and unequal opportunities is important,
particularly when assessing the impact of public policies. Our analysis showed
that in the cases of Germany and the United States, the tax benet system has
no di¤erential e¤ect on unequal opportunity among the working population. In
fact, we found that existing policies might even increase inequality of opportunity.
Abolishing the joint taxation system in Germany increases equal opportunity in
terms of gender by increasing the female labor supply. Thus, we identify policies as
a useful tool to decrease unequal opportunities. However, so far, existing policies
do not di¤erentiate between fair and unfair inequalities. Therefore, in the future,
policymakers might consider more tagging on circumstances to support the fairness
of redistributive policies.
Overall, we addressed several open research questions around the measurement
of the redistributive capacities of welfare states. We analyzed di¤erent measure-
ment methods, included indirect taxes, and discussed possible second-order e¤ects.
We also referred to di¤erent principles of distributive justice by considering varying
inequality concepts. However, primarily due to data limitations, some problems
with respect to the analysis of redistributive e¤ects remained unsolved. For ex-
ample, throughout the book, we did not consider lifetime earnings. Therefore, we
were not able to separate redistribution from rich to poor from pure redistribution
over the life cycle. The separation of these e¤ects should be subject of future
research. Also, in Chapter 4, we revealed the importance of second-order e¤ects
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induced by redistributive policies. However, so far, the analysis is restricted to
labor market-related incentive e¤ects, although other behavioral responses might
be equally important. In fact, further analyses of the incentive e¤ects induced by
di¤erent redistributive policies might also be an interesting task for future research,
specically distinguishing the incentive e¤ects related to opportunity equalizing
policies from those induced by outcome equalizing policies.
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